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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the implementation of anti-social behaviour (ASB) tools and powers 
in England and Wales. The main focus of this thesis is to assess how the 2014 
amendments to the ASB regime have been implemented and to explore whether this 
resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. Although, in theory, 
the rationale underpinning these measures (such as the Part 1 injunction) is the prevention 
of further ASB, the ambiguous drafting of the relevant legislation in conjunction with the 
significant degree of discretion granted to local enforcement agents appear to allow for 
the imposition of sanctions akin to criminal punishment. Central to this thesis is the 
assumption that despite the preventive nature of these measures, it is essential to look 
beyond the official classification of legal rules (ie, ASB rules as non-criminal) and 
investigate how these have been implemented in practice. To achieve this, a working 
definition of criminalisation is formulated in order to determine whether the rules in 
question should be regarded as criminal or non-criminal. 
The theoretical analysis of criminalisation and of the relevant legislation relating 
to ASB was complemented by empirical data collected through twenty-nine interviews in 
two counties in England. As part of the empirical study, semi-structured interviews with 
local practitioners and police officers were conducted.  
   The findings of this research do not only shed light on the implementation of 
the 2014 amendments, but they also challenge a number of preconceptions regarding 
criminalisation and the administration of ASB. This research found that in most cases the 
implementation of these measures did not result in the indirect criminalisation of ASB 
based on the working definition of criminalisation formulated in this thesis. The study 
found that although the administration of ASB is primarily risk-driven, it was also 
informed by a number of other factors, such as the need to address the underlying causes 
of the behaviour in question. However, the study also found that there was, in some cases, 
scope for the implementation of ASB measures to be used as a means of criminalisation. 
This meant that non-criminal conduct could be criminalised indirectly.  
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Introduction 
 
The criminal law does not only seek to punish those who have committed offences, but it 
also aims to prevent the commission of crime (Ashworth, 2007-2008). This preventive 
function of the criminal law is premised on the assumption that if we accept, for example, 
that the unlawful infliction of grievous bodily harm (GBH) is worth criminalising, then 
there is reason for us to prevent this from happening in the first place (Ashworth & 
Zedner, 2015). As Duff (1997) puts it, it would be morally problematic if we criminalise 
the unlawful infliction of GBH, but fail to criminalise those who attempt to inflict this 
kind of harm on others.  
Pre-emptive interventions by the criminal law are most evident in the context of 
legislation targeting terrorism related activities (Wells & Quick, 2010). A prime example 
of this is section 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 which criminalises the possession of 
any document which can facilitate the commission of an act of terrorism.1 This offence 
can be justified on the ground that, in light of the risk posed by terrorism, it would be 
unreasonable for the state not to intervene prior to the commission of a terrorism related 
activity. Pre-emptive criminalisation, therefore, ‘facilitate[s] intervention at an earlier 
stage, with no requirement that the substantive harm results at all’ (Child & Hunt, 2010: 
54). The core of the debate in this area, of course, is to identify when conduct becomes 
sufficiently proximate to a harm to warrant criminalisation in its own right.2  
Legal pre-emptive interventions in England and Wales, however, extend beyond 
the frontiers of the criminal law. This can be attributed primarily to the introduction and 
rise of the civil preventive measures. Some of the most well-known examples of these 
measures include the Anti-social Behaviour Order (ASBO) and the Control Order.3 
Similar to pre-emptive criminalisation, the impetus for the introduction of these measures 
was the prevention of certain undesirable kinds of conduct. The former, for instance, 
aimed at the prevention of ASB and the latter aimed at the prevention of terrorism-related 
activities.  
                                                             
1 For an analysis of this offence see Hodgson and Tadros (2009). 
2 For more on this debate see 2.2.3. 
3 Both of these orders have now been repealed by the new civil injunction under Part 1 of the Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 2011 
respectively.  
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In contrast with pre-emptive criminalisation, civil preventive measures formally 
lay outside the ambit of the criminal law. As Ashworth and Zedner (2010) point out, the 
main objective of these measures is not to punish people for their past wrongdoing, but 
to impose certain restrictions on their liberty in order to prevent them from engaging in 
similar activities in the future and/or causing future harm. The fact that these measures 
formally lay outside the ambit of the criminal law means that they offer more flexibility 
to law enforcement agents since they are not restrained by the same procedural and 
evidential rules that are so important to restrict criminal rules. As explained below, 
although these measures have been labelled as not criminal, in theory, they appear to 
allow for the imposition of restrictions akin to criminal punishment.4 What is, therefore, 
concerning about these restrictions is that they are imposed in the absence of the 
‘enhanced procedural protections’ guaranteed to those facing criminal prosecution 
(Henry & King, 2016).5     
Although the prevention of certain undesirable events ‘is a laudable and 
defensible role of the state’ (Ashworth & Zedner, 2015: 82), this does not necessarily 
warrant the imposition of sanctions akin to criminal punishment in the absence of the 
enhanced procedural protections. As Loader (2008: 405) maintains, as members of a 
contemporary liberal society, we should not only focus on what kinds of behaviour should 
be controlled and prevented, but we should also be mindful of ‘how we do so’ (emphasis 
in the original). For Steiker (1998), if these measures result in the imposition of criminal 
punishment, then it is essential to subject them to the same constraints and level of 
theoretical critique as criminal rules.   
The first challenge faced by legal theorists, therefore, with regard to the civil 
preventive measures, relates to the label attached to them by the legislature and whether 
these measures are indeed civil in nature. For those legal philosophers who believe that 
the label attached to a legal rule should not distract us from examining whether, in fact, 
the restrictions imposed amount to criminal punishment, it is necessary to identify the 
conditions under which these measures are truly criminal (Steiker, 1998). In cases where 
                                                             
4 I elaborate further on what qualifies as criminal punishment in 3.2. 
5 The term ‘enhanced procedural protections’ is used by Hendry and King (2016) to describe all of those 
extra procedural and evidential safeguards afforded under both domestic legislation and the European 
Convention on Human Rights to those facing criminal prosecution. For more on the importance of the 
‘enhanced procedural protections’ see ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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these conditions have been met, the next issue to be addressed relates to the legitimacy of 
this form of regulation.    
The above are some of the broader philosophical challenges posed by civil 
preventive measures in general. This thesis engages with the abovementioned challenges 
using the law relating to ASB as its primary case study. The main reason for choosing 
this area of law as a case study lies with its wide application and extensive use. In contrast 
to other civil preventive measures, such as the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (TPIMs), ASB can be more far-reaching since it can range from conduct which 
is unregulated and/or falls within the realm of everyday human interaction (e.g. noisy 
neighbours) to behaviour that already constitutes a criminal offence (e.g. criminal 
damage) (Field, 2003). This is evident from both the number6 and the diversity7 of ASB 
incidents reported and/or witnessed each year by the public.      
Anti-social behaviour in England and Wales 
Before trying to address the abovementioned philosophical issues, it is important to 
provide an overview of the law relating to ASB in order: (i) to lay the foundations for our 
discussion in the rest of this thesis; and (ii) to illustrate why it is imperative to engage 
with these issues.  
The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour 
The first major legislative attempt to tackle ASB as a specific concept was the 
introduction of the ASBO under section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (1998 
Act).8  In 2002, the post-conviction ASBO (CrASBO) was introduced as well under 
section 64 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (2002 Act).9 The ASBO constituted a ‘two-step 
criminalisation process’ where a ‘civil prohibitory order’ was issued (Simester & von 
Hirsch, 2001: 213); and breach of the order without any reasonable excuse constituted a 
                                                             
6 Evidence suggests that almost 2 million incidents of ASB have been recorded in England and Wales 
between April 2014 and March 2015. See Office for National Statistics, 2015. 
7 According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, public’s perception as to what constitutes ASB 
can vary considerably and it can include amongst other begging, groups of people hanging around on the 
street and drug dealing. See: Office for National Statistics, 2016. 
8 Prior to the introduction of the ASBO local authorities could and still can make use of the powers granted 
to them under section 2 of the Noise Act 1996 in order to deal with nuisance behaviour. Under section 152 
of the Housing Act 1996, an anti-social behaviour injunction (ASBI) could be issued against someone 
whose behaviour had caused ‘nuisance and annoyance’ in residential premises. Moreover, an array of 
provisions in the Public Order Act 1986, such as section 5, enables law enforcement agents to tackle more 
serious kinds of public disorder. None of these measures, however, was explicitly designed to address what 
later became known as ASB.  
9 Section 1C. 
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criminal offence carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a fine.10 
If someone’s behaviour ‘caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
one or more persons not of the same household as himself’, then one of the ‘relevant 
authorities’ listed under section 1 of the 1998 Act, such as the police, could submit an 
application to court for the issue of an ASBO against that individual. If the court 
examining the application submitted was satisfied that the perpetrator behaved in an anti-
social manner, it could then approve the imposition of any restrictions deemed ‘necessary’ 
on the perpetrator in order to prevent him from engaging in further ASB,11 as long as 
there was also a ‘practical way of policing the order’ (Boness and others [2005] EWCA 
Crim 2395 (para. 48)). Some of the most common types of restrictions imposed on those 
against whom an ASBO was issued included, amongst others, curfews, exclusion from 
particular areas and ‘prohibitions on certain kinds of conduct’ (Bakalis, 2007: 427). It is 
also important to note that ASBOs were issued for a minimum period of two years.12  
Despite the fact that these restrictions could have a significant and longstanding 
effect upon the perpetrator’s liberty, proceedings for the issue of an order were deemed 
by the House of Lords in R. (on the application of McCann) v Manchester Crown Court 
[2002] UKHL 39 to be civil rather than criminal in nature. As noted above, the importance 
of this classification, either criminal or civil, lies in the enhanced procedural protections 
guaranteed to those charged with a criminal offence, particularly those under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (King, 2014).13 Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that the House of Lords held that the court examining an application for the 
issue of an ASBO should have been satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt (i.e. the 
criminal standard of proof) that the defendant’s behaviour ‘caused or [was] likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress’ (para. 37).  
In determining the nature of the ASBO’s first limb, the House of Lords did not 
simply focus on the official classification of the order, but it paid particular attention to 
the underlying rationale for the introduction of this hybrid form of regulation.14 For the 
                                                             
10 Section 1(10) and section 1(10)(b) respectively.  
11 Section 1(6). 
12 Section 1(7). 
13 The purpose of Article 6 of the ECHR is to guarantee that those facing criminal prosecution are given a 
fair trial. To achieve this, those charged with the commission of a criminal offence are entitled to a number 
of rights, such as the right to examine all evidence against them (Article 6(3)(d)). 
14 In determining the nature of the ASBO’s first limb, the House of Lords applied the anti-subversion 
doctrine formulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Engel v Netherlands (1979-1980) 
1 E.H.R.R. 647 (para. 81-82). As explained in more detail in 3.1.2, the anti-subversion doctrine constitutes 
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Labour party (1995), which was the main driving force behind the introduction of the 
ASBO when it came to power in 1997 (the New Labour government), the link between 
ASB and criminality was undeniable, but they did not believe that such conduct should 
be criminalised in its own right. For this reason, a new method of social regulation was 
needed in order to enable the state to intervene at an early stage and prevent ASB from 
escalating to serious criminality (Crawford, 2009; Squires, 2006; Jacobson, Millie & 
Hough, 2008).  
In line with the Labour party’s rhetoric, the House of Lords held that the primary 
intention of the legislature was to introduce a civil order which aimed at the prevention 
of certain kinds of behaviour rather than their criminalisation (para. 72). This was crucial 
to the Lords’ decision that the order was civil in nature (para. 27). It was noted, however, 
that despite the civil nature of this order, in cases where the restrictions imposed on the 
perpetrator’s liberty were severe, then, the standard of proof applicable should be the 
criminal standard, i.e. beyond any reasonable doubt, rather than the civil one, i.e. on the 
balance of probabilities (para. 37).  It follows that in McCann the preventive nature of the 
ASBO was sufficient to warrant the imposition of any restrictions deemed necessary on 
a perpetrator, despite the absence of many enhanced procedural protections, such as the 
right ‘to examine or have examined witnesses against him’.15 
This perceived need for an early intervention was also reflected in the drafting of 
the ASB legal framework. There was no need within the 1998 Act, for instance, to prove 
that someone’s behaviour had actually caused ‘harassment, alarm or distress’.16 Instead, 
the institution applying for the issue of an ASBO needed only to prove that the 
defendant’s behaviour was likely to cause any of the abovementioned results. In theory, 
however, this meant that: (i) severe restrictions could be imposed on someone’s liberty 
even if his behaviour had not actually caused ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ to any other 
person; and (ii) one could face a lengthy custodial sentence simply for breaching a civil 
order (Pearson, 2006). 
                                                             
a three-stage test based on which courts can determine whether the legal rule in question should be regarded 
as criminal in nature (and thus trigger all the enhanced procedural protections) regardless of the label 
attached to it by the legislature. 
15 Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR. 
16 As it will be explained below this is still the case under the current law. See ‘The current law on anti-
social behaviour’. 
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For the proponents of this hybrid form of regulation, alongside prevention, 
another important reason for its introduction was the alleged inability of the criminal law 
to deal swiftly and effectively with ASB. As Prime Minister Tony Blair (2006) contended, 
victims of ASB were often left unprotected from low-level criminality and their only hope 
was the criminal law which was, however, not sufficiently adequate for this purpose 
primarily for two reasons. First, the fact that the criminal law paradigmatically focuses 
on isolated events rather than on the cumulative impact of a series of incidents meant that 
no permanent relief could be provided to those experiencing prolonged low-level 
criminality (Koffman, 2006). Secondly, the criminal justice system (CJS) was deemed to 
be particularly costly and time consuming for dealing with low-level criminal activities 
and ASB (Chakrabati & Russell, 2008). This can be partly attributed to the enhanced 
procedural protections afforded to those facing criminal prosecution. Criminal law’s 
evidential and procedural rules posed a number of barriers in the battle against ASB. The 
exclusion of hearsay evidence,17 for example, could be a significant disincentive for 
people to report ASB incidents (Home Office, 2011b). As Sanders and Jones (2007: 282) 
contend, giving evidence in court can be a very daunting prospect for victims who might 
regard this as a form of ‘secondary victimisation’. Another significant hurdle is the high 
standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings which makes prosecution more 
difficult. The above considerations provided the basis for an alternative method of social 
regulation (Koffman, 2006). In an attempt to combine the flexibility of the civil law and 
the deterrent effect of the criminal law,18 a hybrid approach was deemed to be the most 
suitable solution (Squires, 2008). 
Although providing relief to victims and the prevention of further ASB appear to 
be legitimate objectives for the state to pursue, the adoption of this hybrid form of 
regulation in conjunction with the extensive degree of discretion granted to local 
enforcement agents were heavily criticised.19 One of the main criticisms raised against 
the ASBO was its ability to effectively criminalise what local communities regarded as 
intolerable behaviour, albeit not conduct proscribed by criminal law. Focusing on the 
                                                             
17 Section 114(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that ‘in criminal proceedings a statement not 
made in oral evidence in the proceedings can be admissible as evidence of any matter stated’ only under 
certain circumstances, e.g. where ‘all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible’ (s. 114(1)(c). 
In principle, therefore, hearsay evidence is inadmissible in criminal proceedings unless one of the 
conditions specified under section 114(1) is met. 
18 For more on the deterrent effect of the criminal law see Halliday, French and Goodwin (2001). 
19 See 4.1.1. 
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second criminal limb of the ASBO, Alvaro Gil-Robles (2004) contended the ASBO could 
potentially lead to the creation of ‘personalised penal codes, where non-criminal 
behaviour becomes criminal for individuals who have incurred the wrath of the 
community’. This is of course in stark contrast with the very foundations of a 
contemporary liberal society where respect for individual autonomy is of paramount 
significance (Locke, 1980). As Mill (2002) rightly pointed out, individuals should not 
only be protected from the will of the state, but they must also be protected from the will 
of the majority.  
Despite a general focus on the second criminal limb of the ASBO, the first ‘civil’ 
limb has also attracted criticism. As Duff and Marshall (2006) point out, the restrictions 
imposed when the order (which was civil in nature) was issued could be so severe that 
they could constitute a form of punishment in their own right. On this view, it was 
possible for the first limb of this two-part process to constitute a form of indirect 
criminalisation. Indirect criminalisation refers to the process of criminalising certain 
kinds of behaviour through legislation which is classified by the legislature as non-
criminal. In contrast, direct criminalisation refers to the criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour through legislation which is formally labelled as criminal. 
Allowing the state to criminalise behaviour indirectly through non-criminal 
legislation is morally problematic since, in theory, it is possible for law enforcement 
agents to expand (even unwittingly) the reach of the criminal law into areas that had been 
concluded by the legislature as not appropriate for criminalisation. This becomes more 
problematic in light of the fact that those subjected to indirect criminalisation are denied, 
at least to some extent, all of those enhanced procedural protections afforded to those 
subjected to direct criminalisation. It is essential, therefore, for criminal law theorists to 
formulate mechanisms through which instances of indirect criminalisation can be 
identified and prevented.   
Apart from the criminalisation of unregulated conduct and/or conduct that falls 
within the ambit of everyday human interaction, concerns were also expressed about the 
possibility of using the ASBO against behaviour which was already proscribed by the 
criminal law. Duff (2007: 13), for instance, characterised the ASBO as a ‘pseudo-non-
criminal’ measure, since it could be used as an alternative to criminal prosecution in order 
to address behaviour which should have been dealt with by the criminal law. Ashworth 
16 
 
and Zedner (2010) contend that when non-criminal mechanisms of social control are 
utilised to address behaviour that already falls within the ambit of the criminal law, then 
this constitutes a form of under-criminalisation. What is problematic about under-
criminalisation is that it undermines the normative distinction between criminal and non-
criminal legislation.20   
Evidence from a study conducted by Koffman (2006: 601) suggests that on a 
number of occasions the ASBO was used as a means of addressing ‘relatively serious 
forms of misconduct and offending’.21 For Koffman (2006), this was attributed to the fact 
that drawing a precise distinction between behaviour which is purely anti-social and 
behaviour which is criminal in nature is not always possible. This was also acknowledged 
by the Home Office (2011b) which notes that ASB includes behaviour which is already 
proscribed by the criminal law, such as criminal damage.    
The use of the ASBO against certain kinds of behaviour which were already 
proscribed by criminal law, is also evident through a line of cases examined by the Court 
of Appeal, such as in R v Curtis Braxton [2004] EWCA Crim 1374 and R v Tripp [2005] 
EWCA Crim 2253, through which it was acknowledged that it was possible for a 
sentencing court to impose a restriction on the perpetrator which, in effect, would 
duplicate certain criminal offences. In Curtis Braxton, for instance, an ASBO was issued 
against an individual prohibiting him from ‘using threatening, abusive or similar 
behaviour towards any person or property in a city centre’ (167) (see, for example, the 
section 4 offence of the Public Order Act 1984). Similarly, in Tripp, the perpetrator was 
prohibited from ‘using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly 
behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person’ (para. 2). What is important about these 
prohibitions was that on many occasions the maximum sentence for breach of an ASBO 
was significantly higher than the maximum sentence for the criminal offence in question 
(Ashworth & Horder, 2013). Although, for instance, those found guilty of the section 4 
offence face a custodial sentence of six months, those found in breach of their ASBOs 
faced a five-year custodial sentence and a fine. In theory, therefore, the ASBO could be 
used as a means of increasing the maximum sentence available for certain low-level 
offences.  As held by the Court of Appeal in R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, 
however, courts ‘should be reluctant to impose an order which prohibits an offender from, 
                                                             
20 See 2.1. 
21 This finding was reaffirmed by a latter study conducted by Crawford, Lewis and Traynor (2016). 
17 
 
or merely from, committing a specified criminal offence’ since the purpose of the ASBO 
was to prevent ASB rather than to deal with criminal offences (para. 35). 
The second major statutory instrument introduced to address ASB as a specific 
concept was the CrASBO. In contrast to the ASBO, the CrASBO was an order which 
could only be imposed on those who were found guilty of an offence and behaved in an 
anti-social manner.22 Notwithstanding the sentence received for the offence committed, 
if the criminal court in question was convinced that some additional steps were necessary 
to prevent the perpetrator from engaging in further ASB in the future, then a CrASBO 
could be issued.23 The issue of a CrASBO was an addition to the sentence received for 
the commission of the triggering offence.24 Similar to the ASBO, breach of a CrASBO 
without any reasonable excuse constituted a criminal offence.25 
At first sight, the CrASBO appears to be less contentious than the ASBO since it 
could only be issued against those who had already been convicted of an offence, i.e. 
individuals that had already gone into the realm of criminality. Similar to the ASBO, 
however, a number of concerns could be raised regarding the procedure followed for the 
issue of a CrASBO. Despite the fact that the CrASBO could only be imposed by a 
criminal court after the perpetrator was found guilty of an offence and that the prosecution 
had to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the offender behaved in an anti-social 
manner, it was evident that not all enhanced procedural protections were afforded to those 
against whom such an order was issued. Section 3B of the 1998 Act, for instance, 
explicitly stated that it was possible for the prosecution and/or the defence to submit 
evidence which might not ‘have been admissible in the proceedings in which the offender 
was convicted’, e.g. hearsay evidence.  
What was also morally problematic about the CrASBO was the fact that there was 
no need for the offence that triggered the issue of the order to be associated with the ASB 
in question. In theory, it was possible for the triggering offence to be completely unrelated 
to the offender’s ASB. It was sufficient for the perpetrator to have been convicted of at 
                                                             
22 Section 1C(1). 
23 Section 1C(2)(b). 
24 Section 1(4). 
25 Section 1C(9). 
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least one relevant offence, i.e. any offence that was committed after section 64 of the 2002 
Act came into force.26 
The current law on anti-social behaviour 
The ASBO has now been repealed by a new civil injunction (injunction) under Part 1 of 
the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (2014 Act).27 Part 1 of the 2014 
Act consolidated a number of orders and injunctions, such as the ASBO, the ASBI and 
the football banning order, into a single multi-purpose injunction (House of Commons, 
2013). 
Although the two-step regulation model adopted by the ASBO was retained, the 
injunction is a purely civil mechanism.28 Similar to the ASBO, proceedings for the issue 
of an injunction are civil in nature and thus the civil procedural rules apply. In contrast to 
the ASBO, however, breach of the injunction does not constitute an offence (Home 
Office, 2014). Rather, it constitutes a ‘contempt of court’ and carries a maximum sentence 
of two years imprisonment and an unlimited fine (Home Office, 2014). Although breach 
of the injunction no longer constitutes an offence, the applicable standard of proof for 
breach proceedings is the criminal rather than the civil one (Home Office, 2014). This is 
attributed to ‘the potential severity of the penalties which the court can impose on 
respondents’ (Home Office, 2014: 26).  Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that 
breach of the injunction can still result in the imposition of a custodial sentence. 
The CrASBO has been repealed under Part 2 of the 2014 Act by the criminal 
behaviour order (CBO). Although the CBO retains most of the CrASBO’s key features, 
it is worth examining some of the most important changes brought in by the 2014 Act. 
First, in order for a CBO to be issued the prosecution must prove beyond any reasonable 
doubt that the offender has acted in an anti-social manner.29 In contrast to this, in order 
for a CrASBO to have been issued, the relevant court needed only to ‘consider that the 
offender has acted’ in an anti-social manner’.30 It should be noted, however, that in the 
proceedings for the issue of a CBO it is still possible for both the prosecution and the 
                                                             
26 Section 1C(10). 
27 A transitional period of five years was put into place for ASBOs issued before Part 1 came into force. 
Those ASBOs which were issued prior to the 2014 Act and last for more than five years by the end of this 
transitional period will automatically be transformed into Part 1 injunctions (House of Commons, 2013). 
28 See 4.1.2. 
29 Section 22(3). 
30 Section 1C(2)(a) of the 1998 Act. 
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defence to submit evidence which might not have been admissible during the criminal 
proceedings that led to the perpetrator’s conviction.31 For instance, it is possible for the 
prosecution to submit hearsay and/or bad character evidence in order to prove that the 
offender behaved in an anti-social manner. In principle though, hearsay evidence cannot 
be admitted in criminal proceedings.  
Secondly, a CrASBO could only be used if the court examining the application 
was satisfied that this was a necessary means to protect members of the public from 
further ASB.32 In order for a CBO to be issued the criminal court in question must be 
satisfied that this ‘order will help in preventing the offender from engaging’ in further 
ASB.33 The 2014 Act, therefore, appears to lower the required threshold that must be met 
in order for a post-conviction order of this kind to be issued.  
Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law 
According to the Home Office (2011b: 8), ASB ‘cover[s] a broad range of crime, disorder 
and nuisance’. Simply put, ASB can range from mere incivilities, such as noisy 
neighbours, which can be regarded as part of everyday human interaction to behaviour 
which is already proscribed by criminal law, such as criminal damage (Home Office, 
2012). At first sight, certain kinds of ASB, especially those situated at the lower end of 
the spectrum, can be dismissed as too trivial to warrant any kind of formal legal 
intervention (Cornford, 2012). What really matters about ASB though, it is often the 
cumulative impact of someone’s behaviour on others rather than the seriousness of each 
isolated incident. It was this need to protect the public from persistent low-level 
criminality that provided the impetus for the introduction of the initial ASB legal 
framework back in the late 1990s (Macdonald, 2006b). As the tragic case of Fiona 
Pilkington and of her two children revealed, the cumulative impact of ASB can indeed be 
devastating (Koffman, 2006). Following prolonged ASB directed at her family, this 
eventually led her to set fire to her car killing herself as well as one of her children (The 
Guardian, 2012).34  
                                                             
31 Section 23(2) of the 2014 Act. 
32 Section 1C(2)(b) of the 1998 Act. 
33 Section 22(3) of the 2014 Act. 
34  Although Fiona Pilkington complained on numerous occasions to the police about the prolonged 
harassment she and her family experienced, the relevant police force failed to classify them as a vulnerable 
family. Moreover, despite the numerous complaints received, the Leicestershire Police failed to consider 
Pilkington’s neighbourhood as an ‘anti-social behaviour “hot spot” and … it was never targeted for a more 
proactive police response’ (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2009: para. 1212).    
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Another important characteristic of ASB is that it cannot only vary in terms of its 
severity, but it can also vary in terms of its nature. As noted in 2012, by then Home 
Secretary Theresa May, ASB is primarily a local problem which can take various forms 
and vary considerably amongst areas (Home Office, 2012). What can be perceived as 
anti-social in one part of the country, might go unnoticed in another (Home Office, 2012). 
On this view, local enforcement agents should be granted a certain degree of discretion 
needed in order to be able to address what really matters to their local communities (Home 
Office, 2012). To achieve this, a flexible legal framework is required which will enable 
local enforcement agents to address those kinds of behaviour that have a negative impact 
on their communities (Home Office, 2011b).    
This need for a flexible legal framework which will take into consideration both 
of the abovementioned characteristics provided the basis for the current statutory 
definition of ASB under section 2 of the 2014 Act. Section 2, draws a distinction between 
two types of ASB, housing and non-housing related. The former refers to behaviour which 
is ‘capable of causing nuisance or annoyance’ and takes place in a housing related 
context.35 The latter refers to behaviour which ‘caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, 
alarm or distress to any person’ regardless of where this behaviour takes place.36  It is 
worth noting that under the 2014 Act, hate incidents are also regarded for the first time as 
a form of ASB (Duggan & Heap, 2014). 37 
From a victim’s perspective, 38  the broad drafting of the statutory definition 
provides the necessary flexibility required to law enforcement agents to effectively 
address a number of longstanding problems which could not have been adequately 
addressed otherwise. The ambiguous nature and the unrestrained ambit of the statutory 
definition, however, which has not been narrowed within the 2014 Act, was severely 
criticised by a number of legal commentators. Cornford (2012), for example, contends 
that the statutory definition of ASB can potentially include behaviour which is well 
beyond what we commonly regard as anti-social. Numerous cases emerged where the 
ambit of the statutory definition was extended to rather bizarre situations raising concerns 
                                                             
35 Section 2(1)(c) and (b). 
36 Section 2(1)(a). 
37 A hate incident is any kind of behaviour that does not constitute a criminal offence, but it ‘is perceived, 
by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice’ based on someone’s actual or 
perceived race, religion, sexual orientation or disability (College of Policing, 2014: 4). 
38 In a number of Home Office reports and in the Statutory Guidance for the 2014 Act those affected by 
this kind behaviour are referred to as ‘victims’ of ASB (Home Office, 2012; House of Commons, 2013).  
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regarding the implementation of the relevant statutory provisions (Sankey, 2011). One of 
the most illustrative examples is the case of Alexander Muat whose tendency to make 
sarcastic comments to his neighbours was deemed as anti-social (BBC New, 2003).  
Examples such as the above can be attributed to the fact that the statutory 
definition of ASB places particular emphasis upon the impact or the likely impact of the 
perpetrator’s behaviour on other people rather than focusing on the actual nature of the 
behaviour in question. This means that victims, local enforcement agents and the courts 
play a crucial role in terms of how ASB is conceptualised in practice.  It is for this reason 
that ASB must be interpreted with caution, since if left unrestrained it can lead to 
situations where personal eccentricities, such as making sarcastic remarks, can be 
regarded as anti-social simply because someone’s behaviour diverges from what is 
perceived as normal or goes beyond what is tolerated by others within any given 
neighbourhood or community (Ramsay, 2004).  
Research objectives 
The hybrid nature of the ASBO has sparked fierce criticism. For many of its critics, such 
as Ashworth (2004), the criminal nature of the ASBO’s second limb enabled the de facto 
criminalisation of a wide range of activities without the need to resort to direct 
criminalisation. To illustrate this, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that 
Andrew used to feed seagulls in the town centre. This caused many problems to nearby 
businesses and local residents. The police deemed Andrew’s behaviour as anti-social and 
decided to apply for the issue of an ASBO against him through which he would be 
prohibited from feeding seagulls in the town centre. Although Andrew’s behaviour at the 
time was not proscribed by the criminal law, the fact that breach of the order constituted 
a criminal offence meant that the feeding of seagulls was in effect criminalised.39 Seen in 
this way, the move to a purely civil injunction under the 2014 Act appears on face value 
to be a positive development, since it seemingly addresses any concerns raised regarding 
the order’s hybrid nature. 40 It should be borne in mind though that breach of the new civil 
injunction can still result in the imposition of a lengthy custodial sentence (Home Office, 
2014).  
                                                             
39 Ramsay (2012) maintains that what was in fact criminalised through this ‘two-step’ regulation process 
was the failure of the offender to reassure society that he does not pose any threat to their security.  
40 Hoffman and MacDonald (2010) were amongst the first to propose the repeal and replacement of the 
ASBO with a purely civil injunction. 
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Concerns have also been raised about the ASBO’s first limb. Despite the 2014 
amendments and the shift towards a purely civil injunction, these criticisms remain 
largely unaddressed. The unrestrained ambit of ASB’s statutory definition, for instance, 
still enables local enforcement agents to deal with behaviour which appears to be part of 
everyday social interaction. Most importantly, severe restrictions can still be imposed on 
someone’s liberty through the first limb of the current two-step regulatory process.41 
These restrictions might be so severe that they can constitute a form of criminal 
punishment in their own right regardless of the potential consequences that breach of the 
injunction might bring about. 42 In principle, therefore, the issue of an injunction (the first 
limb of this regulatory process) can result in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour. 
Apart from the moral challenges posed by indirect criminalisation discussed 
earlier, the criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour through an injunction’s first limb 
raises a number of additional questions regarding its potential implementation. The 
potential criminal nature of the restrictions imposed through the first limb of the 
injunction in conjunction with the ASB’s broad statutory definition can result in the 
creation of localised criminal codes. To illustrate how localised criminal codes can be 
created through the implementation of the injunction, let us revisit the foregoing 
hypothetical. Suppose that the restrictions imposed on Andrew (for feeding seagulls) 
constitute a form of criminal punishment in their own right regardless of whether he 
breaches the injunction issued against him.43 In this case, Andrew is not only punished in 
the absence of the enhanced procedural safeguards, but the injunction (along with how 
ASB is currently defined) enables local enforcement agents to criminalise indirectly what 
they regard as anti-social leading to the creation of localised criminal codes.     
The foregoing hypothesis becomes more concerning since through the 2014 
amendments the proximity of the injunction to the criminal law has been officially 
distanced. This means that the implementation of the injunction might attract less 
                                                             
41 As discussed in more detail in 4.1.2, the first limb of the injunction and of the CBO are potentially even 
more restrictive than the first limb of the ASBO and of the CrASBO due to the fact that under the 2014 Act 
positive obligations can be imposed as well, i.e. the perpetrator can be ordered to do something. 
42 I justify further why it is worth examining whether the implementation of the injunction constitutes a 
form of criminalisation in 4.2.2.  
43 I will define what amounts to criminal punishment in 3.2. 
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attention and scrutiny, enabling local enforcement agents to use this tool as a means of 
criminalising indirectly what they consider to be ASB.   
The main research objective of this thesis is to test the validity of the 
abovementioned hypothesis by scrutinising the implementation of the injunction’s first 
limb. Before testing the validity of this hypothesis, it is essential to elaborate on the 
difference between criminalisation and every other method of social regulation in order 
to demonstrate why the classification of the injunction as criminal or non-criminal is so 
important. The next step is to identify the circumstances under which a particular kind of 
behaviour is criminalised regardless of the label attached to the relevant legal rule. Central 
to this thesis, therefore, are the following research questions:      
1) Why is it important to distinguish criminal law from other forms of social 
regulation? 
2) How can we identify when conduct has been criminalised (either directly or 
indirectly)?  
3) Have law enforcement agents created their own localised criminal codes through 
the implementation of the injunction’s first limb? 
To address these three research questions, it is necessary to combine several different 
methodologies. Initially, a doctrinal research design is needed through which the validity 
of the original hypothesis can be tested. For instance, attention should be paid on how the 
law appears on the statute book and how this has been interpreted and applied by courts.44 
Second, in order to understand why it is important to distinguish between criminal and 
civil rules, it is imperative to engage with legal theory and questions of legitimate 
questions of criminalisation (i.e. normative theories of criminalisation). Third, in order to 
investigate whether the injunction has been implemented in a manner that resulted in the 
indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB, it is necessary to analyse existing tests 
for distinguishing criminal and civil rules. The close analysis of these pre-existing 
accounts can result in the formulation of a single viable test through which we can assess 
more accurately the status of the law based on how this is applied by law enforcement 
agents. To this end, the theoretical analysis of the law on ASB is complemented by a 
socio-legal analysis that is based on by the findings from an empirical study as part of 
which twenty-nine semi-structured interviews with local enforcement agents from two 
                                                             
44 See 1.1.  
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areas in England have been conducted.45 The main objective of these interviews has been 
to scrutinise the implementation of the injunction’s first limb and explore whether this 
has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. It should be 
noted, however, that although the main focus of this thesis is the injunction’s first limb, 
reference will be made to the CBO’s first limb as well as any other informal interventions 
used by local enforcement agents, such as Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABC), to 
address ASB.46  
The main reason for making reference to both the CBO and any informal 
interventions used at a local level is twofold. First, as far as the CBO is concerned, its 
first limb allows for the imposition of restrictions and obligations similar to the ones that 
can be imposed through the injunction’s first limb. Hence, it is possible for the CBO’s 
first limb to constitute a form of criminalisation in its own right. Secondly, as previous 
research has shown, local enforcement agents sought to address ASB through a number 
of informal interventions, such as ABCs, before applying for the issue of an ASBO 
(Squires & Stephen, 2005b; Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016). Through these informal 
interventions certain restrictions were imposed on those whose behaviour was regarded 
as anti-social. It is necessary, therefore, to further explore the use of these two measures 
in order to examine whether similar normative challenges to those discussed earlier about 
the injunction arise.  
Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 presents the methodology adopted to address the research questions of this 
thesis. The chapter begins by elaborating on how the notion of localised criminal codes 
through the implementation of ASB tools and powers has emerged. The chapter then 
proceeds to discuss the methodology used to address each research question. Central to 
this chapter is the empirical study conducted with local enforcement agents in two 
counties in England regarding the implementation of the ASB measures. The chapter not 
only focuses on the sampling and data analysis techniques used, but it also highlights 
some of the technical and ethical challenges faced during this study.        
                                                             
45 I elaborate further on the methodology adopted to address each question in chapter 1. 
46 For the purposes of this thesis, when reference is made to the ‘ASB tools and powers’ and/or ‘ASB 
measures’, then this should be taken as a reference to the injunction, the CBO and any informal intervention 
used by local enforcement agents.  
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The purpose of chapter 2 is twofold. First, it aims to identify what distinguishes 
criminal law from other methods of social control. The aim of this analysis is to highlight 
criminal law’s unique moral status and demonstrate the importance of a clear distinction 
between criminalisation and other forms of regulation (the first research question). The 
chapter demonstrates what is problematic about indirect criminalisation and why the 
moral distinction between the criminal law and other forms of regulation must be 
preserved. 
 Secondly, it engages with some of the most prominent (and relevant to the 
purposes of this thesis) theories of criminal law and punishment. It also examines some 
of the most important principles underpinning criminalisation and punishment, such as 
the principle against retroactive criminalisation. The close examination of these 
normative accounts highlights further the need to distinguish criminal and non-criminal 
rules, since for most legal philosophers criminalisation should be used only under certain 
circumstances and punishment should only be imposed in order to achieve certain results. 
The close analysis of these theories and principles also equips us with the necessary 
analytical tools and philosophical background required to assess the legitimacy of 
criminal rules. For instance, if there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of 
behaviour, it is then necessary to evaluate this measure in the same way as we would have 
evaluated a criminal offence. 
Chapter 3 proceeds to formulate a working definition of criminalisation. This 
working definition identifies and elaborates on the circumstances under which the 
implementation of a legal rule constitutes a form of criminalisation (the second research 
question of the thesis). Central to this working definition is the need to look beyond the 
official classification of legal rules and investigate if they are operating as de facto 
criminal measures.   
Chapter 4 moves to examine in more detail the current legislative framework on 
ASB and how the law on this area has changed following the 2014 amendments. The 
purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, it is to provide a more detailed account of the 
relevant statutory provisions and lay the foundations for the theoretical evaluation of the 
ASB legal framework. Secondly, this analysis aims to illustrate that despite the 2014 
amendments through which the ASBO was repealed and replaced by a civil injunction it 
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is still necessary to investigate how the injunction has been used in practice. This is 
attributed to the first limb of the injunction and of the CBO. The chapter then examines 
more closely the injunction with reference to the working definition of criminalisation 
formulated in chapter 3. The purpose of this assessment is to investigate if, in theory, the 
implementation of the injunction could lead to the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour.  
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the empirical research conducted with local 
practitioners and police officers in two counties in England. It is worth mentioning that 
this was the first empirical data (that I am aware of) collected regarding the 2014 
amendments and their implementation at a local level. 47 The main objective of the 
empirical study was to examine whether the implementation of the ASB tools and powers 
(primarily of the injunction’s first limb) resulted in the creation of localised criminal 
codes in the sites in question.  
Notwithstanding, the concerns raised about the potential misuse of the relevant 
tools and powers, evidence from this study suggest that the implementation of these 
measures rarely resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour based 
on how criminalisation was defined in chapter 3. Instead, it was evident through the data 
collected from both sites that these measures were used in a sensible manner focusing 
only on behaviour that really had an impact on other people’s lives. The chapter also 
sheds light on how ASB was conceptualised at a local level and how incidents of ASB 
were managed. It was evident from the data collected, for instance, that the management 
of cases was primarily risk driven, i.e. based on the perceived level of risk faced by those 
being subjected to ASB. This study also found that a social-care driven approach was 
adopted by local enforcement agents who paid particular attention on how the underlying 
causes of ASB can best be addressed. The findings of the empirical study, therefore, not 
only shed light on the impact of the 2014 amendments on the daily administration of ASB 
at a local level, but they also challenge a number of preconceptions regarding the potential 
implementation of the measures in question.  
Chapter 6 reflects further on the most important findings of the empirical study 
focusing primarily on how the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB can be 
prevented in the future. Although, the implementation of the ASB tools and powers has 
                                                             
47 For more on the contribution of this empirical study to the current academic literature see 5.1. 
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rarely resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it is still 
necessary to identify and scrutinise some possible reform options. To this end, particular 
emphasis is placed on those instances where the implementation of the ASB measures did 
not result in the imposition of criminal punishment. This chapter concludes by elaborating 
on how the findings of this study affect our broader theoretical understanding of 
criminalisation and ASB. Central to this analysis, is the implications of these findings on 
the debates on over and under-criminalisation. 
The conclusion reflects back on the impetus for initiating this thesis and why it is 
imperative to be mindful of indirect criminalisation. It also draws on the most important 
findings of the empirical study, their broader philosophical implications and the 
contribution of this thesis to the academic literature on criminalisation and ASB. This 
thesis concludes by reflecting on its main research question and the need for additional 
measures to be put in place in order to prevent the implementation of the ASB tools and 
powers in a manner that results in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of 
behaviour.  
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Chapter 1: Methodology 
  
Investigating the presence of localised criminal codes has required me to critically engage 
with important questions within legal theory. Central to this investigation was the need to 
formulate mechanisms for distinguishing criminal from non-criminal rules.1 It has also 
required me to scrutinise various research designs through which the primary (third) 
research question of this thesis could be best addressed. Upon closer scrutiny of the 
various research designs that could have been adopted, a decision was taken to conduct 
an empirical study using semi-structured interviews with local enforcement agents. This 
enabled me to complement the philosophical analysis of the relevant statutory provisions 
with empirical evidence regarding the implementation of the injunction’s first limb at a 
local level. A purely theoretical analysis of the relevant legislation can only expose the 
potential for indirect criminalisation. An empirical study can assist in examining whether 
in fact the implementation of the injunction’s first limb has resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB.  
This chapter begins by elaborating on how initial observations and assumptions 
about the implementation of the injunction led to the notion of localised criminal codes, 
which provided the impetus for this thesis. The second part of this chapter focuses on the 
method used to identify those characteristics of the criminal law that distinguish it from 
other forms of social regulation. The next part of this chapter discusses the work done in 
relation to the identification of those conditions that must be met in order for a particular 
rule to be regarded as criminal. The chapter concludes by elaborating on the empirical 
study conducted through which the potential for creating localised criminal codes 
(through the implementation of the injunction’s first limb) was examined. Particular 
emphasis is placed here on the data collection technique used, the sampling methodology 
adopted, the design of the interview schedules and what methods of coding and analysis 
were employed. 
1.1 Laying the foundations  
This thesis has been premised on the hypothesis that if local enforcement agents have 
been able to criminalise indirectly what they regard as anti-social through the use of the 
                                                             
1 See 3.2. 
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injunction’s first limb, then they would have created their own localised criminal codes. 
Before finalising the research objectives of this thesis and deciding which the most 
appropriate methodology was to test the validity of the above hypothesis, I had to 
critically engage with the existing theoretical and empirical literature on ASB and 
criminalisation (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). The purpose of this was to ‘reconsider and 
refine [my initial hypothesis and] begin to examine possible [research] designs’ (Berg & 
Lune, 2014: 25). 
The analysis of the literature began by focusing on the concerns raised by legal 
commentators on the scope of the injunction’s first limb (as well as of the ASBO’s first 
limb) and how the discretion granted to local enforcement agents can be misused and 
potentially result in the indirect criminalisation of ASB. In order to test the validity of my 
initial hypothesis further, I decided to critically engage with the relevant statutory 
provisions (both the 1998 and the 2014 Act), case law and other authoritative texts, such 
as Explanatory Notes (McCrudden, 2006). As Hutchinson and Duncan (2012: 113) 
maintain, doctrinal research (i.e. reading and analysing primary sources, such as pieces 
of legislation) enables researchers to ‘establish the nature and parameters of the law’ in 
question.   
The doctrinal research began by focusing on how ASB was defined under the 
1998 Act. After a close examination of section 1(1)(a) of the 1998 Act, it was evident that 
the law imposed no limits as to the kinds of behaviour that could be regarded as anti-
social. It appeared possible, therefore, for the law to be used against a wide spectrum of 
behaviour ranging from mere ‘incivilities’ to conduct which is already proscribed by 
criminal law.2 This was further evidenced by the fact that there was no need for the 
perpetrator’s behaviour to actually cause ‘harassment, alarm or distress’. This was 
followed by a close analysis of section 1(6) of the 1998 Act which referred to the 
restrictions that could be imposed on those against whom an ASBO was issued. Similar 
to the definition of ASB, the broad drafting of section 1(6) meant that it was possible for 
the court examining the application for the issue of an ASBO (first limb of the ASBO) to 
impose restrictions that could severely restrict the perpetrator’s liberty. This conclusion 
was further supported through my analysis of a number of cases which revealed that the 
                                                             
2 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
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restriction imposed on those against whom an ASBO was issued included amongst others 
home curfews and non-association clauses (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012).  
The doctrinal research conducted, provided me with an enhanced understanding of 
the nature and scope of the law on ASB (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). Most importantly, 
though, after ‘reading, analysing and linking’ the conclusions drawn from the doctrinal 
research and upon further reflection on the existing literature on ASB and criminalisation, 
it was evident that the initial hypothesis made regarding the possibility of creating 
localised criminal codes through the implementation of the injunction’s first limb was 
reasoned (Hutchinson, 2010: 37). This led me to engage with central questions within 
legal theory and to formulate the research objectives of this thesis, e.g. 'what is it to 
criminalise?’. To reiterate them here, this thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
1) Why is it important to distinguish criminal law from other forms of social 
regulation? 
2) How can we identify when conduct has been criminalised (directly or indirectly)?  
3) Have law enforcement agents created their own localised criminal codes through 
the implementation of the law relating to ASB? 
The methodology adopted for each research question was largely determined by its merits 
and how it could be best addressed (Wilson & Sapsford, 2006).   
1.2 A theoretical analysis of criminal law’s distinctiveness   
In order to illustrate why the classification of the injunction as criminal or non-criminal 
matters, it was essential to focus on criminal law’s distinctiveness and why this should be 
maintained. This was achieved by scrutinising the rich academic literature on the moral 
distinction between the criminal law and other forms of social control used by the state. 
The close analysis of the academic literature enabled me to identify those characteristics 
which are unique and that distinguish the criminal from the civil law. This close 
philosophical analysis also highlighted what is problematic about indirect 
criminalisation.3      
                                                             
3 See 2.1. 
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1.3 Identifying criminal rules: Focusing on doctrines 
Examining whether the implementation of a particular legal rule has resulted in the 
indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, presupposes a clear understanding 
of what it is to criminalise, i.e. a set of conditions which must be met in order for any 
legal rule to be regarded as criminal. To achieve this, doctrinal research was conducted 
in order to examine how courts have maintained the distinction between criminal and 
non-criminal rules in their identification and application of legal rules. The objective of 
this analysis has been to scrutinise the leading authorities in this area in search for a viable 
and robust test within the current literature. Ultimately, this search led to a slightly 
adapted approach which is better suited to address the main research question of this 
thesis. 
The doctrinal research has focused primarily on the decisions of the ECtHR in 
Engel and of the House of Lords in McCann which explicitly dealt with legal rules that 
were susceptible to indirect criminalisation.4 In Engel, the ECtHR formulated the anti-
subversion doctrine through which it examined whether certain administrative rules 
should have been dealt with as criminal (para. 72). In McCann, the House of Lords relied 
on the ECtHR’s decision in Engel to assess whether the ASBO should have been regarded 
as a criminal order, albeit being labelled as civil by the legislature. The close analysis of 
these cases laid the foundations for formulating a working definition of criminalisation 
which has been later utilised to assess whether localised criminal codes have been created 
through the implementation of the injunction’s first limb.   
1.4 Creating localised criminal codes? The empirical study  
Doctrinal research provides researchers with ‘an insider’s view of the law’ (Hutchinson, 
2013: 15).  It enables them to identify legal rules which are applicable to a given scenario 
and ‘not concerned with the effects of the law in the world’ beyond the statute book 
(Hutchinson, 2013: 15).  What is problematic about a purely doctrinal analysis, however, 
is that it fails to take into consideration how the law has been implemented in practice 
(Hutchinson, 2013). As McCrudden (2006) explains, there can be significant 
discrepancies between the way the law appears on the statute book and the way it is 
implemented by law enforcement agents. It was precisely for this reason that I decided to 
scrutinise the implementation of the injunction’s first limb through an empirical study 
                                                             
4 For a more comprehensive analysis of the ECtHR’s decision in Engel and of the House of Lords’ decision 
in McCann see 3.1.2 and ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’ respectively. 
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which would allow me to examine the relevant legislation in its social rather than solely 
its theoretical context and investigate whether localised criminal codes had been created 
(McCrudden, 2006).  
The move to conduct empirical research is not to underplay the importance of 
doctrinal research. As Ramsay (1996: 112) explains, a ‘researcher needs to spend 
sufficient time in order to be reasonably on top of the subject before commencing the 
empirical research’. Rather, the above is to point out that the theoretical analysis of the 
law might not always accurately reflect how the law has been implemented in practice, 
especially in cases where the law in question has been broadly drafted providing a 
significant degree of discretion to law enforcement agents and the courts as to its 
implementation.    
1.4.1 Data collection technique 
Upon closer scrutiny of the various research designs that can be adopted, I decided that 
the most appropriate option for exploring whether localised criminal codes have been 
created would be a qualitative rather than a quantitative study (Silverman, 2013). A 
qualitative study enables researchers to determine the ‘presence or absence’ of a particular 
phenomenon whereas a quantitative design allows them to assess the ‘degree to which 
some feature is present’ (Kirk & Miller, 1985: 9). A mere examination of the number of 
injunctions issued, for instance, could not by itself reveal whether localised criminal 
codes have been created. Previous research has shown that local enforcement agents have 
tried to address ASB through a number of informal interventions, such warning letters 
and ABCs (Home Office, 2003). Although through these interventions certain restrictions 
can be imposed on the perpetrator’s liberty, these do not appear on official statistics. 
Moreover, a quantitative examination would not reveal whether the restrictions imposed 
on the perpetrators constitute a form of criminalisation, since this would not reveal the 
nature of the restrictions imposed and whether these constitute a form of criminal 
punishment. Instead it would have only revealed the number of restrictions imposed.  
It should also be born in mind that the implementation of the ASB measures can 
vary considerably from one area to another due to the wide drafting of the relevant 
legislation (Home Officer, 2011b). It was, therefore, imperative to study the 
implementation of these measures in detail in order to explore local enforcement agents’ 
understanding of ASB, their practices in terms of applying for the issue of an injunction, 
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their reasoning and justifications for doing so, and the types of restrictions that were 
imposed on those against whom the injunction was issued (Patton, 2002).  
The method of data collection used was semi-structured interviews. This method 
of data collection allowed the interviewees to elaborate on their own experiences and 
perceptions of ASB (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Bazeley, 2013), whilst enabling me to 
‘develop a comprehensive picture’ regarding the implementation of the relevant 
legislation in the sites under study (Bachman & Schutt, 2016: 273).5 
1.4.2 Ethical clearance 
Although empirical studies enable legal commentators to move away from a strictly 
theoretical analysis of the law in question, gaining access to research participants and 
information about the issues examined, these should not be achieved at the expense of 
research ethics (RESPECT, 2004). As Israel and Hay (2012: 501) explain, every 
empirical study needs to meet certain ethical standards in order to ‘assure trust and help 
protect the rights of individuals’ who participated in the study. Obtaining data in an ethical 
manner also maintains the integrity of the study (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012). It is 
for this reason that research institutions require researchers who plan to conduct an 
empirical research to apply for ethical clearance as a means to ensure that their research 
will adhere to certain ethical standards (Israel & Hay, 2012).6  
Empirical researchers must not only ‘meet the demands of the regulators of 
research ethics’, but they also need to ensure that their research is, in fact, conducted in 
an ethical manner (Israel & Hay, 2012). Researchers, for instance, must make sure that 
‘the participants agree to research before it commences [and their] consent should be 
informed and voluntary’ (Israel & Hay, 2012: 501). In order to make sure that potential 
interviewees were fully aware of the nature of this study and possible risks associated 
with it; both the consent form and accompanied information sheet for this study were sent 
to them in advance.7 Both documents contained detailed information about the aims of 
this study and the process of data collection and management. Research participants were 
able to scrutinise both documents thoroughly and take an informed decision regarding 
                                                             
5 For further details on the interview schedule see 1.4.5.  
6 Before commencing my empirical study I had to receive ethical clearance from the University of Sussex 
(Application No: ER/SD366/1). As part of my application, I had to explain the nature and purposes of my 
research and how I was planning to meet the ethical standards of the university. 
7 See Appendix A and Appendix B. 
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their participation in this study. Particular reference was made to the use of a voice 
recording device which enabled me to analyse the data obtained more accurately.8 The 
use of this device also allowed me to concentrate fully on the interviewees’ account and 
take additional notes when necessary (Bryman, 2016).   
 Another important ethical issue which had to be taken into consideration both 
prior and throughout this study related to the identity of the interviewees and the sites 
examined. Before contacting any institutions in order to gain access to their employees, 
a conscious decision was taken not to reveal the true identity of the interviewees, their 
institutions or the actual sites investigated. Instead, I decided to replace their true 
identities with reference codes and when necessary to alter the names of places and/or 
organisations (Bryman, 2016). As part of this process, a document matching participants’ 
true identity with a reference code has been created. 9  Interview recordings and the 
document containing the participants’ details have been stored on different external hard 
drives which are only accessible by me.       
Before elaborating on the reasons why I decided to protect the participants’ true 
identity, it is important to explain why site anonymity was required. As explained below, 
the population from which research participants were chosen was relatively small and that 
meant that if the names of the sites examined were revealed, then this could have easily 
led to the identification of the research participants. 10  To clarify this further, it is 
important to explain how crime and disorder (including ASB) is managed at a local level. 
Under sections 5-7 of the 1998 Act, Community Safety Partnerships (CSP) were 
established. Each CSP comprises of the local authority, the relevant police force, the fire 
and rescue authority and probation services.11 For each council district there is a CSP and 
its aim is to formulate strategies through which crime and disorder is to be addressed.12 
According to data provided by the Home Office (2011a), there are approximately 9-10 
CSPs per county. In Site A, police officers from 7 different CSPs participated in this 
study. If the true identity of this site (and thus of the police force) in question was 
revealed, then this most probably would have resulted in the identification of the research 
                                                             
8 These recordings were securely stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
9 See ‘Ethical challenges’. 
10 See ‘Sampling technique’.  
11 Section 5(1) of the 1998 Act. 
12 Section 6(1). 
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participants. It was, therefore, necessary to retain site anonymity in order to prevent the 
identification of the research participants.   
The underlying rationale for concealing/altering any information that could lead 
to the identification of the research participants was threefold. First, my primary objective 
was to protect interviewees from any kind of harm (Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills and Government Office for Science, 2007). Despite the New Labour 
government’s endeavours to promote the use of the ASB tools and powers (Squires, 
2006), the ASBO and the way it was implemented have been severely criticised on a 
number of occasions (Squires & Stephen, 2005a). Revealing the true identity of research 
participants (especially if there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb has led to the creation of localised criminal codes), could result in 
their stigmatisation and possibly jeopardise their employment. Researchers should not 
only concern themselves with the immediate risks posed to interviewees as a result of 
their participation in the study in question, but they also need to be mindful of ‘the 
consequences that may flow from’ it in the future (Israel & Hay, 2012). Anonymity, 
therefore, was deemed necessary in order to allow research participants to elaborate on 
the implementation of the ASB measures by their organisations without fearing that this 
might jeopardise their interests (Bachman & Schutt, 2016).   
Secondly, another important factor for concealing the participants’ true identity 
related to the issues of accessibility and participation. Due to the criticisms discussed 
earlier regarding the implementation of the ASBO, it appeared possible for ‘gatekeepers’ 
to deny access to potential participants in order to protect them and their institutions from 
outside scrutiny and, in turn, public scrutiny. Similarly, even if access was obtained, I 
thought that potential participants might have not been eager to participate or elaborate 
extensively on the implementation of these measures if their true identity was to be 
revealed. As a study conducted by Chan (2012: 306-307) with police officers revealed, it 
is ‘difficult for academic outsiders to penetrate a close-knit organisation, [such as the 
police], to examine its culture and work practices’. Confidentiality, therefore, was also 
used as a means of gaining access to institutions and facilitating higher participation. 
Finally, another important reason for site and participant anonymity lied with the 
need to protect any other individual who might have been negatively affected by this 
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study. Particular emphasised has been placed on the need to protect the identity victims 
and of people against whom these measures have been used. 
1.4.3 Sampling technique  
A purposive sampling technique was used to identify potential research participants and 
sites. The overall objective of the sampling technique used was to identify and study 
‘information-rich case[s from which I could] learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance to the purpose of’ this study (Patton, 2002: 230). This enabled me to collect 
a credible body of data regarding the implementation of the injunction and explore 
whether localised criminal codes have been created (Wilson & Sapsford, 2006). To 
achieve this, it was essential to interview people who had an everyday interaction with 
ASB and were responsible for the implementation of the relevant legislation.13 Although 
interviewing call-takers, for instance, would have provided useful insight on how ASB 
has been defined at a local level, this would not have been sufficient to determine whether 
localised criminal codes have been created (Bryman, 2016). Consequently, I decided to 
focus on ASB officers within police forces, local authorities, housing associations, and 
other institutions (such as Business Crime Reduction Partnerships) which are either part 
or often work closely with CSPs.14  
Each local council, for instance, has its own Community Safety Unit (CSU) which 
deals explicitly with the reduction of crime and disorder. The manager of each CSU is 
also a member of the local CSP. Similarly, housing associations have their own ASB 
teams. Although housing associations are not members of CSPs, they are able to apply 
for a Part 1 injunction and they often work closely with CSPs to address crime and ASB 
in their properties.15 The decision to include non-CSP members in this study enabled me 
to add variety into my sample and examine the implementation of these measures from a 
number of different perspectives (Flick, 2007). This also allowed me ‘to test [any 
possible] contrasting’ views that might exist (Rubin & Rubin, 2012: 53).  
Initially, it was my intention to interview forty-five local enforcement agents from 
three different counties in England. This number of interviews was deemed sufficient for 
                                                             
13 For the purposes of this thesis, non-police officers are referred to as local practitioners. All research 
participants are collectively referred to as local enforcement agents.       
14 Under section 5(2) of the 1998 Act, CSPs can co-operate with a number of other institutions and 
organisations if this is deemed necessary for the reduction of crime and disorder. 
15 Prior to the 2014 Act, housing providers, such as housing associations, could apply for the issue of an 
ASBI. See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’.   
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‘constructing a corpus of empirical examples [which would allowed me to study the 
implementation of ASB measures in the] most constructive way’ (Flick, 2007: 27). After 
obtaining ethical clearance from the University of Sussex to conduct my empirical 
research, a list with the possible sites and institutions in which the ‘target population [was] 
likely to be available’ was drafted (Berg & Lune, 2014: 47).  
The initial selection of possible locations was based on two criteria. The first and 
most important criterion related to what Patton (2012: 234-235) describes as the 
‘maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling’. For Patton (2012: 234-235), the 
underlying objective of this method of purposive sampling is to ‘capture and describe the 
central themes that cut across a great deal of variation’. This, according to him, can result 
in the identification of ‘common patterns that emerge from great variation [which] are of 
particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared 
dimensions of a setting or phenomenon’ (Patton, 2012: 235).  The importance of these 
common patterns lies with the fact that they ‘emerge out of great variation’ (Patton, 2012: 
235). To achieve variegation, it was necessary to study one site which experienced high 
levels of ASB when compared to other sites, one which experienced moderate levels of 
ASB, and one situated at the lower end of the spectrum.  
The process of identifying potential locations was based on the findings from the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales with regard to ‘the percentage of adults aged 16 
and over who have witnessed/experienced anti-social behaviour by police force area, in 
the year ending December 2013’ (Office for National Statistics, 2014). Although, the 
figures provided were estimates, they were indicative of the level of ASB experienced 
and/or witnessed in these areas. 
At this point it is important to explain why this selection process was not based 
on the actual number of ASBOs and CrASBOs issued per police force area. 16 At first 
sight, it could be argued that the number of orders issued in each county would be a strong 
indication of how punitive the implementation of ASB measures was in each area (Home 
Office & Ministry of Justice, 2014a). On this view, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that in areas where the ratio of orders issued to the area’s population was above the 
national average, local enforcement agents most probably adopted a more punitive 
                                                             
16 At that point there were no available statistics about the new tools and powers since Part 1 of the 2014 
Act came into force in March 2015.  
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approach towards ASB. It is common practice, however, for local enforcement agents to 
use a number of informal interventions through which they try to address the perpetrator’s 
behaviour before applying to court for an injunction or a CBO (Home Office, 2009). It 
was possible, therefore, for an area to have a relatively low ratio of orders to population, 
but in reality, having individuals punished through the use of informal interventions. This 
might have been particularly prevalent in areas with a high level of ASB, where local 
enforcement agents might have found it more convenient (maybe due to lack of resources) 
to deal with perpetrators through informal interventions. As a study conducted by Squires 
and Stephen (2005b) revealed, for instance, individuals who signed ABCs (and their 
families when young people were involved) were threatened with eviction from their 
property if they were found in breach of their contract. Based on the findings of that study, 
on many occasions perpetrators and their families ‘felt they had been offered no choice 
but to sign the contract which contained terms already decided upon’ (Squires & Stephen, 
2005b: 132-133). The potential punitive nature of these informal interventions was the 
main reason why this study moved beyond the injunction and the CBO.17  
The second criterion related to the resources available for this study. Due to the 
limited amount of resources and my desire to conduct face-to-face interviews, I had to 
choose sites which were in close proximity and easily accessible (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; 
Denscombe, 2014). The main reason for choosing face-to-face interviews lays with the 
need to build rapport with the interviewees and possibly gain access to more institutions 
(snowball sampling) (Bachman & Schutt, 2016). Although as Chan’s (2012) study 
revealed, building rapport at an operational level can be challenging due to police culture, 
this endeavour to build rapport was necessary due to the relatively small number of the 
target population. In fact, most of the participants who preferred a face-to-face interview 
were happy to identify and provide me with the contact details of other potential 
participants who met the abovementioned criteria.18 
Upon closer scrutiny of the abovementioned statistics and bearing in mind the 
above practical considerations, three possible sites were identified: (i) Site A; (ii) Site B; 
and (iii) Site C. Before elaborating further on the characteristics of each site it has to be 
noted that according to the above statistics, across England and Wales on average 26.78 
                                                             
17 See ‘Research objectives’. 
18 Only three out of the twenty-nine interviewees preferred telephone rather than face-to-face interviews as 
this was more convenient for them. 
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per cent of people aged 16 and above experienced and/or witnessed some kind of ASB 
between December 2012 and December 2013. Site A was chosen because the percentage 
of adults experienced and/or witnessed ASB was significantly higher than the average 
national. In contrast to Site A, Site B was very close to the national average. As far as 
Site C is concerned, this area was situated in the middle between Site A and Site B in 
terms of the percentage of adults who experienced ASB during the relevant period.  
1.4.4 Negotiating access 
In April 2015, a few weeks after Part 1 of the 2014 Act came into force, I approached 
various institutions from all three sites requesting permission to contact and possibly 
interview some of their employees who fulfilled the abovementioned criteria and were 
willing to participate in this study. Two institutions from Site A were the first to respond 
to my requests. As part of the negotiations to gain access to potential interviewees I was 
asked by these institutions to give two presentations to the relevant ‘gatekeepers’ through 
which I had to elaborate on the nature and objectives of this study. After these 
presentations, both institutions agreed to grant me access and assist me in contacting 
potential interviewees.  
As far as Site B is concerned, I contacted the manager of a CSU who agreed to 
meet me in order to discuss my research in more detail. After our meeting this manager 
agreed to participate in the study and allowed me access to the ASB officers working 
within that particular CSU. After completing three interviews with this CSU, the manager 
also introduced me to four other institutions within the same site which later agreed to 
allow me access to their employees as well.  
Finally, as far as Site C is concerned, I contacted two CSPs from this area in order 
to gain access to their ASB officers. After numerous emails, phones calls and a long 
waiting period one of the CSPs informed me that they could not participate in the study 
because at the time their main priority was to finalise their crime and disorder reduction 
strategy. I then decided to contact another CSP within Site C. Unfortunately, after many 
emails and phone calls I was told that none of the members of that CSP was interested in 
participating in this study. Hence, I decided to identify and contact another site with 
similar characteristics to Site C.  
After following the same selection process as before, Site D was identified as a 
suitable alternative to Site C. A CSP which was in close proximity was contacted. As the 
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chair of that CSP explained to me over the phone, he and his colleagues were not able to 
participate in the study at the time due to significant workload. Due to the fact that no 
other suitable site could be identified and due to time constraints, I decided to focus solely 
on Site A and Site B. In order to ensure data saturation, however, I decided that I should 
interview twenty local enforcement agents from each site instead of fifteen as originally 
planned, i.e. ten with the relevant police force and ten with local practitioners.  
Between May 2015 and April 2016 twenty-nine interviews were conducted in 
both sites. In Site A, nineteen interviews were conducted: (i) nine with police officers; 
and (ii) ten with local practitioners. In Site B, ten interviews were conducted: (i) four with 
police officers; and (ii) six with local practitioners. In total, thirteen police officers and 
sixteen local practitioners were interviewed from both sites. Although fewer interviews 
than what aimed for were conducted, it is important to note that data saturation was 
achieved. 
1.4.5 Interview schedule 
Prior to my field work, an interview guide was drafted which included a number of 
questions and possible follow-up questions based on which the interview sessions were 
structured.19 Each interview session was divided into four parts all of which related to the 
potential creation of localised criminal codes.  The use of semi-structured interviews was 
deemed necessary since they offer flexibility and allow participants to ‘speak more widely 
on the issues raised’ (Denscombe, 2014: 186). 
 During the first part of the interview sessions participants were asked to elaborate 
on what exactly their role was and on the work they were doing on a daily basis with 
regard to ASB. These introductory questions made interviewees ‘feel comfortable enough 
to start telling their story’ and were very beneficial in terms of building rapport (Hennink, 
Hutter, & Bailey, 2011: 113). Participants were then asked to define ASB and provide 
some examples which they would personally regard as anti-social. The purpose of this 
part was to gain an insight on how ASB was defined at a local level. If there was evidence 
to suggest that the implementation of these measures resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it would have been necessary to scrutinise 
the nature of the behaviour criminalised. 
                                                             
19 See Appendix C. 
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In the second part of the interviews, participants were asked to elaborate on the 
procedure followed after a potential incident of ASB was reported to them. Particular 
emphasis was paid on the 2014 amendments and whether these had any impact on the 
procedure followed by local enforcement agents. An equally important task of the second 
part of the interview sessions was to explore any informal interventions used by research 
participants when dealing with ASB. 
During the third part of the interview sessions, attention shifted to the restrictions 
and/or obligations imposed on those against whom an injunction was issued. This part 
allowed interviewees to elaborate on the nature and extent of the restrictions/obligations 
imposed on the perpetrators. The underlying objective of this part was to explore whether 
the restrictions/obligations imposed met every prerequisite of the working definition of 
criminalisation formulated in chapter 3.  
The final part of the interview sessions focused on the participants’ intentions with 
regard to the implementation of ASB tools and powers, i.e. what they intended to achieve 
through the use of these measures. Initially, interviewees were asked whether they 
perceived the use of these measures as a means of punishing (based on how they 
personally perceived punishment) the perpetrators for their past behaviour. Questions 
then enabled participants to justify the use of these measures. The responses collected 
during the final part of the interview sessions can assist further in the theoretical critique 
of these interventions.    
1.4.6 Coding and analysis 
Shortly after every interview session, the recording was fully transcribed by me. This 
provided me with a very detailed account of each interview session. This was also very 
beneficial in terms of preventing research bias since it enabled me to constantly reflect 
on the interview sessions ensuring that these were not influenced by my personal views 
about the issues discussed (Bryman, 2016). 
After all interview sessions were fully transcribed, they were uploaded on 
NVivo.20 Prior to the initial coding, I went through every transcript in order to familiarise 
myself with the data obtained. This was followed by a second reading of the transcripts 
                                                             
20 NVivo is a software designed to facilitate the analysis of research data. It allows researchers to upload 
their data (e.g. interview transcripts) and organise them based on their research objectives. Researchers are 
also able to create their own codes and sub-codes through which common themes can be identified.    
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through which key concepts were identified (coding) (Bryman, 2016). These concepts 
were given short titles in order to categorise important pieces information relating to this 
study (Green et al, 2007). This initial coding led to a more meaningful interpretation of 
my data (Bachman & Schutt, 2016). A sample of these codes was discussed during a 
supervisory meeting in order to safeguard the reliability and validity of my findings 
(Patton, 2002; Kirk & Miller, 1985). Following this meeting, I revised my codes in order 
for them to reflect more accurately the main topics addressed through the interview 
sessions.   
The final stage of this process involved a thematic analysis of the data obtained. 
In particular, a number of themes which could assist me in addressing the primary 
research question of this thesis were identified (Bryman, 2016). Before elaborating 
further on the basis upon which these themes were selected, it is imperative to comment 
on the underlying rationale for choosing this particular method of data analysis. Other 
methods, such as grounded theory method, for instance, aim to formulate a new theory 
‘as the research proceeds’ (Webley, 2012: 934-944). For this reason, ‘data collection and 
analysis [should] take place simultaneously’ (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2014: 153). In 
contrast to the grounded theory method, thematic analysis ‘requires the researcher to 
focus on selected aspects [of the data collected which] … relate to the overall research 
question’ (Schreier, 2014: 170). The interpretation of these aspects (or themes) and their 
correlation enables the researcher to address their underlying objectives of his study 
(Webley, 2012). As noted above, the main objective of this thesis is to test the validity of 
a pre-existing assumption rather than to formulate a new theory. It was for this reason 
that a thematic analysis was the most suitable method for this thesis.  
The selection of the various themes was based primarily on two criteria. First, the 
repetition of certain topics was an initial indication about the importance of certain codes 
with regard to the implementation of the ASB tools and powers (Bryman, 2016). What 
was really important though was the relation of these recurring topics to the potential for 
creating localised criminal codes (Bryman, 2016). Here, it is worth noting that the 
findings of this study were categorised and presented in accordance with the interview 
guide.21  
                                                             
21 See 5.2. 
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Conclusion  
The impetus for this study came from the criticisms raised through theoretical analyses 
and empirical findings from previous studies which pointed out the possibility of 
imposing severe restrictions on perpetrators’ liberty through non-criminal legislation. The 
possibility of implementing the injunction’s first limb in a manner which would result in 
the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour in the absence of the enhanced 
procedural protections was an alarming prospect. Legal rules which appear to allow for 
the imposition of criminal punishment should be subjected to the same level of scrutiny 
and constraints, such as procedural and evidential rules, as criminal rules.  
Notwithstanding my personal views regarding indirect criminalisation and the 
potential adverse consequences of this phenomenon, I was constantly reflecting on how 
my ‘own … assumptions can intervene [and influence] the research process’ (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy, 2005: 141). During the early stages of this study, for instance, it was 
essential to examine the theoretical validity of my original hypothesis on which this thesis 
is premised in order to ensure that this was not solely based on criticisms raised regarding 
the ASBO and its potential implementation (Green & Thorogood, 2014). This continued 
process of reflection on my own stance was also the main reason for interviewing not just 
police officers but also a range of other local enforcement agents who dealt with ASB on 
a daily basis and were responsible for the implementation of the relevant tools and 
powers. This enabled me to collect data from a variety of sources ensuring that the 
implementation of these measures was examined from various perspectives. Another 
important strategy used to safeguard objectivity was the use of semi-structured interviews 
which allowed participants to elaborate freely on their own experiences rather than being 
confined within the strict limits of fully structured interview schedules. 
Another major ethical challenge encountered during this study related to my 
commitment to preserve site and participant anonymity, especially during the 
presentation of my findings. To achieve this, names of places, businesses and institutions 
have been altered and/or concealed when necessary. In order to ensure, however, that the 
findings are presented in a logical and coherent manner, a unique reference code has been 
assigned to each research participant. These reference codes allow me to provide more 
information about each of the quotes used during the presentation of my findings. Each 
code includes three pieces of information, e.g. Int.10 (LP) Site B. The first piece of 
information is a number given to each interviewee. This number has been chosen 
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randomly by me and does not relate to the actual order in which the interviews were 
conducted. This was deemed necessary to further protect participants’ true identity. The 
second piece of information (LP or PO) relates to the participant’s occupation. For police 
officers the ‘PO’ abbreviation is used. For local practitioners the ‘LP’ is used. The last 
piece of information (Site A or B) reveals the site in which each interview was conducted.   
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Chapter 2: The moral foundations of the criminal law 
 
Since the age of Plato, legal and political philosophers have introduced and defended 
principles and theories through which a fair balance between individual autonomy and 
state control is to be maintained (Mackenzie, 1981). This is done primarily by identifying 
and defending constraints on the conditions under which state interference with our 
liberty and freedoms can be warranted (Mill, 2002).  Some of these theories, such as legal 
moralism, were formulated explicitly to set limits to the legitimate use of the criminal law 
by the state (Husak, 2008b: 196). Other theories, such as Mill’s (2002: 4) harm principle, 
were introduced as broader political theories, but they were later adopted and modified 
by criminal law theorists, such as Feinberg (1984), in order to determine criminal law’s 
proper boundaries.  
This need to set constraints on the use of the criminal law by the state can be 
attributed primarily to its coercive nature. As Husak (2011: 102) maintains, the criminal 
law is the most coercive means of social control due to the nature of the sanctions imposed 
on those who violate its commands. The criminal law does not impose mere sanctions, 
but it punishes those who offend (Husak, 2008b). It is due to the coercive nature of 
criminal punishment that legal and political theorists seek not only to determine the 
circumstances under which the criminal law must be used, but they also theorise about 
the purposes that punishment should serve.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part aims at illustrating the 
distinctiveness of criminal rules (as opposed to non-criminal rules) in order to understand 
why the classification of the injunction as criminal or non-criminal is so vital, i.e. the first 
research question. The second part engages with some of the most prominent (and 
relevant to the purposes of this thesis) theories of criminal law. The close analysis of these 
theories provides an enhanced understanding of criminal law’s moral limits in terms of 
the kinds of behaviour proscribed. In the third part, attention is shifted to the most 
influential account on punishment. The analysis of these theories does not only highlight 
criminal law’s distinctiveness, but it can also assist in our theoretical critique of the 
injunction. If there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the injunction’s first 
limb has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB, we should then 
evaluate this measure in the same way as we scrutinise criminal rules.  Moreover, the 
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analysis of these theories and the need to maintain criminal law’s distinctiveness will 
highlight further the need to formulate a test based on which it will be possible to identify 
criminal rules regardless of their official classification, i.e. the second research question. 
The chapter concludes by scrutinising on some of the most important principles 
underpinning criminalisation and punishment. Similar to the theories of criminal law and 
punishment, the close examination of these principles can assist our future analysis of the 
injunction.    
2.1 The distinctiveness of the criminal law 
As Ogus (2010: 27-28) explains, the state through various mechanisms of social 
regulation seeks to prevent certain ‘undesirable outcomes’. Through criminal 
prohibitions, for instance, the state seeks to prevent unlawful killings and non-consensual 
sexual intercourse. Similarly, if a party to a contract fails to comply with his contractual 
obligations, the law of contract will seek to address this by ordering the defendant to pay 
damages to the injured party. Through this process, the law of contract ensures that 
individuals who fail to comply with their contractual obligations cannot simply walk 
away without any consequences, safeguarding at the same time the rights of the injured 
party. Through various mechanisms of regulation, therefore, the state purposefully 
attempts to control and/or influence our behaviour (Lacey, 2004).  Thus, the criminal law 
is just one of many mechanisms of social control used by the state to regulate our 
behaviour (Ashworth, 2007-2008; Lacey, 2004). For most criminal law theorists, 
however, criminalisation is distinct from other methods of regulation because it allows 
for the imposition of punishment (Husak, 2008b). Simply put, criminal law does not 
impose mere sanctions on those who offend, but it punishes them (Husak, 2008b). 
According to Feinberg (1965: 400) and Husak (2008b: 57), sanctions imposed by 
the criminal law comprise of two characteristics: (i) the imposition of ‘hard treatment’; 
and (ii) the intentional communication of censure. For Feinberg (1965), ‘hard treatment’ 
refers to the financial and/or physical deprivations imposed on those who violate a given 
legal rule. As he has pointed out, however, not every deprivation imposed on the 
perpetrator amounts to ‘hard treatment’. Based on his conception of ‘hard treatment’, a 
custodial sentence is a paradigmatic example of punishment (Feinberg, 1965). This is not 
the case though with parking fines which, according to him, constitute mere penalties 
(Feinberg, 1965). The difference between penalties and punishments lies, according to 
Feinberg (1965), in the second prerequisite of punishment, i.e. that the deprivation must 
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intentionally comunicate censure. Based on his account, both penalties and punishment 
aim to prevent certain kinds of ‘undesirable behaviour’, such as unauthorised parking 
(Feinberg, 1965: 399). But punishment has an additional element. Punishment, according 
to him, ‘is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the 
punishing authority … or of those "in whose name" the punishment is inflicted’ 
(Feinberg, 1965: 400). This conceptualisation of punishment is in line with Husak’s 
(2008a: 104) account of punishment according to which ‘a state response to conduct does 
not qualify as punitive unless it is designed to censure and to stigmatise’. 
Based on Feinberg and Husak’s accounts, criminal punishment does not only 
interfere with the perpetrator’s liberty, but it also labels him as a serious wrongdoer. It 
conveys a message to both the offender and the rest of the community that the behaviour 
in question constitutes a serious moral wrong which is worth of society’s reprobation. 
Criminalisation, therefore, symbolises society’s ‘formal and solemn pronouncement of 
the moral condemnation’ against the kinds of behaviour proscribed (Hart, 1958: 405; 
Dimock, 2014). Through criminalisation a dialogue is generated between the community 
and individual citizens where the former does not only seek to deter the latter from 
offending, but it also aims to inform them about the principles by which they should abide 
(Duff, 2001; Walters, forthcoming). Through this dialogue, as members of the community 
we are not only provided with ‘prudential reasons for desistence’, but we are also 
provided with a moral one (von Hirsch, 1993: 12). The criminal law assumes the role of 
an educator who seeks to communicate to its subjects the core values and principles that 
underpin our society (Coffee, 1991). Seen in this way, criminalisation symbolises the 
moral denunciation of society towards both the offender and the wrong committed (von 
Hirsch, 1993).  
It would be instructive here to examine in more detail how this communicative 
and educational function of the criminal law operates in practice. One of the most 
illustrative examples of this, is ‘hate crimes’. Hate crimes are offences which are 
‘motivated by “hate” or “prejudice”’ (Walters, 2014b: 2). Prejudice, in this context, can 
relate to certain characteristics of the victim, such as religion and ethnicity.1 Hate crimes 
are regarded as more serious than their parallel offences due to their impact, which is 
                                                             
1 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 section 28. 
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likely to be more severe (Iganski, 2008). Compare, for example, an assault which is 
aggravated by religious hostility under section 29 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
and an assault under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The criminal law draws 
a distinction between the two offences as a means of emphasising society’s reprobation 
towards crimes motivated by hatred or prejudice. This is a direct message to the public 
that our society will not tolerate certain forms of hostility against a group of individuals 
due to their religious and/or ethnic background since conduct of this nature ‘undermine[s] 
fundamental values of tolerance, acceptance and equality’ (Walters, 2014a). Criminal 
law’s primary objective, therefore, is to maintain certain positive norms and dilute 
existing (negative) norms (Robinson, 1996). As Robinson (1996: 212) explains, criminal 
law is the only set of legal rules in a diverse contemporary liberal society which 
‘transcends cultural and ethnic differences’ because it focuses on society’s core values. 
In order, however, for society to fully comprehend the moral messages conveyed 
through criminalisation, it is essential for the criminal law to remain distinct from other 
forms of regulation. As Husak (2004: 211) puts it, ‘the criminal law is and ought to be 
different – importantly dissimilar from other kinds of law’ (emphasis in the original). To 
hold otherwise, is to blur the normative distinction between the criminal law and other 
forms of social control (Coffee, 1992). As a result of this, those to whom ‘the criminal 
law is directed’ at might not be able to comprehend the moral wrongfulness of certain 
kinds of behaviour.2 They will not be able to understand that there are both moral and 
prudential reasons for not violating criminal law’s commands (von Hirsch, 1993).  
Criminalisation not only communicates society’s censure towards particular kinds 
of behaviour, but it also expresses society’s reprobation towards those who offend. 
Society’s condemnation towards the perpetrator is articulated through criminal 
conviction. To be convicted for an offence is to be publically condemned for violating 
society’s core values (Walters, Forthcoming). It is for this reason that a criminal 
conviction can stigmatise offenders and can have a devastating effect on their future lives 
(Ashworth, 2006). If, for example, the perpetrator is found guilty of an offence which can 
lead to the imposition of a custodial sentence, then this offence will be registered on the 
perpetrator’s record.3 This can have a detrimental impact on the perpetrator’s future 
                                                             
2 As Chalmers and Leverick (2014: 74-75) contend, not every criminal prohibition addresses the entire 
population. Rather, according to them, certain offences (especially regulatory ones) are directed at specific 
groups of people, such as those against whom a CBO is issued. 
3 See National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000 regulation 3(1)(a). 
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prospect of employment since he can be automatically disqualified from certain 
professional bodies and holding public office.4 Although the perpetrator has served any 
direct criminal sentence imposed on him as a result of his past wrongdoings, the label of 
‘offender’ may continue to have an adverse impact on his future. 
It is due to the combination of ‘hard treatment’ and censure that criminal 
punishment is regarded as the most coercive means of social control (Packer, 1968; 
Husak, 2011). It is because of punishment’s coercive nature that enhanced procedural 
protections are afforded to those charged with a criminal offence (Henry & King, 2016). 
In particular, under Article 6 of the ECHR a number of procedural and evidential rights 
are provided to those who are prosecuted for the commission of a criminal offence as a 
means of ensuring a fair trial. The most important of these include Article 6(1) ECHR, 
which provides, ‘in the determination of [someone’s] civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing’; Article 
6(2) ECHR, which provides that every individual ‘charged with a criminal offence shall 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law’; and Article 6(3)(d) ECHR, 
which provides that a defendant should be allowed to examine all the evidence against 
him including any witnesses who wish to testify. Consequently, the label attached to each 
legal rule is of paramount significance since it will determine the level of protection that 
should be afforded to those who have allegedly committed the wrong in question.  
In principle, therefore, criminalisation should be reserved only for the most 
serious wrongs, the commission of which undermines some of our society’s core values 
and principles. 5  A prime example of this is the unlawful infliction of GBH which, 
according to Feinberg (1984: 10), is amongst those wrongs which ‘are crimes (under one 
name or another) everywhere in the civilised world, and no reasonable person could 
advocate their “decriminalisation”’. To be convicted of an offence such as the unlawful 
infliction of GBH, is to be labelled as a serious wrongdoer worthy of reprobation by the 
rest of the polity.6 This is one of the main reasons that a criminal conviction can have a 
devastating effect on the perpetrator’s future prospect of employment as employers are 
                                                             
4 For example, under section 66(3)(c) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 someone 
will automatically be disqualified from running as a candidate to become a Police and Crime Commissioner 
if they have been convicted for a recordable offence. See Bennett (2016). 
5 This is also one of the reasons why the criminal law attracts more academic scrutiny as to its appropriate 
use and limits.   
6 For a more elaborated analysis of this wrong see Demetriou (2016). 
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less eager to employ individuals with a criminal record (Podmore, 2012). It should be 
acknowledged, however, that the criminal law does not restrict itself only to mala in se 
offences, i.e. independently wrongful behaviour such as the unlawful infliction of GBH 
(Duff, 2007). Instead, as Duff (2010: 102) explains, the ‘English criminal law includes a 
number of offences that other systems do not classify as “crimes”’, i.e. they criminalise 
conduct which is not inherently wrongful but becomes wrongful due to its criminalisation. 
This is one of the main reasons why legal philosophers formulate and defend theories of 
criminal law. Formulating an ideal benchmark regarding the moral limits of the criminal 
law can lead to its principled and coherent development through which its distinctiveness 
can be preserved.    
Under and indirect criminalisation are both problematic because they undermine 
criminal law’s distinctiveness. As discussed earlier,7 the former refers to the use of non-
criminal rules, such as the civil preventive measures (e.g. the injunction and the TPIMs), 
as a means of addressing behaviour which is already proscribed by the criminal law 
(Ashworth & Zedner, 2010). As mentioned above, to label a particular kind of behaviour 
as a criminal wrong is to formally denounce it as behaviour that contradicts society’s core 
values. If this kind of behaviour, however, is addressed through non-criminal rules, then 
those subjected to the criminal law might not be able to comprehend the moral message 
conveyed through direct criminalisation. Consequently, those subjected to the criminal 
law will no longer be provided with a moral ‘reason for desistance’ (von Hirsch, 1993: 
12). Their decision as to whether they should commit a criminal wrong will be based 
solely on prudential grounds. A possible consequence of this might be an increase in 
criminality.  
Indirect criminalisation is problematic for two main reasons. First, if we accept 
Husak’s (2011) claim that the criminal law is the most coercive means of regulation 
because it allows for the imposition of punishment, then punishment should only be 
imposed through criminal prosecution and upon conviction, rather than through the 
implementation of non-criminal rules which cannot guarantee the presence of the 
enhanced procedural protections. To prevent this, it is necessary for legal rules which 
appear to allow for the imposition of punishment to be classified as criminal. This of 
course requires a mechanism based on which we can determine whether a particular rule 
                                                             
7 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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should be regarded as criminal regardless of the label attached to it by the legislature.8 
Through this examination we can ensure that non-criminal rules which allow for the 
imposition of punishment are subjected to the same theoretical critique and constrains as 
criminal rules. Secondly, similar to under-criminalisation, indirect criminalisation 
jeopardises the moral distinction between the criminal law and other forms of regulation. 
If punishment is imposed through non-criminal rules, then members of the public might 
not be able to fully comprehend the moral blameworthiness of those found guilty of an 
offence. This again might provide members of the public only with prudential reasons to 
commit no offence.  
2.2 Criminal law’s moral boundaries 
Thus far, our discussion focused on criminal law’s distinctiveness when compared to 
other forms of social regulation. The overall objective of the above discussion was 
twofold. First, it was to illustrate what is unique about the criminal law when compared 
to other forms of regulation and why it is necessary to preserve this moral distinction (the 
first research question of this thesis). It is due to this unique educational character of the 
criminal law, and the message that punishment conveys to society, that leads legal 
theorists to introduce and defend constraints to the ambit of the criminal law. Secondly, 
it was to demonstrate why it is vital to be able to identify and address instances of indirect 
criminalisation. This chapter now proceeds to examine the content of some of the most 
prominent (and relevant to the purposes of this thesis) theories of criminal law.  
Although many legal and political philosophers have introduced and defended 
normative accounts of criminalisation, we currently lack common consensus as to the 
kinds of behaviour that should fall within the ambit of the criminal law.9 Nonetheless, it 
is still important to examine more closely these theories for two reasons. First, despite the 
lack of common consensus regarding the ambit of the criminal law, the rich academic 
literature in this area and legal philosophers’ endeavours to formulate an ideal account of 
criminalisation suggests that the criminal law is indeed special and that it should only be 
used against specific types of behaviour. As Husak (2004: 211) puts it, ‘the criminal law 
is and ought to be different – importantly dissimilar from other kinds of law’ (emphasis 
in the original). To hold otherwise, is to blur the normative distinction between the 
                                                             
8 See 3.2. 
9 This lack of common consensus is evident through the close analysis of some of the most prominent and 
influential theories of criminalisation discussed in this chapter.   
52 
 
criminal law and other mechanism of regulation used by the state. It follows that if we 
wish to maintain criminal law’s distinctiveness, we must ensure that the kinds of 
behaviour criminalised are different from those addressed through other mechanisms of 
social control.  
Secondly, the close analysis of these theories can assist in our theoretical critique 
of the injunction’s first limb if there is indeed evidence to suggest that it has been 
operating as a de facto criminal rule. For instance, if the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb has resulted in the criminalisation of behaviour which is merely 
offensive,10 we can then use the analysis of these moral accounts in order to examine what 
might potentially be problematic about the criminalisation of this kind of behaviour. 
For the purposes of this thesis, four of these theories of criminal law are 
scrutinised: (i) legal moralism, (ii) the liberal approach; (iii) paternalism; and (iv) the 
criminalisation of offensive behaviour. Each of these theories is closely analysed in order 
to examine the potential grounds upon which criminalisation can be warranted. 
2.2.1 Wrongs worth criminalising 
Based on Duff’s (2010) account, the criminal law should only be used to address wrongs 
which are public in nature. What makes a particular kind of behaviour a public wrong, 
according to Marshall and Duff (1998), is that wrongs of this nature concern society as a 
whole and thus necessitate a collective response by the entire polity. The reason for this 
is that the criminal law aims to safeguard certain values which are fundamental to society 
(Ashworth & Horder, 2013). Hence, criminal wrongs should not be seen as wrongs done 
to a particular victim, but they should be seen as wrongs done to the ‘common good’ 
(Marshall & Duff, 1998: 11-12). This of course is not to disregard or undermine the 
importance of the harm suffered by the victim (Ashworth & Horder, 2013), but rather it 
is to highlight the fact that the individual should be seen as an integral part of society. The 
state assumes an obligation to challenge the perpetrator’s behaviour on behalf of the entire 
society (Marshall & Duff, 1998).  
Based on Marshall and Duff’s (1998) public/private wrong distinction certain 
wrongs are regarded as public wrongs because by their nature they violate society’s core 
values. According to them, what makes a particular kind of behaviour a ‘public wrong’ 
                                                             
10 See 2.2.5. 
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is its nature rather than its severity (Marshall & Duff, 1998). To illustrate this, consider 
the following hypotheticals. A, Sam recklessly causes minor damage to Andrew’s 
property worth £100. B, Sam also fails to comply with his contractual obligations and as 
a result of this, Andrew, the other contracting party, incurs losses totalling £10m. 
Although in the second scenario Andrew loses 100,000 times the amount of that in the 
first scenario, it is only the first scenario that can qualify as a ‘public wrong’, i.e. criminal 
damage. This, based on Marshall and Duff’s (1998) account, can be attributed to the 
nature of criminal damage which violates Andrew’s right to property, one of society’s 
key values. In contrast, contractual agreements are a private matter between Sam and 
Andrew who voluntarily choose to owe each other certain obligations. Although Sam’s 
conduct can be regarded as morally reprehensible, it does not violate one of society’s 
fundamental values. Consequently, in the second scenario society has no standing for 
intervening, despite the severity of the loss suffered by Andrew.   
At first sight, Duff and Marshall’s public/private wrong distinction can be 
criticised on two grounds. The first criticism relates to their decision to focus more on the 
nature rather than the severity of certain wrongs. As Moore (2014) explains, although 
breach of contract and torts are not wrongs worth criminalising the public/private wrong 
distinction adopted by Marshall and Duff is problematic. According to him, what renders 
a particular kind of behaviour worth criminalising is the severity of the wrong committed 
(Moore, 2014). Based on this account, the criminal law should only concern itself with 
serious moral wrongs (Moore, 2014). As he goes on to explain, even if certain wrongs 
violate some of society’s core values, we still need not resort to criminalisation if its 
potential benefits are outweighed by other values, such as the presumption of liberty 
(Moore, 2014). Minor infractions of those core values should not be criminalised. 
Secondly, if the public/private wrong distinction is to survive close scrutiny it is necessary 
to decide which rights/values are fundamental to our society. 11  Although the 
criminalisation of certain wrongs, such as the unlawful infliction of GBH, can hardly be 
disputed, this might not the case when we move away from paradigmatic mala in se 
offences. 
It is evident from the above analysis that the public/private wrong distinction 
drawn by Duff and Marshall provides some general guidelines as to what kinds of wrongs 
                                                             
11 See 3.2.1. 
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should be the proper concern of the criminal law, but further guidance is needed. This can 
be achieved by a closer analysis of some of the most prominent theories of criminal law 
through which we can determine which kinds of wrongs should be considered for 
criminalisation. Moreover, the public/private wrong distinction provides us with an initial 
indication of how the criminalisation of ASB through the injunction’s first limb could be 
problematic. Although certain kinds of ASB might be treated as de facto public wrongs, 
i.e. to be criminalised through the injunction’s first limb, it should be remembered that 
each injunction applies to specific individual(s) rather than the entire polity. In effect, this 
means that others could behave in exactly the same manner (i.e. commit those public 
wrongs) as those against whom an injunction was issued without any legal consequences. 
This is of course in stark contrast with Duff and Marshall’s public/private wrong 
distinction. Simply put, if the kinds of behaviour proscribed through the injunction’s first 
limb were truly public wrongs, then the entire polity should have been prohibited from 
committing those wrongs.  
2.2.2 Legal moralism 
Legal moralism starts from the premise that the immorality of an activity can justify its 
criminalisation (Devlin, 1965; Moore, 2010). According to Devlin (1965), morality 
constitutes one of the most fundamental components of our society and for this reason the 
legislature has a legitimate right to use the criminal law as a means of protecting morality 
in order to safeguard the existence of our society. The pressing question is under what 
circumstances a particular kind of behaviour is regarded as immoral and thus worth 
criminalising for a legal moralist?  
Devlin’s (1965) formulation of legal moralism embraces the idea that the criminal 
law operates on the standard of a reasonable man rather than on what the majority of the 
community believes. Simply put, if a reasonable man would have regarded a specific 
conduct as immoral, then the conduct at stake should be treated as such (Devlin, 1965). 
This is not to suggest that every moral wrong should fall within the ambit of the criminal 
law. Rather, as Devlin (1965: 7-17) explained, we should be able to appreciate an 
individual’s freedom by punishing only those wrongs which ‘lie beyond the limit of 
tolerance’. Accordingly, what makes an immoral act a public wrong is the requirement of 
genuine reprobation (Devlin, 1965). In other words, that wrong should be judged 
deliberately by the state as a wrong which ‘is injurious to the society’ if it is to justify the 
use of the criminal law (Devlin, 1965).  
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A possible objection to Devlin’s theory of criminalisation emanates from Packer’s 
account on morality and its relation to criminalisation. Packer (1968) acknowledged that 
there is a close relation between morality and the condemnatory function of punishment. 
He believed, however, that ‘an automatic enforcement of morals’ is impossible and 
unacceptable in any contemporary liberal society (Packer, 1968: 265). Enforcement of 
morality could have been permissible in a monolithic society where individuals share the 
same religious beliefs and ethnic background (Packer, 1968). The enforcement of a 
specific set of moral values in a pluralistic society ‘carries a heavy cost in repression’ due 
to the fact that there is a wide disagreement among the public as to the moral status of 
certain activities (Packer, 1968). While Devlin suggested that immorality is a justifiable 
basis for criminalisation, for Packer, enforcement of morality seems to undermine the 
very essence of having a liberal society. For Packer (1968: 265), the more diverse a 
society is, ‘the more foreign to its ethos’ that enforcement of morality would be. Dictating 
a moral code through criminalisation, therefore, appears to be unwarranted in such 
society.   
Moore’s version of legal moralism seeks to depart from Devlin’s account. 
According to Moore (2014: 199), Devlin’s account is based on ‘the intensity of [people’s] 
disgust and not by any criterion about the content of their moral beliefs’. Moore’s (2010) 
account starts from the premise that criminalising immoral acts which cause a prohibited 
result, such as GBH, in the absence of any valid excuse can be warranted. For Moore 
(2010), moral wrongdoing consists of wrongs committed voluntarily and intentionally by 
the offenders. If someone acts in such a manner and he is unable to provide any excuse 
for his actions, then this provides the state with a justifiable ground for criminalisation 
(Moore, 2009). Moore, an advocate of retribution,12 contends that retributivism and legal 
moralism are inextricably linked. Hence, legal moralism should only be concerned with 
culpable offenders and must deliver ‘just deserts’ (Moore, 2009: 31). Nevertheless, 
according to Moorean legal moralism, not every wrong should be subjected to 
criminalisation. Conduct which simply becomes wrong as a result of criminalisation, i.e. 
mala prohibita offences, is not to be regarded as a moral wrong (Moore, 2009). This is 
not to suggest that mala prohibita wrongs should never be criminalised. Rather, as Moore 
(2014: 204) maintains, ‘to be protected from criminalisation… an action must be a 
                                                             
12 See 2.3.2. 
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sufficiently minor wrong that the good of its punishment and prevention is outweighed 
by the costs the state incurs in achieving such punishment and prevention’.  
At first sight, Moore’s account provides more guidance than Devlin’s legal 
moralism as to when conduct constitutes a moral wrong. His account, however, does not 
provide any precise guidance as to what constitutes an independent wrongful act. What 
Moore (2009) claims is that the criminal law should follow the legal moralist principle. 
According to this principle if the act at stake is not condemned by morality, then the 
criminal law should not do either (Moore, 2009). The legislature must observe and 
determine what the current social morality dictates and decide what is to be criminalised 
(Moore, 2009).  
Although deciding what constitutes immoral behaviour can be very contentious, 
especially in a contemporary liberal society, legal moralism provides another limb to our 
evaluation of criminal offences. In particular, if through the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb certain kinds of behaviour are criminalised due to their perceived 
immorality (in line with Devlin’s legal moralism), it will be necessary to scrutinise the 
morality of the ASB in question. If what has been criminalised through the injunction’s 
first limb is behaviour which is not regarded as immoral by the standards of a reasonable 
man, then it will be hard to justify the implementation of the injunction.   
2.2.3 The liberal approach 
In contrast to legal moralism is the harm principle. This is a political theory which is 
situated within the liberal school of thought and not specifically designed to regulate 
criminalisation (Ashworth & Horder, 2013). The main impetus for the creation of this 
principle was to establish an appropriate balance ‘between individual independence and 
social control’ (Mill, 2002: 4). Based on Mill’s (2002: 8) formulation of the harm 
principle, state interference with our liberty can only be warranted if it aims ‘to prevent 
harm to others’ or to eliminate the risk of causing harm to others. For Mill (2002), the 
fact that someone chooses to harm themselves is insufficient to warrant any interference 
by the state. 
At first sight, criminalising behaviour which is harmful or can potentially cause 
harm to others appears to be a legitimate ground for criminalisation in a contemporary 
liberal society. The unlawful infliction of GBH, for instance, can be regarded as a 
paradigmatic example of harmful behaviour. This kind of behaviour is an inherently 
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harmful wrong and its criminalisation can hardly be disputed in a liberal society. The 
severity and blameworthiness of unlawful GBH is further evident by the fact that those 
who are found guilty of intentionally inflicting GBH on others face a maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment.13   
Nonetheless the liberal approach and its advocates face a number of challenges. 
First, if the liberal approach is to be adopted, then ‘harm’ and what qualifies as harm need 
further exploration and qualification (Feinberg, 1989). Similar to immorality, the notion 
of harm can be interpreted very widely especially when moving away from paradigmatic 
offences such as the unlawful infliction of GBH. As Feinberg (1984) pointed out, what 
constitutes harm and the extent of harm required in order for criminal law’s intervention 
to be warranted can vary significantly based on the characteristics of the victim. Suppose 
that in a deeply religious society the majority of people believe that atheists and their 
views jeopardise the cohesiveness of society and that if not addressed they can cause 
social unrest. From the majority’s perspective, atheism can potentially lead to serious 
violence and thus its criminalisation is warranted. From a liberal perspective, however, to 
criminalise atheism is to deny atheists the right to express themselves in the way they 
wish and constitutes an unlawful interference with their liberty. As Mill (2002) explained, 
individual liberty should not only be protected from the will of the sovereign, but it must 
be protected from the will of the majority as well.  
It follows from the above discussion of the liberal approach that the notion of 
harm should not be left unrestrained if we are truly committed to striking a fair balance 
between individual autonomy and criminalisation. According to Feinberg (1984: 188-
189), the criminal law should only deal with ‘genuine harm and not mere annoyance, 
inconvenience, hurt, or offence’. Hence, the main challenge faced by the proponents of 
this theory is to decide at what point we shall draw the line between those harms that are 
the proper concern of the criminal law and those which are not. Equally, when scrutinising 
instances where the implementation of the injunction constituted a form of indirect 
criminalisation, it is necessary to explore whether the kinds of ASB criminalised caused 
‘genuine harm’ to others or if it was behaviour which caused ‘mere annoyance’. Based 
on Feinberg’s account, only the criminalisation of the former kinds of ASB can be 
warranted. 
                                                             
13 Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
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A second challenge faced by the advocates of the harm principle relates to pre-
emptive criminalisation. Pre-emptive criminalisation can be warranted on the ground that 
it would be paradoxical if the legislature has decided that certain wrongs should be 
criminalised because they are inherently harmful, but has failed to punish those who either 
plan or who unsuccessfully attempt to commit wrongs of this kind (Duff, 1997). Although 
the prevention of harm appears to be a justifiable ground for criminalisation, it also raises 
the question: how pre-emptive can the state really be? What is the required degree of 
remoteness between the potential harm proscribed and the actual harm that the principal 
offence seeks to prevent?  
The need to set limits to pre-emptive criminalisation is particularly evident when 
scrutinising offences targeting terrorism-related activities. One of the most illustrative 
examples is section 1(2)(b)(ii) of the Terrorism Act 2006 which criminalises the 
publication of a statement which encourages others ‘to commit, prepare or instigate’ an 
act of terrorism. In order to establish liability for this offence, one needs only to prove 
that the person publishing this statement has been at least ‘reckless as to whether members 
of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the 
statement’. Although this offence prevents, through criminalisation, the publication of 
any statement that can encourage others to commit an act of terrorism, it also raises 
concerns as to how pre-emptive the state can be. What if Sam publishes a statement which 
can potentially encourage others to commit such an act but no one reads his statements? 
Similarly, what if none of those who read Sam’s statements is likely to commit an act of 
terror?   
Based on Feinberg’s formulation of the harm principle, pre-emptive 
criminalisation can be warranted even in cases where the behaviour criminalised is 
unlikely to lead to the infliction of harm. According to him, ‘if the harm in question is 
very great, then a very small likelihood of its occurrence will’ be sufficient to warrant 
criminalisation (Feinberg, 1984: 190). Seen in this way, most of the anti-terrorism 
legislation enacted in recent years can be warranted based on the level of risk posed by 
acts of terror.  In effect, however, this can result in the criminalisation of behaviour which 
is far remote from the infliction of any harm and thus jeopardise the moral distinction 
between the criminal law and other forms of regulation.14   
                                                             
14 See 2.1. 
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Similar to the analysis of legal moralism, the examination of the liberal approach 
can provide the basis for evaluating the implementation of the injunction’s first limb if 
this has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of harm. The importance 
of this analysis also lies with ASB’s statutory definition. As noted earlier, the current 
definition of ASB enables local enforcement agents to intervene pre-emptively before 
someone’s behaviour actually causes ‘harassment, alarm or distress’.15 Consequently, if 
there is evidence to suggest that the criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB is justified 
on the basis of preventing the infliction of harm, we can then reflect back on Feinberg’s 
formulation of the harm principle in order to assess and/or challenge the legitimacy of 
this form of criminalisation. Although, for instance, the behaviour criminalised might 
have caused ‘alarm and distress’, it can still be justified as a pre-emptive intervention if 
it aims at preventing the infliction of harm. This of course will require a sufficient degree 
of proximity between the behaviour criminalised and the harm prevented otherwise the 
injunction will hardly be justified.    
2.2.4 The paternalistic approach 
In contrast to Mill’s formulation of the harm principle, legal paternalism allows for the 
criminalisation of behaviour which can cause harm to the wrongdoer himself rather than 
to others (Husak, 2012). Paternalism works from the premise that people sometimes need 
to be protected not just from others but from themselves as well either because they are 
not capable of making the right decision or because they might simply refuse to make it. 
Parents, for example, might not allow their children to ride their bikes in the city centre 
because they believe that they do not possess the necessary skills required to do so. This 
means that the children are not allowed to choose whether they will ride their bikes in the 
city centre or not. By the same token, under paragraph 83 of the Highway Code a duty is 
imposed on every motorist to wear a protective helmet. 16  In theory, every motorist is 
denied the opportunity to choose whether he wishes to buy a protective helmet or not. 
Sam, for instance, might have been tempted not to buy a protective helmet simply to save 
some money. Under certain circumstances, therefore, a higher authority assumes that its 
subjects should be denied the opportunity to choose either because they are not capable 
                                                             
15 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
16 Feinberg (1989) provided a number of subcategories of paternalism as well based primarily on the 
intention of the one who acts in a paternalistic way. 
60 
 
or because they can be tempted not to make the right decision, e.g. to prioritise their safety 
over the extra cost of buying a protective helmet.   
The main cause for concern with regard to paternalistic interventions, therefore, 
is that they appear to undermine individual autonomy by denying individuals the 
opportunity to choose freely what is in their best interest (Gert & Culver, 1976). As Husak 
(2012) contends, however, paternalism as a reason for action is not prima facie 
objectionable. For a legal paternalist, the interference of the state is usually justified on 
the grounds of ‘welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being 
coerced’ (Dworkin, 1971: 108). To support his argument Husak (2012) uses the example 
of a patient who is driven to a hospital unconscious where lifesaving surgery should be 
carried out. The surgeon conducting the operation acts in a paternalistic manner. Thus, 
under certain circumstances paternalistic interventions can be justified especially when 
dealing with individuals who are not able to decide for themselves.  
Similarly, the criminal law sometimes adopts a paternalistic approach in order to 
protect certain groups of individuals. To illustrate how paternalistic interventions operate, 
consider sections 9 - 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which proscribe the participation 
of a child in any sort of sexual conduct regardless of consent. The criminal law intervenes 
in this case in order to protect a specific group of people from taking what the state 
assumes to be the wrong decision. In this case, regardless of a minor’s desire to engage 
in a sexual activity, the criminal law assumes a responsibility to protect that individual 
from harming himself.  
As Simester and von Hirsch (2011) rightly point out, the justifiability of these 
interventions should also be examined in light of the mechanisms used by the state to 
achieve these desired outcomes. For them, any paternalistic intervention by the state 
should take place through the civil rather the criminal law due to criminalisation’s 
coercive nature (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011). They contend that under certain 
circumstances the adverse effects of a criminal conviction, such as its stigmatising effect, 
can outweigh the effects of taking the wrong decision (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011). For 
them, if 'limited state intervention of a civil character [can be] justified, then recourse to 
the criminal law should not follow’ (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011: 160). 
Based on the above analysis of paternalism, if local enforcement agents use the 
injunction on paternalistic grounds we can then evaluate its implementation with the 
61 
 
limits of justifiable paternalism in mind. Suppose that local enforcement agents believe 
that Andrew is not capable of making the right to decision to attend drug-related treatment 
and decide to apply for the imposition of a positive obligation in order to force him to 
attend a number of sessions.17 Based on Simester and von Hirsch’s (2011) account, if the 
positive obligation imposed on Andrew constitutes a form of criminal punishment, then 
its imposition can hardly be justified.  
2.2.5 Criminalising offensive behaviour 
Thus far, the theories of criminalisation examined have focused either on the prevention 
of serious harm or the preservation of morality. For Feinberg (1985), under certain 
circumstances the criminal law can also be deployed against certain wrongs which at first 
sight appear to be relatively trivial, such as behaviour which causes annoyance and 
anxiety. In this context, Feinberg (1985: 1) used ‘the word “offence” to [describe] the 
whole miscellany of universally disliked mental states’ which fall within his offence 
principle. Based on his account, the invocation of the criminal law can be warranted only 
for the prevention of ‘serious offence to persons other than the actor, and that it is 
probably a necessary means to that end’ (Feinberg, 1985: 1).    
There remains the question of course as to where we can draw the line between 
offensive behaviour which is worth criminalising (serious offence) and offensive 
behaviour which should not fall within the ambit of the criminal law, i.e. behaviour which 
is merely offensive. For Feinberg (1985: 1-2), the criminalisation of offensive behaviour 
can only be warranted ‘when [one of the abovementioned “disliked mental states” was] 
caused by the wrongful (right-violating) conduct of others’. According to his account, a 
prime example of a right-violating offence would be a noisy bus passenger who violates 
other passengers’ right to privacy (Feinberg, 1985: 23). Feinberg’s (1985: 2) distinction 
starts from the premise that ‘the law does not concern itself with trifles’. For this reason, 
Feinberg (1985: 25-26) formulated a number of constraints in order to prevent any 
‘intuitively unwarranted legal interference’ through his offence principle. These 
mediating principles enable us, according to him, to assess the severity of the offence at 
stake and determine whether its criminalisation can be warranted. These principles 
include: (i) the extent and severity of the offence caused; (ii) whether it would be 
reasonable for the perpetrator to take any steps to avoid offending others; (iii) whether 
                                                             
17 As discussed in 4.1.2, under the 2014 Act positive obligations can be imposed on those against whom an 
injunction or a CBO is issued. 
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the victim voluntarily chose or put themselves in a position where there was a risk of 
being offended; and (iv) whether the victim has been offended due to their ‘abnormal 
susceptibility to offence’ (Feinberg, 1985: 35).  
It is worth noting that as far as the 2014 Act is concerned, none of Feinberg’s 
criteria apply, at least as the law appears on the statute book, in relation to the issue of an 
injunction. Instead, it is expected that local enforcement agents will exercise their 
discretion appropriately and use the injunction only against ASB which is ‘more than 
merely offensive’.     
Although, Feinberg’s mediating maxims appear to restrict criminalisation to 
behaviour which is more than merely offensive, according to Simester and von Hirsch 
(2011), Feinberg’s account still remains over-inclusive. They attribute this to the fact that 
we currently live in a society which is less tolerant than before (Simester & von Hirsch, 
2011). For them, Feinberg’s account should be complemented with the requirement of 
wrongfulness (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011). They argue that some general principles 
should be formulated as to ‘when the offence becomes a wrong, one that relates to the 
conduct’s showing a manifest lack of respect or consideration for others’ (Simester & von 
Hirsch, 2011: 137). Based on their account, if we are to criminalise offensive behaviour, 
we must ensure that we only target behaviour which is inherently wrongful rather than 
behaviour which becomes wrongful due to its impact on others.   
Accordingly, if we are to criminalise offensive behaviour, we should focus only 
on behaviour which constitutes a moral wrong. To illustrate how this can apply in 
practice, consider the following hypothetical.  Suppose that Andrew tends to stand in the 
middle of the high street in early afternoons and continuously makes racist comments 
towards people who pass by. As a result of Andrew’s behaviour many bystanders are 
offended and are fearful (‘disliked mental states’) about their own safety. Andrew’s 
behaviour in this context is more than merely offensive due to the fact that it includes an 
element of racial hatred. Even if no spectator was offended by his behaviour, the 
imposition of criminal punishment on Andrew can still be warranted on the basis that his 
behaviour constitutes a moral wrong regardless of its impact on others.18 As Lawrence 
                                                             
18 A similar approach is adopted by Hörnle (2006: 140) who argues that if someone’s behaviour violates 
the rights of other people, ‘then is no need to ask whether it is harmful or offensive’. On this view, since 
the behaviour at stake violates someone’s right then it should be considered for criminalisation irrespective 
of the label attached to it, either harmful or offensive. 
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(2002) points out, allowing hate crimes to flourish jeopardises the cohesiveness of our 
community since it violates one of society’s core principles, i.e. the principle of equality. 
This additional requirement of wrongfulness reiterates the need to reserve criminalisation 
for the most serious kinds of wrongs.  
From a theoretical perspective, the importance of the above distinction between 
behaviour which is merely offensive and behaviour which is more than merely offensive 
lies with the need to preserve criminal law for conduct which is truly worthy of 
reprobation. For the purposes of this thesis, what also matters about this distinction (as 
well as for the other theories of criminal law examined earlier) is that this can be utilised 
to assess the implementation of the injunction’s first limb. Simply put, if there is evidence 
to suggest that its implementation has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of behaviour 
which is merely offensive, we can then reflect back on our analysis of the ‘Offence 
Principle’ and criticise local enforcement agents for extending the net of social control to 
‘trifles’, i.e. behaviour that falls within the realm of everyday human interaction.  
As illustrated above, none of the theories of criminal law examined here is 
unproblematic or completely rigid in application. The close analysis of these theories 
enhances our understanding regarding the basis upon which criminalisation can be 
warranted and what can be problematic about each approach. It was evident through our 
earlier theoretical analysis of the relevant statutory provisions that what can be regarded 
as anti-social can range from mere ‘incivilities’ between neighbours to behaviour which 
is already proscribed by the criminal law, such as criminal damage. 19  It has been 
imperative, therefore, to scrutinise a number of theories which can potentially assist our 
future theoretical critique of the injunction’s first limb.   
2.3 Punishment 
Any attempt to assess the legitimacy of a criminal rule should not be limited to the kinds 
of behaviour criminalised, but it should also extend to the potential sanctions imposed on 
those who are found in breach of this rule. As Duff and Garland (1994: 2) point out, 
justification is needed ‘because [punishment] is morally problematic’. This is due to the 
nature and severity of the sanctions imposed by the criminal law on those who offend. On 
this view, it is morally objectionable to impose such sanctions on individuals unless 
sufficient justification is provided (Duff & Garland, 1994).  For this reason, the 
                                                             
19 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
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imposition of punishment has to be justified by the state (Husak, 2008a). It is also for this 
reason that enhanced procedural protections are afforded to those facing the prospect of 
criminal punishment (Ashworth & Zedner, 2015).  
Consequently, in cases where the implementation of injunction’s first limb 
constitutes a form of criminalisation, our evaluation of this measure should move beyond 
the kinds of behaviour criminalised and scrutinise the sanctions imposed as well. This 
requires an examination of the basis upon which punishment was imposed and what its 
ultimate objectives were. To achieve this, it is essential to critically engage with a number 
of theories of punishment which can potentially be relevant to our future analysis of the 
injunction.   
2.3.1 The consequentialist approach 
For some legal commentators, such as Bentham (2007), what really matters about the 
imposition of punishment is its net result, the consequentialist approach. For them, if the 
net result of punishment is a positive one then its imposition can be warranted (Bentham, 
2007). Conversely, if the net result is a negative one then the imposition of punishment 
cannot be warranted (Bentham, 2007).  
What constitutes a positive outcome in this context, however, varies amongst 
consequentialist theorists. Some consequentialists, for example, pay particular attention 
to the notion of utility. According to Bentham (2007), punishment is an inherently evil 
practice due to its adverse consequences. Nonetheless, it can still be warranted if it 
promotes ‘the happiness of the party whose interest is in question … [or if it] prevent[s] 
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is 
considered’ (Bentham, 2007: 2). As far criminal offences are concerned, the ‘party whose 
interest is in question’ is the entire community, since these are wrongs done to the 
community as opposed to the individual victim.20 If the punishment imposed on the 
perpetrators results in lower re-offending (something which benefits the entire 
community), then its imposition can be warranted. Similarly, from a consequentialist 
perspective, if there is evidence to suggest that the restrictions imposed on those against 
whom an injunction has been issued have been successful in terms of preventing further 
ASB, then their imposition can be warranted.  
                                                             
20 See 2.2.1. 
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For Lacey (1988), who adopts a communitarian approach to punishment, criminal 
law’s response to those who offend should be structured in line with the principles of 
welfare and autonomy. According to her, punishment can be warranted if it manages to 
address the needs of both the victim and the perpetrator (the principle of welfare) (Lacey, 
1988). For instance, if the punishment imposed manages to address the underlying causes 
of criminality, then its imposition can be warranted since it will enhance the perpetrator’s 
welfare. As Lacey (1988) points out, however, this attempt to enhance the perpetrators’ 
welfare should respect individual autonomy and minimise punishment on paternalistic 
grounds. Despite the different interpretations given to the positive outcome, 
consequentialists agree that punishment should be inflicted only as a means of achieving 
an ‘independent identifiable good’ (Duff & Garland, 1994: 6).  
2.3.1.1 Deterrence 
The deterrent theories of punishment are based on the assumption that an individual is 
always motivated by his own personal benefits rather than the common good (Becarria, 
1971). As members of society we give up part of our liberty in exchange for membership 
in the community. Some people, according to the deterrent approach to punishment, will 
seek to regain that part of the lost liberty while trying to preserve their membership 
(Becarria, 1971). For this reason, society should counterbalance individuals’ desire to 
revoke the part of their liberty sacrificed with something else (Becarria, 1971). According 
to Beccaria’s (1971) account, those who seek to revoke the part of their liberty by ignoring 
the commands of the criminal law should be punished. In this regard, punishment will act 
as a counterbalancing factor in deterring individuals from offending. Consequently, the 
infliction of punishment can be warranted if it can deter future offending (Benn, 1958). It 
is essential, however, that the level of punishment imposed should not ‘exceed what is 
necessary for [the] protection of the deposit of public security’ (Beccaria, 1971: 122). 
Deterrent theorists approach punishment from three different perspectives: (i) 
general deterrence; (ii) specific deterrence; and (iii) educative deterrence. General 
deterrence operates at two levels, i.e. criminalisation and the imposition of punishment. 
General deterrence starts from the position that criminalisation and the possibility of 
punishment are sufficient to deter members of society from offending (Paternoster, 2010; 
Packer, 1968). As to the latter, it is believed that if potential offenders are made aware of 
the punishment imposed on those who have been found guilty for the commission of a 
similar offence as the one they are about to commit, they will then be deterred from 
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offending (Bentham, 2007). In order for general deterrence to be effective the public need 
to be aware that certain kinds of behaviour are proscribed by criminal law and of the 
punishment imposed on those who offend (Mabbott, 1971). In addition to this, it also 
presupposes that potential offenders are in a position to carefully consider the gravity of 
the potential punishment and regard the fruits of offending as a risk which is not worth 
taking (Robinson & Darley, 2004). 
At first sight, general deterrence can be very effective especially when the 
maximum sentence for an offence is severe. As evidence suggests, however, what really 
deters individuals from committing an offence is not criminalisation and the gravity of 
the sanction available for an offence, but the likelihood of detection and prosecution 
(Halliday, French, & Goodwin, 2001; Chambliss, 1971). Consequently, criminalisation 
and the prospect of punishment have little if any impact on potential offenders (Doob & 
Webster, 2003). Thus, regardless of how severe the maximum sanction for a particular 
offence is, if a potential offender believes that the possibility of detection and prosecution 
is minimal, then it is unlikely to refrain from offending simply because the wrong he is 
about to commit constitutes a criminal offence (Doob & Webster, 2003). 
Specific deterrence is based on the rationale that if someone has already been 
punished the whole experience will discourage re-offending (Paternoster, 2010). For an 
advocate of this approach, the consequences of punishment are so undesirable that 
convicted offenders will voluntarily refrain from any criminal activity in the future. 
Contrary to what advocates of specific deterrence believe, however, evidence suggests 
that one out of four offenders will re-offend within one year (Ministry of Justice, 2017). 
Moreover, another cause for concern is that specific deterrence appears to allow for the 
imposition of punishment which can be disproportionate to the blameworthiness of the 
wrong committed. For an advocate of specific deterrence, the imposition of a 
disproportionate sentence can be warranted since that is likely to further enhance the 
deterrent effect of the sanction imposed (Tyler, 2006; Walker, 1994).21  
Finally, educative deterrence embraces the idea that punishment should 
communicate society’s disapproval for the wrong committed. According to Andenaes 
(1971: 142), through this process ‘public’s moral code [will be strengthened] and thereby 
create conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime’. Educative 
                                                             
21 I will return to the issue of proportionality in sentencing in 2.3.2. 
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deterrence, therefore, is inextricably linked with the communicative function of the 
criminal law.22 This theory is built on the assumption that there is a correlation between 
public sentiment and punishment (Keating et al, 2014). On this view, if the legislature 
decides to criminalise a specific wrong, then members of the community will perceive 
the commission of this offence as highly immoral (Bottoms, 2002). As a result, they will 
voluntarily choose not to offend. 
At first sight, the deterrent theories of punishment are appealing since they appear 
capable to prevent future criminality. According to Robinson and Darley (2004), 
however, deterrent theorists neglect the possibility that potential offenders might be 
willing to take risks and engage in proscribed activities irrespective of the possibility of 
detection and punishment. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that under certain 
circumstances individuals are not able to take rational decisions especially in the context 
of non-premeditated offences (Robinson & Darley, 2004). An individual who is 
intoxicated, for instance, may not be able to fully comprehend the potential consequences 
of a violent attack on another person, such as the possible sanction imposed for an offence 
of this kind. Consequently, under certain circumstances criminalisation and the prospect 
of punishment can have minimal deterrent effect on potential perpetrators. 
 Accordingly, if the sanctions (which amount to criminal punishment) imposed on 
those who behaved in an anti-social manner aim to deter future criminality, local 
enforcement agents need to ensure that the perpetrators are capable of making rational 
and informed decisions about their future behaviour. To explain this further, consider the 
following hypothetical. Suppose that Andrew, who is an alcoholic, constantly uses 
threatening and abusive language towards his neighbours. It is evident in this case that 
the main cause of Andrew’s behaviour is his alcohol addiction. Local enforcement agents 
believe that Andrew will be deterred from behaving in a similar manner in the future if 
restrictions akin to criminal punishment are imposed on him through the issue of an 
injunction (specific deterrence). Although these restrictions can be very beneficial for 
some people in terms of altering their future behaviour, in this case it seems unlikely for 
them to have any deterrent effect on Andrew due to his alcohol addiction. 23  Local 
enforcement agents need first to address Andrew’s alcoholism rather than to resort to the 
                                                             
22 See 2.1. 
23 This is of course true of all kinds of criminal punishment. 
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imposition of sanctions that aim at inflicting ‘hard treatment’.24 Failure to do so will 
severely undermine any attempt to justify the restrictions imposed on Andrew. 
2.3.1.2 Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is another forward-looking theory of punishment which starts from the 
premise that punishment is warranted when it aims at incapacitating high-risk individuals 
(Morris: 1994). As Morris (1994: 241) explains, the possibility of incapacitating ‘the 
criminal before the crime is surely an alluring idea’. As Lawton LJ noted in R v Sargeant 
(1974) 60 Cr. App. R. 74 (77-78), incapacitation is the only solution for offenders for 
whom ‘neither deterrence nor rehabilitation works’. A repeat rapist, for instance, will be 
prevented from re-offending if he receives a lengthy custodial sentence simply because 
he will be in prison and he will be unable to commit any further offences of similar nature. 
According to selective incapacitation, offenders who are most likely to re-offend 
must be incapacitated as a means of preventing future criminality (Halliday, French, & 
Goodwin, 2001). Based on that rationale if the state believes that a convicted rapist is 
likely to re-offend after he is released from prison, then it would be permissible to 
incapacitate him further in order to prevent him from re-offending (Morris, 1994). To 
illustrate how this can apply in practice, consider the following scenario. Suppose that 
Andrew who is 80 years old and Sam who is 20 years old have been found guilty of rape. 
In both instances, the victims were 20 years old and the rapes had been committed under 
exactly the same circumstances, no aggravating or mitigating factors apply in either case. 
This is the first criminal conviction for both. According to the Crown Prosecution 
Service’s (CPS) sentencing guidelines for rape and sexual offences, the starting point for 
the sentencing court should be a custodial sentence of five years.25   
For a proponent of selective incapacitation, the imposition of a significantly 
lengthier custodial sentence on Sam can be warranted due to his age since he possesses a 
higher risk of reoffending, although being as blameworthy as Andrew. In principle, if the 
consequentialist calculus adopted by those advocating in favour of incapacitation is 
accurate, we can then safely predict who is most likely to offend or re-offend. Evidence 
                                                             
24  For a more elaborated discussion on the infliction of ‘hard treatment’ in the context of criminal 
punishment see 3.1.1. 
25  See CPS, Prosecution Policy and Guidance: Rape and Sexual Offences Chapter 19: Sentencing. 
Available from: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/sentencing/ [Accessed 18th 
May 2017]. 
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suggests, however, that even a tremendous rise in the prison population is unlikely to have 
any significant effect on crime rates (Halliday, French, & Goodwin, 2001). Instead, 
offenders who have been convicted of relatively minor offences can be transformed to 
career criminal due to affiliation with other offenders whilst being in prison (Halliday, 
French, & Goodwin, 2001). 
A second variation of this theory of punishment is collective incapacitation 
(Keating et al, 2008). Collective incapacitation allows for the incapacitation of dangerous 
individuals who are regarded as potential offenders in order to prevent the commission of 
future crimes (Morris, 1994). As Morris (1994) explains, in order to assess the likelihood 
of offending or reoffending we can rely: (i) on one’s previous conduct; (ii) how 
individuals with the same characteristics tend to behave; and (iii) through professional 
experience.  
As von Hirsch (1971-1972: 735-736) rightly points out, an accurate assessment 
as to the future criminal behaviour of an individual is difficult to make because ‘violence 
generally is not a quality which inheres in certain “dangerous” individuals: it is an 
occurrence which may erupt’ under certain circumstances. Someone needs not be a 
dangerous individual to unlawfully inflict GBH on others. He simply might have done so 
whist being voluntarily intoxicated. Moreover, this calculus is vulnerable to the assessor’s 
subjectivity and fails to take into consideration the possibility that the individual under 
scrutiny is a rational agent who can voluntarily decide not to offend (Morris, 1994).  
Aside from any concerns raised as to the accuracy of this consequentialist 
calculus, advocates of this theory face a number of normative challenges as well.  As von 
Hirsch (1971-1972) contends, punishment should only be imposed by determining the 
guilt of the accused rather than on predictions as to their future criminal behaviour. Strict 
adherence to the abovementioned consequentialist calculus appears to allow for the 
imposition of punishment in cases where the individual in question has committed no 
wrong, but poses a great risk of offending in the future. Here, an analogy can be drawn 
with the injunction. As discussed above, there is no need for someone’s behaviour to 
actually cause ‘harassment, alarm, or distress’ to another in order for an injunction to be 
issued against them.26 Rather, the court examining the application for the issue of an 
injunction needs only to be convinced on the balance of probabilities that the perpetrator’s 
                                                             
26 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
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behaviour was likely to cause any of the above outcomes.27 It is possible, therefore, for 
local enforcement agents to justify the imposition of certain restrictions on someone who 
has committed no wrong simply based on the perceived risk posed by this individual. In 
cases where the implementation of the injunction has resulted in the imposition of 
criminal punishment and the perpetrators in question have committed no wrong, local 
enforcement agents can be criticised for punishing the perpetrators based on the supposed 
level of risk they pose rather than on the blameworthiness of their behaviour. 
Furthermore, concerns can be raised about the accuracy of their assessment as well.  
2.3.1.3 Rehabilitation 
The rehabilitative approach to punishment is situated within the humanitarian approach 
to offending (Weihofen, 1971). According to Weihofen (1971: 255), this theory was a 
humanitarian response to the ‘degrading physical conditions in prisons’. Unlike the 
deterrent theory of punishment, rehabilitation operates on the basis that an offender can 
change through moral edification and reform (Weihofen, 1971). This theory of 
punishment is based on the assumption that the inclination to engage in criminal activities 
‘is the product of antecedent causes’ (Allen, 1959: 226).  
Similar to the other consequentialist theories of punishment, rehabilitation cannot 
guarantee that the sanction imposed on the offender will be proportionate to the wrong 
committed. The principle of proportionality dictates that the sentence imposed should be 
commensurate to the seriousness of the wrong committed (von Hirsch, 1994). For a 
proponent of rehabilitation, the primary objective of punishment is to address the causes 
of criminality. Thus, the nature and severity of the sanction imposed on each individual 
is contingent upon the underlying causes of his offending behaviour. This of course means 
that each offender will require different treatment in order to rehabilitate (Weihofen, 
1971). Inevitably this is going to result in the ‘unequal treatment for offences in 
themselves alike’ (Weihofen, 1971: 255). In addition to this, as Bottoms (1980: 1-3) 
contends, such an approach is objectionable due to the fact that punishment is based on 
‘extremely impressionistic evidence’ rather than on the blameworthiness of the wrong 
committed.  
Rehabilitation as an approach to punishment allows for the imposition of a 
disproportionate sentence and enables the sentencing court to treat similar cases 
                                                             
27 Section 2(1)(a) of the 2014 Act. 
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differently. It should be noted, however, that under section 142 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 rehabilitation is listed as one of the purposes that punishment should serve. This 
can be attributed to the fact that if rehabilitation is successful it has the potential to 
permanently address the underlying causes of criminality. Thus, if rehabilitation is 
applied correctly, it can lead to lower re-offending rates in the future and assist the 
offender’s reintegration to society. 
The above analysis of the rehabilitative approach to punishment is central to the 
purposes of this thesis since, according to the Home Office (2012), ASB often has a 
number of underlying causes, such as alcoholism. This was one of the main reasons for 
the introduction of positive obligations, e.g. the perpetrator can be ordered to attend drug-
related treatment (Home Office, 2012). It is possible, therefore, for local enforcement 
agents to justify the imposition of sanctions akin to criminal punishment on the need to 
address the causes of the perpetrators’ behaviour. Based on our earlier analysis of the 
rehabilitative approach to punishment, however, in order for the imposition of these 
punitive sanctions to be warranted, they need to be necessary and proportionate to the 
wrong committed. 
2.3.2 The non-consequentialist approach 
In contrast to consequentialists, the non-consequentialists are backwards looking 
theorists. A non-consequentialist focuses on the wrong committed, rather on what 
punishment can achieve in the future (Hawkings, 1971). For a non-consequentialist, the 
wrongdoer must get what he deserves for his past behaviour (Moore, 2010). Emphasis is 
placed, therefore, upon the notion of retribution (von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005). 
Although retribution can be interpreted in various ways, for retributivists the wrongdoer 
should be treated as a rational agent who must be held accountable for his actions (Packer, 
1968). An equally important concept for many retributivists is the communicative 
function of punishment (Marshall & Duff, 1998). As it will be discussed in more detail 
below, for many retributivists the punishment imposed on the offender should reflect the 
moral blameworthiness of the wrong committed. 
 Similar to the other theories discussed above, the close analysis of the non-
consequentialist stance will enrich our theoretical understanding of punishment and assist 
us in our future evaluation of the injunction. In the remainder of 2.3, I will focus on the 
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‘just deserts’ approach to retribution which appears to be the most relevant non-
consequentialist approach to punishment for the purposes of this thesis.    
2.3.2.1 ‘Just deserts’ 
The ‘just deserts’ approach embraces the idea that through punishment the perpetrator 
must receive what he really deserves based on his past behaviour (Ashworth & Horder, 
2013). This theory, according to Mundle (1971), comprises of three primary principles: 
(i) the moral offence; (ii) proportionality; and (iii) desert. Moral wrongdoing in this regard 
refers to the commission of a criminal wrong by a culpable individual (Ashworth & 
Horder, 2013). For an advocate of the desert theory, punishment should only be imposed 
on culpable wrongdoers. As to the principle of proportionality, in order for punishment 
to accurately reflect the moral blameworthiness of the wrong committed, we must ensure 
that the sanctions imposed on those who offend are ‘proportionate in their severity to the 
gravity of offences’ committed (von Hirsch, 1994). In contrast to the consequentialist 
theories of punishment, retributivism appears to dismiss outright the imposition of 
disproportionate and/or inconsistent sanctions. The last prerequisite is the need for 
punishment to be an appropriate desert.       
This approach can be further divided into two sub-theories which interpret the 
notion of desert in different ways. According to the ‘unfair advantage’ interpretation of 
the ‘just deserts’, the commission of a criminal wrong gives to the perpetrator an unfair 
advantage over every law-abiding citizen (von Hirsch, 1994). This theory starts from the 
premise that compliance with the law benefits every member of society (von Hirsch, 
1994). Accordingly, if someone chooses to offend then they gain an unfair advantage over 
the rest because they are still enjoying the fruits of others’ compliance despite the fact 
that they broke the law (von Hirsch, 1994). Punishment can, therefore, be warranted on 
the basis that the offender through his suffering is repaying to society that unfair 
advantage received.  
A key reservation about this conceptualisation of retribution relates to the gain of 
that unfair advantage. As von Hirsch (1994) maintains, the commission of certain crimes 
enables the perpetrator to obtain an ‘unfair advantage’ which can be accurately measured. 
This is not the case though with every single offence (von Hirsch, 1994). To explain his 
point further, von Hirsch (1994) uses the example of tax evasion which clearly benefits 
those who do not pay their fair share, but still benefit from the tax paid by other members 
73 
 
of the community. What is the advantage though obtained by someone who uses 
threatening and abusive language towards others whilst being drunk?  Whilst calculating 
the benefit obtained through the commission of certain offences can be unproblematic, 
this might not be the case for other offences which do not produce any monetary benefit 
for the offender, such as unlawful manslaughter.  
Another cause for concern with regard to the ‘unfair advantage’ approach relates 
to the extent of the punishment that should be imposed on each offender (von Hirsch, 
1994). Further guidance and reasoning is needed with regard to how this unfair advantage 
is to be calculated and how a proportionate punishment is to be imposed (von Hirsch, 
1994). The most challenging task for an advocate of this theory is to identify 
‘determinants of punishment exclusively in the offence itself’ (Benn, 1958: 335). Without 
identifying those determinants someone will find it extremely hard to justify the nature 
and extent of punishment that must be imposed.  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned criticisms, retributivism appears to provide 
a good basis upon which constraints can be placed on the ability of the state to inflict 
punishment upon us. The fact, for instance, that this approach utilises the principle of 
proportionality is likely, if adopted, to minimise disproportionate punishment and 
facilitate clarity, consistency and predictability in terms of sentencing. Retributivists are 
still faced with one very important challenge. In contrast with the forward-looking 
theories of punishment, especially deterrence and rehabilitation, retributivism is only 
concerned with what has happened in the past. Its endeavour is focused on delivering a 
deserved punishment to the wrongdoer. This is unlikely, however, to address the 
underlying causes of criminality and facilitate the offenders’ reintegration to society.  
Similar to criminality, ASB often has deeper causes, such as alcohol or drug 
addictions, which need to be addressed (Home Office, 2014). The imposition of 
restrictions which simply aim to deliver a deserved punishment cannot always adequately 
address these underlying causes. Restrictions of this nature might provide temporary 
relief to those affected by the perpetrator’s behaviour, but these cannot have a permanent 
effect.28 Consequently, if there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb has resulted in the imposition of sanctions akin to criminal 
punishment on purely retributivist grounds without attempting to address the underlying 
                                                             
28 See 4.1.2. 
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causes of ASB, we can then express our reservations about the legitimacy of the 
punishment imposed on those people.    
The second variation to the ‘just deserts’ relates to the need for punishment to 
communicate censure. This latter approach departs from the premise that what 
distinguishes punishment from other legal sanctions is its expressive function (Feinberg, 
1965). For the advocates of this theory, punishment does not simply impose restrictions 
on our liberty, but it ‘conveys censure’ as well (von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005: 17). 
Punishment extends beyond the material consequences, since, according to Feinberg 
(1965), it has a symbolic function. To punish someone is to express society’s disapproval 
for the wrong committed (Feinberg, 1965). As von Hirsch and Ashworth (2005) assert, 
the expression of this disapproval is an invitation to the wrongdoer to problematise about 
their behaviour and to acknowledge the blameworthiness of the wrong committed. It 
follows that for an advocate of this theory, punishment can be justified if its underlying 
rationale is to censure both the wrongdoer and the wrong committed. 
This is the main reason why the ‘just deserts’ approach requires that the level of 
‘hard treatment’ imposed on the perpetrator should reflect the stringency of his 
blameworthiness (von Hirsch, 1993); the higher the blame the more severe the ‘hard 
treatment’ should be. As Foucault (1977) explained, the imposition of ‘hard treatment’ 
was traditionally associated and structured based on the blameworthiness of the wrong 
committed. Based on his account, in the 18th and 19th century public executions and 
tortures were designed to reflect ‘the nature of the crime: the tongues of blasphemers [for 
example] were pierced’ (Foucault, 1977: 44-45).  
Although the censure approach to ‘just deserts’ seems grounded especially in light 
of our earlier discussion about criminal law’s distinctiveness,29 its success is contingent 
upon maintaining the normative distinction between the criminal law and other methods 
of social regulation deployed by the state. The extensive use of non-criminal legislation, 
such as the injunction and the TPIMs, which can potentially lead to the imposition of 
criminal punishment, blurs the dividing line between the criminal and the civil law 
(Coffee, 1992). Criminalisation and punishment can only communicate censure if there 
is an unequivocal distinction between the criminal law and every other form of regulation. 
On this view, if functions of criminal law, such as dealing with the most serious moral 
                                                             
29 See 2.1. 
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wrongs, are taken by other form of regulation, then society will not be able to comprehend 
the moral value of the messages communicated through criminalisation. As a result of 
this, members of the public will see no difference between wrongs proscribed by criminal 
law and wrongs dealt with by civil law, such as breach of a contract. 
Similarly, if non-criminal methods of regulation, such as the injunction, are used 
by the state to publically condemn those whose behaviour is regarded as immoral, then 
the criminal law’s distinctiveness will be undermined. Consequently, if there is evidence 
to suggest that local enforcement agents sought to publically condemn those who behaved 
in an anti-social manner, then the implementation of the injunction can hardly be justified 
since it undermines the theoretical distinction between the criminal law and the civil 
preventive measures. 
2.4 Further reflections on criminalisation and punishment 
This chapter has critically engaged with some of the most prominent and influential 
theories of criminal law and punishment. The main objective of this analysis was twofold. 
First, it aimed at highlighting criminal law’s distinctiveness and why the classification 
between criminal and non-criminal rules matters. Secondly, the close analysis of these 
normative accounts aimed at laying the foundations for the theoretical evaluation of those 
instances where the implementation of the injunction’s first limb resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB. Although the analysis of these theories is central 
to the purposes of this thesis, the legitimacy of criminal rules also depends on a number 
of other rules and principles which are not necessarily associated with specific offences, 
but relate to the overall structure of the criminal law. Consequently, if the injunction is 
operating as a de facto criminal rule, then it not only needs to be examined in light of the 
theories of criminalisation and punishment examined above, but should also be evaluated 
with reference to the principles underpinning the criminal law.  
These principles include, but are not limited to the enhanced procedural 
protections afforded to those facing criminal prosecution.  One of the basic principles 
underpinning the criminal law, for instance, is that no one should be punished if his 
behaviour was not at the time a criminal offence, i.e. the principle against retroactive 
criminalisation. This principle is enshrined under Article 7(1) of the ECHR and its aim is 
not simply to prevent the introduction of criminal rules which will have a retrospective 
effect, but also to ensure that the application of existing rules by courts does not result in 
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the imposition of punishment for conduct which at the time was not proscribed by 
criminal law (Ashworth & Horder, 2013). The importance of this principle lies with the 
need to ensure that ‘a person ought not to be punished in the name of a political 
community unless it can confidently be said that the community officially regards his 
conduct as warranting the criminal punishment at issue’ (Westen, 2007: 230). Seen in this 
way, a duty is imposed on courts to interpret and apply criminal rules in line with the 
legislature’s objectives, rather than extending the scope of the law beyond what was 
originally intended for by the Parliament. For Westen (2007), in cases where it is unclear 
whether the behaviour of the accused falls within the scope of the offence charged with, 
then the accused should be acquitted in order to prevent the retroactive criminalisation of 
the behaviour in question. 
Retroactive criminalisation is not simply about which body (the Parliament or the 
courts) should determine the proper scope of criminal rules. Rather, the principle against 
retroactive criminalisation should be examined bearing in mind its potential broader 
societal implications. The criminal law should not be seen as a mere mechanism of 
regulation. Instead, it should be viewed as a mechanism of edification through which 
members of the community are informed about society’s core values.30 The criminal law 
should allow people to decide for themselves whether they want to undermine society’s 
core values. It should let people know in advance that certain wrongs are criminal and 
those who are convicted of these wrongs will be publically condemned. This will provide 
people with an opportunity to plan their future behaviour accordingly without being 
unsure as to whether they might be in breach of a criminal rule (Gardner, 2008). This 
requires criminal rules to be easily accessible by the public, with clear and identifiable 
limits ensuring that a ‘fair warning’ is given to people about the kinds of behaviour 
criminalised (Robinson, 2005). Clearly, a certain degree of flexibility is necessary in order 
to ensure that the criminal law ‘keep[s] pace with changing circumstances’. 31  As 
Robinson (2005: 340) explains, however, providing a ‘fair warning [is] a quality of 
special importance in criminal law, where a defendant’s life and liberty are often at stake’. 
Based on the above analysis of the principle against retroactive criminalisation, 
what can be problematic about the injunction’s first limb is that its implementation can 
result in the criminalisation of behaviour which at the time was not proscribed under the 
                                                             
30 See 2.1. 
31 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 at para. 40. 
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criminal law. Apart from the fact that punishment would have been imposed in the 
absence of the enhanced procedural protections, what is also problematic about this is that 
certain kinds of behaviour have been criminalised without informing the rest of the polity 
that the perpetrators’ conduct was in fact treated as a crime. Thus, no ‘fair warning’ is 
given to the rest of the polity that behaving in a manner that is likely to cause ‘harassment, 
alarm or distress’ or that it is capable of causing ‘nuisance and annoyance’ can potentially 
result in the indirect imposition of criminal punishment. Using of course the injunction 
as a means of addressing behaviour which is already proscribed by criminal law 
undermines the moral distinction between criminal and civil rules, it constitutes under-
criminalisation.32  
The purpose of the above discussion has been to re-emphasise the need for a 
holistic examination and analysis of the implementation of the injunction by local 
enforcement agents. If there is empirical evidence to suggest that the injunction has been 
operating as a de facto criminal rule, it must then be subjected to the same scrutiny as 
criminal rules. As part of our theoretical evaluation, for instance, we need to investigate 
the clarity of the relevant legislation and whether a ‘fair warning’ has been given to the 
community about the behaviour criminalised. Based on our earlier theoretical analysis of 
the law relating to ASB, it seems extremely difficult for the relevant statutory provisions 
to survive close scrutiny primarily due to their ambiguous scope.33 This reinforces further 
the need to examine empirically the implementation of the injunction’s first limb and 
investigate whether this has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of 
behaviour.       
Conclusion 
As with every political decision, criminalisation is a complex process which involves 
many conflicting interests and considerations (Stuntz, 2001-2002; Stoker, 2006). As 
Lacey (2004) points out, one of the most important factors taken into consideration by 
the legislature is the influence exerted by various pressure groups and strong public 
opinion regarding criminalisation. As Well and Quick (2010: 28) maintain, members of 
the parliament are ‘ultimately accountable to the populace and are therefore liable to be 
influenced by what they think are prevailing opinions’. Public deliberation regarding 
criminalisation and any other important decision that can influence society as a whole is 
                                                             
32 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
33 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
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an inherent characteristic of a democratic society (Stoker, 2006). The impact of this public 
deliberation, however, must be approached with caution. As Garland (2001) contends, 
politicians tend to calculate the potential appeal of their actions before planning their 
strategies. Penal populism is a worrisome phenomenon since in an attempt to avoid any 
‘signs of weaknesses’ politicians tend to adopt more punitive measures, such as severer 
sentences, which can sometimes contradict with penal expertise (Garland, 2001: 111-
112).34 Similarly, politicians tend to ‘tapping into and using for their own purposes, what 
they believe to be the public’s generally punitive stance’ (Bottoms, 1995: 40). It is due to 
the effects of penal populism that the state is unable ‘to create and maintain rational 
criminal law policy’ (Brown, 2007: 2).  
The importance of maintaining a principled and coherent criminal law policy lies 
not only with the need to enable people to plan their behaviour safely without fearing that 
they might be in breach of a criminal rule (i.e. a rule labelled by the legislature as criminal 
in nature), but it also lies with the need to preserve criminal law’s distinctiveness. This 
can only be achieved if the criminal law remains dissimilar to other methods of regulation 
both in terms of the behaviour proscribed and in terms of its response to those who violate 
its rules (Husak, 2004).  
The potential adverse consequences of penal populism further reinforce the need 
to look beyond the official classification of the injunction and examine whether its 
implementation has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. 
As noted earlier, if there is empirical evidence to suggest that the injunction’s first limb 
has been operating as a de facto criminal rule, we should then reflect back on our 
theoretical analysis of the theories of criminal law and punishment (and any other general 
rules and principles underpinning criminalisation) and subject this measure to the same 
scrutiny as criminal rules. To reach to this point, however, it is necessary to identify a 
single viable test through which we can determine whether a given legal rule should be 
regarded as criminal regardless of the label attached to it by the legislature. As explained 
in more detail in chapter 3, courts have formulated such a test (i.e. the anti-subversion 
doctrine), but this test was found to be problematic in a number of respects (e.g. it appears 
to be circular in application), which necessitated the formulation of a new working 
definition of criminalisation.     
                                                             
34 For more on penal populism see 4.2.1. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptualising criminalisation 
 
Examining whether the implementation of a given rule constitutes a form of 
criminalisation pre-supposes a clear understanding of what it is to criminalise. This could 
be reduced to a simple examination of how the rule in question was classified by the 
legislature, i.e. either criminal or non-criminal. On this view, to criminalise is to label a 
particular kind of behaviour as a criminal wrong (i.e. direct criminalisation). Although 
this rationale appears to be theoretically plausible, it fails to take into consideration the 
possibility of indirect criminalisation. The importance of this omission lies with recent 
legislative developments, such as the introduction of the civil preventive measures, 
which, in theory, appear to allow for the imposition of sanctions akin to criminal 
punishment without the need to resort to direct criminalisation.       
This chapter is structured in three parts. The first part investigates the way 
criminalisation has been conceptualised in academic discourse and explores how courts 
have applied rules which were susceptible to indirect criminalisation. The main objective 
of this analysis is to examine whether these accounts can provide us with a test for 
distinguishing criminal from non-criminal rules. Through the close analysis of these 
accounts, certain problems and inconsistencies are identified which necessitate the 
formulation of a working definition of criminalisation. In part two, a working definition 
of criminalisation is formulated. The working definition formulated below does not 
constitute a complete departure from the accounts of criminalisation examined in the first 
part of this chapter. Rather, it utilises these accounts and seeks to overcome some of the 
concerns and problems encountered by them. This working definition enables us to 
determine whether a legal rule constitutes a form of criminalisation irrespective of the 
label attached to it (the second research question of this thesis). The chapter concludes 
with an evaluation of this working definition of criminalisation by scrutinising its main 
limitations and advantages.   
3.1 Conceptualising criminalisation: The existing approaches 
In order to be able to identify (and then possibly address) instances of indirect 
criminalisation, it is essential to pre-determine under what circumstances a legal rule 
should be regarded as criminal. The importance of this task lies with the very nature of 
indirect criminalisation. In contrast to direct criminalisation, indirect criminalisation 
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formally lies outside the contours of the criminal law. Our examination, therefore, should 
also be extended to rules which are labelled as non-criminal but are susceptible to indirect 
criminalisation. Central to this thesis is the need to examine whether the injunction’s first 
limb (which formally lies outside the criminal law) has been implemented in a manner 
that resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. To achieve this, 
a test is needed through which we will be able to look beyond the official classification 
of legal rules and examine whether they should be regarded as criminal or non-criminal. 
At first sight, the need for a working definition of criminalisation can be 
questioned for two reasons. First, there is already a well-established understanding of 
criminalisation in the academic literature. 1 Many prominent criminal law theorists agree 
that what really distinguishes criminalisation from other forms of regulation is the 
imposition of criminal punishment. These theorists have also provided a very compelling 
account of criminal punishment. Secondly, as revealed below, courts have already dealt 
with legal rules which were labelled as non-criminal and were susceptible to indirect 
criminalisation. In McCann, for instance, the House of Lords scrutinised the ASBO’s first 
limb and concluded that it should be regarded as a civil order.2 Thus, courts have already 
formulated their own test through which they sought to examine whether a particular legal 
rule should be regarded as criminal or non-criminal.  
Before elaborating on my working definition of criminalisation, therefore, it is 
important to illustrate why a new test is needed bearing in mind the presence of these pre-
existing accounts both in the academic literature and in case law. To illustrate this, it is 
necessary to engage further with these pre-existing accounts and elaborate on what is 
problematic about them. It has to be noted from the outset that the working definition of 
criminalisation formulated below is not a completely new account. Instead, it was built 
upon these existing approaches’ (both in the academic literature and in the case law) 
inconsistencies and problems. The main objective of this endeavour is to identify and 
articulate a single viable test can be applied to all non-criminal rules.  
                                                             
1 See 2.1. 
2 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
81 
 
3.1.1 The current academic literature 
As mentioned in 2.1, for many leading criminal law theorists, such as Feinberg (1965) 
and Husak (2008b), criminalisation must be associated with punishment.3 According to 
them, what distinguishes a criminal rule from other forms of regulation is that the former 
punishes those who offend whereas the latter imposes mere penalties (Feinberg, 1965; 
Husak 2008b). Based on their formulation of punishment, sanctions imposed by the 
criminal law comprise of two main features both of which must be present in order for 
them to amount to criminal punishment: (i) they impose ‘hard treatment’; and (ii) they 
intentionally convey censure. 
The pressing question is whether the above formulation of criminal punishment 
can assist us to address the second research question, i.e. ‘how can we identify when 
conduct has been criminalised?’ Clearly, what Feinberg and Husak intended through the 
abovementioned account of criminalisation was to highlight the distinctiveness of certain 
paradigmatic offences, such as the unlawful infliction of GBH, when compared to other 
kinds of wrongs, e.g. breach of contract. Their formulation of criminalisation though faces 
two main challenges when used as a test for distinguishing criminal from non-criminal 
rules. First, ‘hard treatment’ (akin to the one imposed for those found guilty of an offence) 
can also be imposed through a number of non-criminal measures, such as the restrictions 
imposed on those against whom TPIMs are used.4 Secondly, censure (which for both 
Feinberg and Husak is the most defining characteristic of criminal punishment) is tied 
exclusively to the criminal label, i.e. to label a particular kind of behaviour as a criminal 
wrong is to publically and intentionally condemn it. It is possible though that censure 
(public condemnation) can be communicated outside of the criminal law as well. 
Consequently, the above formulation of punishment fails to take into consideration legal 
rules which formally lay outside the ambit of the criminal law, but are susceptible to 
indirect criminalisation. It is, therefore, imperative to formulate a more fine-grained 
model which will enable us to look beyond the label attached to each legal rule and 
examine whether its implementation has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain 
kinds of behaviour.    
                                                             
3  For an alternative approach see Tadro’s (2010) account based on which the main objective of 
criminalisation should be deterrence rather than censuring.  
4 I elaborate further on these restrictions below. 
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This need for a more fine-grained model is particularly evidenced by the 
introduction and rise of the civil preventive measures, such as the injunction and the 
TPIMs, which appear to undermine the normative distinction between criminal 
punishment and mere penalties. As Coffee (1992: 1875) explains, ‘the line between civil 
and criminal penalties is rapidly collapsing’ rendering the separation between the two 
almost impossible. Mann (1991-1992) contends that based on the current state of the 
criminal law there is no real difference between the nature of the sanctions imposed by 
the criminal law and the sanctions imposed by the civil law. For Mann (1991-1992), this 
can be attributed to the introduction of ‘punitive civil sanctions’ which form the 
middleground between the criminal and the civil law. ‘Punitive civil sanctions’ were 
defined as those sanctions which are able to punish the ‘offender’ through the civil 
procedure (Mann, 1991-1992: 1799). As Mann explains (1991-1992: 1799), legal rules 
which allow for the imposition of ‘punitive civil sanctions’ form a ‘hybrid jurisprudence’ 
which is very similar to the ASBO discussed earlier.5   
In order to examine whether the sanctions imposed by civil preventive measures 
constitute indeed a form of criminal punishment, it is necessary to look beyond the label 
attached to them and examine their implementation. To illustrate this, let us consider in 
more detail how the TPIMs operate. Section 3(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011 (2011 Act) allows for the imposition of severe 
restrictions on an individual’s liberty in cases where ‘the Secretary of State is satisfied on 
the balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-
related activity’. 6 If the Secretary of State deems the imposition of certain restrictions as 
necessary for the prevention of any terrorist activities, then these can be imposed on that 
individual. 7 These restrictions can include amongst others overnight curfews, travel bans 
and restrictions on movement.8  Though the main objective of these measures is the 
prevention of terrorism, it is evident from the above that the TPIMs allow for the 
imposition of severe restrictions on an individual’s liberty (akin to ‘hard treatment’) 
through non-criminal legislation. Although breach of the restrictions imposed constitutes 
an offence under section 23 of the 2011 Act, there is no need for an offence to be 
committed in order for these restrictions to be imposed in the first place. Similar to the 
                                                             
5 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
6 I will deconstruct the concept of liberty in 3.2.1. 
7 Section 3(3). 
8 For a complete account of these restrictions see Schedule 1 of the 2011 Act. 
83 
 
injunction’s first limb, our main focus here is the imposition of these restrictions rather 
their possible breach.  
What is also important about the potential restrictions that can be imposed through 
the implementation of the TPIMs, is that these are imposed in the absence of the enhanced 
procedural protections. In cases, for instance, where the threat of a terrorist attack is 
imminent, there is no need for a court permission in order for the Secretary of State to 
make use of these measures.9 Where a prior permission by court is needed, it is evident 
from the wording of section 6(3) and section 6(4) that the enhanced procedural protections 
do not apply. The court examining the imposition of these restrictions, for example, need 
only be satisfied that the Secretary of State’s decision to use these measures is not 
‘obviously flawed’ in order to grant its permission for the imposition of these restrictions 
on an individual.10  
To illustrate further why the above formulation of criminalisation advanced by 
Feinberg and Husak is problematic, consider the following hypotheticals. A, Sam, a 
suspected terrorist, has been found in possession of a military knife outside a night club. 
Sam has been convicted under section 57(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and sentenced to 
one year imprisonment. B, there has been intelligence to suggest that Andrew, who has 
committed no offence yet, has close ties with a number of suspected terrorists who are 
planning an imminent terrorist attack. The Secretary of State ‘is satisfied, on the balance 
of probabilities’ that Andrew is also involved in this terrorist attack and decides that a 
number of restrictions should be imposed on Andrew under Schedule 1 of the 2011 Act, 
such an overnight home curfew, in order to prevent the attack. The restrictions imposed 
on Andrew last for one year.11 
The pressing question here is whether the sanctions imposed on Sam and Andrew 
amount to criminal punishment. Based upon Feinberg and Huska’s formulation of 
criminal punishment, the custodial sentence imposed on Sam clearly satisfies both 
prerequisites of punishment, i.e. ‘hard treatment’ (one year imprisonment) and censure 
(section 57(1) constitutes an offence). As far as the restrictions imposed on Andrew are 
concerned, although the imposition of a home curfew can be regarded as a form of ‘hard 
treatment’, this cannot amount to criminal punishment because censure is tied exclusively 
                                                             
9 Section 3(5)(a). 
10 Section 6(3). 
11 Section 5(1)(b). 
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to the criminal label. The TPIMs are regarded as civil preventive measures the purpose 
of which is to protect ‘members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism 
prevention’ and to assist the investigation of terrorism-related incidents.12 Seen in this 
way, the legislature’s intention was not for the TPIMs to publically condemn suspected 
terrorists. Consequently, the restrictions imposed on Andrew cannot amount to criminal 
punishment despite their severity simply because of the label attached to the TPIMs. This 
is neither to suggest that every measure imposed through the TPIMs amounts to 
punishment nor that the imposition of these restrictions on Andrew cannot be warranted. 
Rather, is to point out that we should not tie censure exclusively to the criminal label. 
Instead, we should look beyond the official classification of each rule and explore whether 
its implementation allows for the imposition of punishment. 
The way criminal punishment has been conceptualised in academic literature, 
therefore, fails to take into consideration the possibility of indirect criminalisation. What 
if, for example, the implementation of TPIMs leads to the imposition of severe restrictions 
on Andrew’s liberty whilst state actors, such as the police, publically and purposefully 
condemn both Andrew (e.g. Andrew being purposefully stigmatised by state actors as a 
terrorist sympathiser or aider) and his behaviour? This is not to undermine the validity of 
the arguments raised by criminal law theorists regarding the punishment-penalty 
distinction. Rather, it is to point out the need for an alternative test which will enable us 
to determine under what circumstances supposedly non-criminal sanctions amount to 
criminal punishment.  
The importance of being able to identify instances of indirect criminalisation lies 
beyond the need of ensuring the ‘fair labelling’ of legal rules.13 Instead, this has broader 
and much more important implications for the ‘rule of law’ and the way the state chooses 
to regulate our behaviour. Based on Raz’s (2009) formulation of the ‘rule of law’, the law 
should not just be predictable, but it has to be unequivocal and stable as well. The 
importance of this lies with the need for our legal system to develop in a coherent and 
principled manner allowing the public to safely predict whether their future behaviour is 
likely to result in the imposition of punishment.  
                                                             
12 Section 3(3). 
13 For more on ‘fair labelling’ see Chalmers and Leverick (2008).  
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The above criticisms regarding the way some of the most prominent legal theorists 
have conceptualised criminalisation should not be regarded as an invitation to disregard 
the official classification of legal rules. Rather, it is to suggest that the legislature’s 
intentions should not distract us from our main objective, which is to examine whether 
the implementation of a given legal rule constitutes a form of criminalisation regardless 
of the label attached to it. As Ashworth and Zedner (2015: 16) put it, ‘the key question 
[to be addressed here] is whether the measure is punitive: it may also be preventive in its 
purpose, but the classification depends on whether it is punitive in substance’. If there is 
evidence to suggest that the legal rule under scrutiny has resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, we can then refer back to the legislature’s 
original intentions in order to assess the legitimacy of this rule.  
3.1.2 Moving beyond direct criminalisation 
Thus far, it has been argued that the way we conceptualise criminalisation should take 
into consideration both instances of direct and indirect criminalisation. This will enable 
us to look beyond the official classification of legal rules and investigate if punishment 
has been imposed indirectly through non-criminal legislation. In Engel, the ECtHR 
attempted to formulate a mechanism for distinguishing criminal from non-criminal rules 
based on the nature of the sanctions imposed rather than on the label of the rule in 
question. This test also raises a number of concerns and is in need of modification if it is 
to survive close scrutiny.   
In Engel, the ECtHR had to determine whether sanctions imposed on members of 
the Dutch armed forces through disciplinary proceedings should have been regarded as 
criminal in nature and thus trigger the Article 6 enhanced procedural protections 
(para.79). The applicants argued that they were entitled to the same procedural safeguards 
as those charged with a criminal offence (para.79), because ‘the disciplinary penalty or 
penalties, measure or measures pronounced against them contravened Article 5(1)’ 
(para.56), i.e. the right to liberty and security. The ECtHR acknowledged that ‘the 
Convention without any doubt allows the States, in the performance of their function as 
guardians of the public interest, to maintain or establish a distinction between criminal 
law and disciplinary law’ (para.81). It was held, however, that Article 6(3) can still be 
applicable nothwistanding the label attached by domestic legislation to a legal rule if it 
‘counts as “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6’ (para.82-83).  
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In order to determine whether these disciplinary proceedings against the 
applicants were criminal in nature, the ECtHR devised a three-stage test known as the 
anti-subversion doctrine (para.72). The test is as follows: 
(i) ‘It is first necessary to know whether the provision(s) defining the offence charged 
belong, according to the legal system of the respondent State to criminal law, 
disciplinary law or both concurrently .… 
(ii) The very nature of the offence … [and] 
(iii)The seriousness of what is at stake’ (para.81-82). 
The introduction of this test was deemed necessary in order to prevent states from 
classifying legal rules as non-criminal simply as a means of circumventing the extra layers 
of protection guaranteed by the Convention to those facing a criminal trial (Ashworth & 
Horder, 2013). To illustrate how the anti-subversion doctrine operates in practice, let us 
consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that one of the contracting states to the 
ECHR decides to re-label its entire penal code as a civil set of wrongs without changing 
the substance of any of the rules in question as a means of circumventing the Convention. 
Although all of the offences included in that state’s penal code are now labelled as civil 
rules, the anti-subversion doctrine enables, in theory, courts to determine whether each 
legal rule should be regarded as criminal regardless of its new label.  
Based on the anti-subversion doctrine, our starting point in this process should be 
the classification made by domestic legislation, i.e. whether the legislature classified this 
as a criminal or a non-criminal rule (para.81-82). The domestic classification should 
provide us with an indication as to the intentions of the legislature. The second step is to 
examine the nature of the offence committed by that individual (para.82). In Engel, the 
fact that the applicants were members of the armed forces and the offences committed 
were inextricably linked with their occupation meant that the classification of the offence 
at stake as disciplinary rather than as criminal could be warranted (para.82). Thirdly, 
according to this test, one should assess ‘the degree of severity of the penalty that the 
person concerned risks incurring’ (para.82). The ECtHR held that if the sanction imposed 
is so severe that it amounts to a deprivation of someone’s liberty under Article 5 of the 
Convention, then it should be regarded as a form of criminal punishment (para.82). 
According to the ECtHR, ‘in a society subscribing to the rule of law, [sanctions of this 
severity] belong to the “criminal” sphere (para.82).    
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Before analysing in more depth this three-part test, it is imperative to examine 
how terms like ‘liberty’ and ‘deprivation’ have been conceptualised by the ECtHR. Based 
on Engel, liberty in this context should be given its classic meaning and interpreted as 
‘the physical liberty of the person’ excluding any ‘mere restrictions upon liberty of 
movement’ (para.58). This approach is in harmony with the interpretation given to liberty 
by both Article 5 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention which make reference 
to individuals’ right to move freely within the contracting states’ jurisdiction.  
In determining whether the sanction imposed amounts to a deprivation of 
someone’s liberty, the ECtHR held that ‘account should be taken of a whole range of 
factors such as the nature, duration, effects and manner of execution of the penalty or 
measure in question’ (para.59). In Engel, the court focused on the severity of the sanctions 
imposed on the applicants, i.e. the number of days they had to spend under arrest (para.61-
64). For the ECtHR, only in those cases where individuals were actually locked in a cell 
and were completely deprived of their freedom of movement would that amount to a 
deprivation of their liberty under Article 5, i.e. they must have been ‘kept under lock and 
key’ (para.61-64).  
At first sight, the three-part test introduced by the ECtHR in Engel seems a 
positive development, especially in cases where severe restrictions on an individual’s 
liberty have been imposed in the absence of the enhanced procedural protections 
guaranteed under Article 6. Although the anti-subversion doctrine provides a good 
starting point for a more holistic approach to criminalisation, two key reservations can be 
expressed about the test formulated by the ECtHR. 
First, according to Engel, it is essential to pay attention to the legislature’s original 
intentions with regard to the legal rule under scrutiny, i.e. the first limb of the test 
(para.81-82). If the expressed intention of the legislature was not to punish those who 
violate this legal rule, then this should be an indication against criminalisation (para.81-
82). This is an explicit acknowledgement by the ECtHR that the national legislature is in 
a better position to determine how domestic legislation should be labelled.  
In effect, however, reliance on the legislature’s original intentions can be 
problematic since it provides national legislatures with a significant leeway through 
which they can manage to circumvent the anti-subversion doctrine. To elucidate how this 
can work in practice, let us re-examine the TPIMs in light of the Engel test. As noted 
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above, through the TPIMs significant restrictions can be imposed on suspected terrorists, 
even though they have committed no offence.14 As the wording of the 2011 Act suggests, 
the main objective of these measures is to prevent terrorism-related activities. If we were 
to strictly apply the first limb of the Engel test, then we would have dismissed outright 
the possibility of regarding the TPIMs as a criminal rule because the legislature’s 
intention was to introduce a civil preventive measure rather than to punish suspected 
terrorists. Consequently, the first limb of the test can encourage states to label legislation 
as non-criminal in the name of prevention, even though, in theory, it seems possible for 
the rule in question to be implemented in a manner that results in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. As King (2014: 382) explains, however, 
labelling a specific legal rule either as civil or preventive ‘does not [necessarily] relieve 
proceedings of their criminal nature’.15 In order to examine, therefore, the true nature of 
the legal rule in question we need to look beyond the label attached by the legislature and 
‘concentrate on the realities of the situation’ (Ezeh and Connors v United Kingdom (2004) 
39 EHRR 1: para 16). 16  As the ECtHR rightly pointed out in Ezeh, the official 
classification made by the legislature has ‘only a formal and relative value’ (para. 9). 
Although in both Engel and Ezeh (para. 16) the need ‘to look beyond appearances 
and the language used’ was highlighted, it is evident through a line of cases that the 
                                                             
14 See 3.1.1. 
15 King (2014) is critical here of the approach adopted by the ECtHR in Air Canada v UK [1995] 20 EHRR 
150 which in effect mirrored the first-limb of the anti-subversion doctrine. In this case, the ECtHR had to 
determine, inter alia, whether section 141(1) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (by virtue 
of which the applicant’s property was seized) constituted a criminal offence and thus triggered the Article 
6 protections (e.g. the presumption of innocence) (164). In determining the nature of section 141, the 
ECtHR paid particular emphasis upon the legislature’s intention, which according to the Strasbourg court, 
was not the imposition of a penalty (164-165). Rather, according to the majority, the £50 000 payment 
made by the applicant for the return of its property should ‘be seen as a measure limiting the harm caused’ 
to them (164-165). As Judge Trechsel (dissenting) rightly pointed out, however, when determining the 
nature of a particular provision we should look ‘behind appearances … [and investigate] what [has] actually 
happened in the present case’ (166).          
16 This case involved disciplinary proceedings against the applicants who were already serving a custodial 
sentence. As a result of these disciplinary proceedings, additional days of custody were imposed on both 
applicants. The applicants claimed that these proceedings were criminal in nature and thus denial of legal 
representation constituted a violation of their rights under Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention. In determining 
the true nature of these disciplinary proceedings, the Grand Chambers of the ECtHR held that in order for 
the Article 6 protections to be triggered, the ‘offence [in question must] made the person liable to a sanction 
which, by its nature and degree of severity, belongs in general to the “criminal” sphere’ (para. 86). In this 
case, the Grand Chambers of the ECtHR, indeed, looked beyond the stated objectives of these disciplinary 
proceedings noting that prevention and punishment ‘are not mutually exclusive’ (para. 105). On this view, 
since one the purposes of the sanctions imposed was to punish the applicants, then the disciplinary 
proceedings against them should be regarded as criminal for the purposes of the Convention. 
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ECtHR on many occasions was in fact reluctant to do so.17 This reluctance of the ECtHR 
to actually look beyond the official label attached by domestic legislation is particularly 
evident in cases involving civil forfeiture.18 One of the most illustrative examples of this, 
is the case of M. In M, the applicant had a number of previous convictions including 
‘membership of an organisation of the mafia type …, lending money at an extortionate 
rate, obtaining money with menaces and demanding money with menaces’ (82-83). The 
Italian authorities managed to obtain a compulsory residence order as well as a 
confiscation order against him on the basis that his vast fortune ‘could only have been 
accumulated from the proceeds of [his] unlawful activities’ (84). According to the 
domestic legislation in question, it was sufficient for the Italian authorities to establish a 
prima facie case regarding the unlawful origins of the applicant’s assets. Simply put, there 
was no need for the authority applying for the issue of a confiscation order to prove 
beyond any reasonable doubt that M’s assets were in fact the product of his criminal 
activities.19 This was due to the nature of the relevant legislation which, according to the 
Italian government, was to prevent dangerous individuals from committing crimes, rather 
than to punish them for their past behaviour. If a prima facie case was established against 
an individual’s assets, then he/she had to provide an explanation for his/her assets. 
For the appellant, the confiscation of his property constituted a form of criminal 
punishment and thus violated his rights under both Article 6(2) (i.e. the presumption of 
innocence) and Article 7(1) (i.e. prohibition against retrospective punishment). For the 
respondent, there was no violation of the Convention since these rights only apply to 
criminal offences and do not extent to preventive interventions. Similar to the approach 
taken in Engel, in determining the true nature of the legal rule at stake, the ECtHR focused 
on what the legislature aimed at through the introduction of this legal provision and how 
domestic courts dealt with measures of this kind before. Since, according to the 
Strasbourg court, ‘proceedings on an application for a preventive measure are 
autonomous in relation to criminal proceedings and do not involve a finding of guilt’, 
                                                             
17 In effect, this created certain anomalies (see. for instance, my analysis of M v Italy 12386/86 and Ezeh 
below) and ambiguities which enabled domestic courts to turn a blind eye (at least in certain cases) to the 
realities of the situation. This was particularly evident in cases such as McCann. As Bakalis (2003: 584) 
maintains, ‘the House of Lords [in this case] … was rather selective in the parts of the Strasbourg judgments 
it chose to apply’ choosing to neglect or dismiss cases, such as Lauko v Slovakia (1998) 33 EHRR 9, where 
the ECtHR in fact focused on the actual impact of the sanctions/restrictions imposed on those subjected to 
legal rules which were susceptible of indirect criminalisation.  
18 For a more comprehensive analysis of these cases see King, 2014.  
19 As far as M is concerned, there was ‘a substantial body of circumstantial evidence’ against the unlawful 
origins of his assets (83). 
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then a confiscation order against the applicant ‘does not imply a finding that he was guilty 
of a specific offence’ (97-98).   
Depriving criminals of their unlawfully obtained assets is a defensible objective 
for the state to pursue since this does not only prevent future criminality, but it also 
communicates a message to society that there is a significant ‘likelihood of 
detection/conviction’ (King, 2014: 374). As Loader (2008) rightly points out though, as 
a society we should not only be concerned with what kinds of behaviour we regulated, 
but we should also be mindful of how we do so. Although the primary objective of the 
confiscation order issued against M might have indeed been the prevention of future 
crime, we cannot simply overlook the realities of the situation. In this case, the appellant 
was not only deprived of most of his property, but he was also labelled (at least indirectly) 
by the Italian authorities as a criminal whose behaviour is worth of reprobation. It follows 
that regardless of the legislature’s objectives, preventive measures such as the 
confiscation order imposed on M, might result in the imposition of sanctions akin to 
criminal punishment. This was also acknowledged by Lord Bingham in the case of 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 where he stated that 
preventing interventions can be equally restrictive as criminal offences.20 In his words 
‘this distinction [between preventive and criminal interventions] is not watertight, since 
prevention is one of the recognised aims and consequences of punishment and the effect 
of a preventative measure may be so adverse as to be penal in its effects if not in its 
intention’ (para. 23).21 Hence, if we are truly determined to investigate the actual nature 
of the law in question, it is imperative to look beyond its stated objectives and focus on 
its impact on those subjected to it.   
                                                             
20 In this case the House of Lords had to determine, inter alia, whether a non-derogating control order 
issued under section 2 and section 3(1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ‘constituted a criminal 
charge for the purposes of Article 6’ (para. 3). Similar to the approach adopted in McCann, the House of 
Lords (relying on the Engel test) held that these non-derogating control orders were civil in nature since 
they ‘do not involve the determination of a criminal charge … only a foundation of suspicion’ (para. 24). 
Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that ‘in any case in which a person is at risk of an order containing 
obligations of the stringency found in this case’, that person should be entitled to the Article 6 protections 
(para. 24). 
21 As Stahlberg and Lahmann (2011: 1076) explain, this distinction is particularly problematic in the context 
of terrorism-related preventive measures which might include ‘retributive and punitive element(s)’. 
According to them, the Engel test affords national courts with a significant degree of discretion regarding 
the classification of these measures since it allows them to place particular emphasis upon their preventive 
objectives. This is further evident through the House of Lords’ decision in MB (discussed above) where a 
balancing act was conducted in order to determine whether the non-derogating control orders should be 
regarded as a criminal charge for the purposes of the Convention.  
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Looking beyond appearances enables us to scrutinise the true nature of legal rules 
and identify instances of indirect criminalisation. It also allows us to draw a distinction 
between what Tadros (2010) describes as ‘true crimes’ and regulatory offences. Based on 
the Engel test though this might be problematic since  it is the intention of the legislature 
for both kinds of wrongs to be considered as criminal rules. Our analysis, therefore, 
should start from the premise that regulatory offences should be regarded as criminal rules 
because this is what the legislature intends. The foregoing criticisms illustrate further why 
it is necessary for legal theorists to look beyond the official classification of legal rules 
and investigate if their implementation has resulted in the imposition of criminal 
punishment. Clearly, the official classification of a legal rule provides a good starting 
point in terms of determining whether it should be regarded as criminal or non-criminal, 
but we should take care not to place too much weight on it.22 This should only be a starting 
point, not a criterion.       
The second cause for concern relates to the severity of the sanctions imposed on 
the perpetrator, i.e. the third limb of the test. Based on Engel, if the sanction imposed on 
the perpetrator constitutes a severe deprivation of their liberty under Article 5, then it 
should be regarded as a form of criminal punishment (para.85). It is important to note that 
the ECtHR in Engel had to adopt a very narrow interpretation of liberty since the 
applicants argued that the sanctions imposed on them constituted a violation of their 
Article 5 rights (para.56). This led the ECtHR to interpret liberty in the context of Article 
5. Consequently, in order for a sanction to meet the threshold set by Engel it must severely 
restrict the perpetrator’s physical liberty (para.61-64). Accordingly, if we were to adopt 
the Engel approach as to the meaning of liberty, then we would only associate criminal 
punishment with imprisonment, home curfews and any other kinds of sanctions which 
limit the perpetrators’ freedom of movement.  
Although imprisonment is regarded as a paradigmatic form of criminal sanction 
and freedom of movement as a fundamental right, this does not necessarily mean that our 
analysis should be restricted only to the most severe types of sanctions. Imprisonment is 
just one out of the many weapons in the criminal law’s arsenal that can be used against 
those who offend. A defendant who is found guilty of a criminal offence can be ordered 
to pay a fine, he can be required to compensate the victim for the harm suffered or he can 
                                                             
22 See Figure 3.1. 
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receive a community sentence.23 As part of this process, the sentencing court must take 
into consideration an array of other external factors to the wrong committed, such as the 
rehabilitation of the perpetrator 24  and his financial circumstances. 25  This means that 
sanctions imposed for the commission of a criminal offence can take various forms and 
vary considerably both in terms of their nature and severity.  
The narrow interpretation of liberty adopted in Engel may in fact facilitate further 
subversions to the criminal law rather than prevent them. Focusing on imprisonment 
alone might encourage the introduction of civil measures, such as the TPIMs and the 
injunction, through which non-custodial sanctions can be imposed. Although these non-
custodial sanctions can severely restrict the perpetrator’s liberty (not necessarily his 
physical liberty), based on Engel, these measures should not be regarded as criminal rules. 
To prevent possible subversions to the criminal law, therefore, liberty should be 
interpreted more widely than in Engel. This will allow us to expand our analysis beyond 
traditional forms of criminal sanctions, such as custodial sentences, and examine whether 
alternative sanctions can also be regarded as a form of criminal punishment.  
Another cause for concern regarding the third limb of the anti-subversion doctrine 
relates to the requirement of severity. As discussed earlier, the sanction imposed need not 
only to restrict the perpetrator’s physical liberty in order to be regarded as a form of 
criminal punishment, but it must also do so severely, i.e. to completely restrict their ability 
to move freely (para.81-82).  
Determining whether a given sanction constitutes a deprivation of someone’s 
liberty can be straightforward in cases where the perpetrator receives a lengthy custodial 
sentence since the sanction will be severe enough to meet the threshold required by Engel. 
This, however, might not be as straightforward when a non-custodial sentence is imposed 
on the perpetrator. Suppose that both Andrew and Sam constantly behave in an anti-social 
manner whilst being in their local city centre. As a result of their behaviour many local 
residents feel upset and avoid the city centre, something which has a significant financial 
impact on local businesses. In order to prevent them from engaging in further ASB, it is 
decided by local authorities that they must apply for the issue of an injunction against 
both of them in order to prevent them from entering the city centre. For Andrew, this 
                                                             
23 Section 142(1)(e) and section 151 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 142(1)(e) respectively. 
24 Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 142(1). 
25 Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 164. 
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restriction means that he will not be able to visit some members of his family who live in 
the city centre. For Sam the issue of the injunction does not really mean anything as he 
tends to move frequently from one town to another. 
If we were to determine whether the sanctions imposed on Andrew and Sam 
constitute of a form of criminal punishment based on Engel, we would have concluded 
that these restrictions can hardly be regarded as such since both of them can visit every 
other part of the city. Examined objectively these sanctions do not severely restrict their 
physical liberty. If a subjective assessment is conducted, however, we could argue that 
for Andrew the issue of the injunction deprives not only his physical freedom, but also 
his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, i.e. the right to private and family life. 
Determining, therefore, whether a particular sanction constitutes a severe deprivation of 
one’s liberty can be contingent upon their personal circumstances. An objective 
assessment in this context cannot always be representative of the actual consequences that 
a given sanction has on the perpetrator. Equally, if we are to engage in a subjective 
assessment we must draft a list of factors which should be taken into consideration when 
determining the severity of the sanction imposed.  
To illustrate further the problematic nature of the above approach, it would be 
instructive to compare the third limb of the anti-subversion doctrine was applied in the 
cases of M and Ezeh. Whilst in Ezeh (para. 129) the ECtHR noted that additional days of 
custody imposed on the appellants (i.e. forty days for the first appellant and seven for the 
second one) ‘cannot be regarded as sufficiently unimportant or inconsequential as to 
displace the presumed criminal nature of the charges against them’, in M (98) the 
Strasbourg Court held that depriving someone of most of his property (and in effect 
labelling him a criminal) is not so severe ‘as to warrant its classification as a criminal 
penalty for the purposes of the Convention’. The above decisions beg the question 
whether seven days of additional custody is indeed a more severe sanction than seizing 
most of an individual’s assets and publically condemning him as someone’s who lives of 
the proceeds of crime. A possible solution here would be to avoid the imposition of a 
specific threshold all together and focus on whether the sanction in question simply 
interferes with the perpetrator’s liberty.26 
                                                             
26 See 3.2.1. 
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The formulation of the anti-subversion doctrine can clearly be regarded as a 
positive development since it constitutes an explicit acknowledgment by the ECtHR that 
non-criminal measures can be operating as de facto criminal rules. In doing so, however, 
the ECtHR decided to adopt a quite conservative approach by focusing solely on the most 
extreme examples of indirect criminalisation, i.e. sanctions that severely restrict the 
perpetrators’ freedom of movement. This is of course in stark contrast with the variety of 
sanctions that can currently be imposed on those found guilty of an offence. A more 
inclusive approach, however, means that we should assess (subjectively) how the sanction 
in question has affected the perpetrator and whether this is sufficient to amount to criminal 
punishment.    
3.2 Redefining criminalisation: Developing existing approaches 
Our discussion so far has focused on the main challenges faced by both the way 
criminalisation has been conceptualised in the academic literature and through the anti-
subversion doctrine. The main purpose of this discussion has been to examine more 
closely how criminalisation has been defined and explore whether these existing accounts 
can provide a single viable test for distinguishing criminal from non-criminal rules.  
For many prominent legal philosophers, what distinguishes the criminal law from 
other forms of regulation is the imposition of punishment. For them, in order for a legal 
sanction to be regarded as criminal punishment it must: (i) allow for the imposition of 
‘hard treatment’; and (iii) it must intentionally and publically communicate censure.  As 
mentioned earlier, however, this account of criminalisation was formulated to illustrate 
the difference between paradigmatic offences, such as the unlawful infliction of GBH, 
and non-criminal rules. Although this account accurately represents the difference 
between the two, it has been argued that it fails to take into consideration the prospect of 
indirect criminalisation since it is based on the assumption that censure is tied exclusively 
to the criminal label. In order to examine whether criminalisation occurs indirectly, it is 
essential to look beyond the label attached to each legal rule and scrutinise the nature of 
the sanctions imposed or threatened to be imposed on those who are found in breach of 
the rule in question.   
Although the anti-subversion doctrine aims at looking beyond the official 
classification of legal rules, it has been concluded that it is in need of modification. The 
main reason for this is twofold. First, the anti-subversion doctrine requires an examination 
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of the legislature’s intentions with regard to the legal rule in question (the first limb of the 
three-part test). In practice, this doctrine is circular in application. Rules which were 
explicitly regarded by the legislature as non-criminal, will inevitably fail to meet the first 
limb of this doctrine. Secondly, concerns have been raised regarding the third limb of the 
test according to which a sanction can only be regarded as a form of criminal punishment 
if it has severely deprived the physical liberty of the perpetrator. As noted above, this 
narrow interpretation of liberty is problematic because it fails to take into account the 
entire array of sanctions that can currently be imposed upon a guilty verdict. Moreover, 
it has been argued that this narrow interpretation of liberty might in fact encourage 
subversions to the criminal law rather than to prevent them.  
The above criticisms led to the conclusion that a working definition of 
criminalisation is needed through which we can distinguish criminal from non-criminal 
rules irrespective of the label attached to them. It has to be acknowledged from the outset 
that this working definition of criminalisation does not constitute a complete departure 
from the way criminalisation has been conceptualised through the abovementioned 
accounts. Instead, it was built upon the deficiencies of these pre-existing accounts aiming 
primarily at preventing possible subversions to the criminal law rather than to encourage 
them.  
Similar to the accounts of criminalisation examined earlier, central to the working 
definition formulated below is the assumption that criminal rules are those rules which 
result in the imposition of criminal punishment. Criminal punishment comprises of two 
main prerequisites, both of which must be satisfied in order for the legal rule under 
scrutiny to constitute a form of criminalisation. The two prerequisites of this working 
definition are: 
(i) The legal rule must threaten to impose and/or its implementation must result in 
the imposition of a sanction which limits the perpetrator’s liberty; and 
(ii) The sanction imposed and/or threatened to be imposed on the perpetrator must 
publically and purposefully communicate censure.   
96 
 
Figure 3.1: Applying the working definition of criminalisation in practice27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, this working definition of criminalisation cannot pre-
determine whether certain kinds of sanctions constitute a form of criminal punishment. 
Rather, it requires us to scrutinise each sanction individually in order to examine whether 
it satisfies both prerequisites.28  
                                                             
27 Figure 3.1 constitutes a working definition of criminalisation that provides a step by step process to 
determine whether a localised criminal code is created or not. 
28 I will further discuss this need to assess each case individually during my evaluation of the working 
definition of criminalisation in 3.3. 
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3.2.1 To limit the perpetrator’s liberty 
Central to both accounts of criminalisation scrutinised earlier, is the need for the sanction 
imposed to interfere with the perpetrator’s liberty, i.e. the imposition of ‘hard treatment’. 
For Feinberg (1965), a distinction must be drawn between mere penalties, such as parking 
fines and disqualifications, and sanctions which amount to punishment, such as 
imprisonment. According to him, sanctions like parking fines can hardly qualify as a form 
of punishment (Feinberg, 1965). Seen in this way, ‘hard treatment’ must have a severe 
impact on those who offend (Feinberg, 1965). Although based on his account punishment 
appears to have a more severe impact on the offender than a penalty, he acknowledged 
that this might not always be the case since penalties can also be heavy-handed (Feinberg, 
1965). Similarly, based on the anti-subversion doctrine, the sanction imposed needs to 
severely restrict the perpetrator’s physical liberty if it is to be regarded as a form of 
punishment. As discussed earlier though, drawing a distinction between sanctions that 
severely restrict someone’s physical liberty and those which do not, can be particularly 
problematic especially when scrutinising non-custodial sentences.29 For this reason, the 
working definition of criminalisation formulated above sought to adopt a more inclusive 
approach focusing on any sanction that interferes with someone’s liberty. 
At first sight, both the working definition formulated in this chapter (the first 
prerequisite) and the abovementioned accounts of criminalisation appear to require a 
deprivation of the perpetrator’s liberty. Although this is true, the interpretation of liberty 
adopted by each stance varies considerably.  As Moore (2014: 184) rightly contends, 
liberty can be interpreted in various ways due to the fact that it can ‘mean a lot of things 
to a lot of different people’. According to him, to be left free without any interference by 
the state is not always desirable since this will allow people to ‘do evil’ (Moore, 2014: 
184, Dworkin, 1996). It is for this reason that as members of the community we must 
accept some deprivation of our liberty, such as restricting our freedom to ‘do evil’, in 
order for the state to guarantee to us a number of other more important and valuable 
freedoms, such as to protect us from others’ evil behaviour (Rousseau, 1998). On this 
view, not ‘all instances of coercion are equally objectionable’ (Husak, 1983: 357, 
Feinberg, 1973). Road users, for instance, must accept a deprivation of their liberty by 
driving on a particular side of the road, in exchange for a more secure road network. 
                                                             
29 See 3.1.2. 
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Liberty, therefore, should be interpreted as a set of valuable freedoms rather than as an 
all-encompassing abstract term (Raz, 1986). 
The above account of liberty requires a distinction between those freedoms which 
are valueless, such as the freedom to ‘do evil’, and those which are worthwhile, such as 
the right to life (Raz, 1986). A potential solution here would be to draft a list of basic 
and/or fundamental liberties which form the backbone of every contemporary liberal 
society. Raz (1986: 246) is critical of this approach and points out that a ‘list of basic 
liberties is a matter of contention’ and only a handful of freedoms, such as the right to 
family, can certainly be included in our list. Instead, Raz (1986: 246) proposes a 
distinction based on the ‘contribution [that these freedoms] have to the ideal of personal 
autonomy’. Based on his account, if a particular freedom, such as the freedom of religion, 
is capable of enhancing one’s autonomous life, then it would be justifiable to hold 
‘members of the society at large to be duty-bound … to provide [individuals] with the 
social environment necessary’ to exercise their religion (Raz, 1986: 247). 
Although Raz’s assertion that a list of basic and/or fundamental freedoms can be 
a very contentious matter appears to be reasoned, this approach should not be dismissed 
outright. In many jurisdictions, such as in the United States, an indication as to what is 
regarded as a basic and/or fundamental freedom can be provided through a closer 
examination of the rights protected under the Constitution. In the absence of a written 
constitution, such as in the case of England and Wales, our focus could shift to other 
authoritative sources of law. As far as England and Wales is concerned, the main focus 
can be on the rights found in the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998). The HRA 1998 
has incorporated in this jurisdiction most of the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
ECHR, such as the ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘the protection of property’.30  The 
enactment of the HRA 1998 indicates that these rights and freedoms are to be regarded 
as basic and/or fundamental for this society since they reflect its core values and 
principles. For the purposes of this working definition, liberty is conceptualised in terms 
of those rights and freedoms guaranteed to every citizen in this jurisdiction through the 
HRA 1998.     
The final aspect of the first prerequisite relates to the required threshold that the 
restrictions on one’s liberty must meet in order to qualify as a potential form of criminal 
                                                             
30 Article 10 and Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR respectively.  
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punishment. As discussed earlier, in both academic discourse and in Engel it has been 
suggested that in order for a legal sanction to potentially qualify as a form of criminal 
punishment, it must severely restrict the perpetrator’s liberty.31  Feinberg (1965), for 
example, argued that imprisonment is a paradigm form of ‘hard treatment’ whereas 
parking fines should be regarded as mere penalties. Similarly, in Engel, the ECtHR held 
that only when the perpetrator is ‘kept under lock and key’ the sanction imposed against 
him can be regarded as a form of punishment (para. 61-64).  
This thesis contends that a working definition of criminalisation should not 
require the sanction imposed to severely restrict the perpetrator’s liberty in order for 
qualify as a potential form of criminal punishment. In fact, it should include no such 
requirement at all. Simply put, if the sanction under scrutiny interferes with the 
perpetrator’s liberty as this was defined above, then the first prerequisite is satisfied. The 
degree of deprivation is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether the first 
prerequisite is satisfied. The reason for this is twofold. First, the imposition of ‘hard 
treatment’ does not only serve an instrumental purpose, such as the incapacitation of the 
offender, but it also has a symbolic meaning. As von Hirsch (1993) points out, the severity 
of ‘hard treatment’ should be a reflection of the perpetrator’s blameworthiness. 
Accordingly, the higher the blame, the more severe the ‘hard treatment’ should be and 
vice versa. On this view, the sanctions imposed by criminal law should range from mild 
deprivations of liberties, such as a relatively small fine, to life imprisonment. Based on 
the pre-existing account of criminalisation analysed above, only those sanctions at the top 
end of the ladder can amount to criminal punishment. If this line of argument is true, we 
must then restrict the ambit of the criminal law only to the most serious kinds of moral 
wrongs, i.e. to wrongs which would justify the imposition of a severe deprivation of the 
perpetrator’s liberty. For those who advocate for the use of the criminal law as a ‘last 
resort’ measure, this could be the most preferable option since criminalisation would be 
reserved for the most serious kinds of moral wrongdoing, but this is descriptively 
inaccurate as to the current criminal law.32  
Secondly, the imposition of any threshold in this context can cause unnecessary 
ambiguities as to what qualifies as a severe restriction of liberty. To illustrate this point, 
consider the following hypothetical. Sam, who is a young unemployed individual, 
                                                             
31 See 3.1. 
32 For more on criminalisation as a ‘last resort’ measure see Husak (2004). 
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receives a £500 fine for driving beyond the speed limit. This fine is likely to have a severe 
impact on Sam since he will find it very difficult to pay his rent for the next few months; 
he might even have to sleep rough. Andrew, a multibillionaire, receives a £500 fine as 
well for driving beyond the speed limit. Both of them were driving at the same speed, on 
the same road and at the same time. In contrast to Sam, this £500 fine will barely affect 
Andrew’s life.  
If we were to strictly apply the Engel approach, then we would have concluded 
that the fine imposed on both of them does not constitute a form of punishment since it 
does not restrict the perpetrators’ physical liberty. Nevertheless, if one adopts the 
interpretation of liberty advanced above, it could be argued that the fines imposed 
interfere with the ability of the perpetrators to enjoy their property freely. Is this 
interference sufficiently severe to qualify as a ‘hard treatment’? If this is to be assessed 
objectively without paying attention to Sam’s financial situation, then it is unlikely that a 
£500 fine would severely restrict someone’s enjoyment of his property. Still the pressing 
question is where do we draw the line between sanctions which constitute a severe 
deprivation of the perpetrator’s liberty and those sanctions which are not? Although such 
a distinction can be easier to apply when scrutinising custodial sentences, this might not 
be as straightforward when dealing with other types of sanctions imposed either by 
criminal law or by other forms of regulation.    
As far as the foregoing hypothetical is concerned, the impact that these sanctions 
have on the perpetrators vary considerably due to their financial circumstances. If our 
assessment was based on purely subjective grounds, then we could argue that only the 
sanction imposed on Sam is severe enough to qualify as a form of ‘hard treatment’.33 On 
this view, if we wished to impose a ‘hard treatment’ on Andrew as well, then we should 
have imposed on him a considerably higher fine than the one imposed on Sam.34 Imposing 
a considerably higher fine on Andrew, however, due to the fact that he is a multibillionaire 
would constitute a disproportionate response to the wrong committed. Moreover, to 
punish Andrew on those terms would be morally controversial since based on the 
                                                             
33 For courts, however, it would be impracticable and probably too expensive to accurately assess the exact 
impact that a fine is likely to have on the perpetrator.  
34 According to the sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council there are six different fine 
bands. The fine band applicable in each case is determined by the seriousness of the offence committed by 
the accused. Each fine band will determine the maximum amount of fine that can be imposed on the 
accused. Although Andrew is likely to receive a higher fine than Sam due to his financial prosperity, this 
fine cannot exceed the maximum amount applicable for that particular fine band. See Sentencing Council. 
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principle of proportionality ‘the severity of a sanction [must reflect] the stringency of the 
blame’ (von Hirsch, 1993: 15).35 Andrew’s conduct is as blameworthy as Sam’s conduct 
and thus the sanction imposed on both of them should be at least similar if not identical. 
To hold otherwise, would result in the imposition of a different sanction for the same 
wrong. This would contradict with one of criminal law’s core function of punishing the 
blameworthiness of a particular kind of behaviour (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011), rather 
than the imposition of something akin to progressive punishment where the higher the 
income the higher the fine will be.36   
For the reasons given above we should refrain from setting a specific threshold of 
severity that each sanction must meet in order for the first prerequisite to be satisfied. 
Instead, we should require that the sanction imposed or threatened to be imposed on the 
perpetrator simply limits the ability of the wrongdoer to enjoy his liberty. This will enable 
us to focus on the actual sanction imposed rather than on assessing how severely the 
sanction imposed limits the perpetrator’s liberty. This, however, means that the net of 
potential criminal rules is cast very widely and thus the role of the second criterion 
becomes even more important in terms of identifying those rules which can result in the 
imposition of criminal punishment. 
3.2.2 It must communicate censure 
The second prerequisite of this working definition is that the sanction imposed (or 
threatened to be imposed) needs to publically and purposefully condemn the perpetrator 
and his behaviour. As Duff (2010) explains, what really distinguishes criminal sanctions 
from other types of sanctions imposed by law is their ability to publically condemn both 
the offender and the wrong committed. To formally criminalise a particular kind of 
behaviour is to publically condemn it (Duff, 2001; Walters, Forthcoming). Through 
criminalisation a message is conveyed (intentionally) to society that the behaviour 
criminalised is so blameworthy that is worth criminalising (Kadish, 1987). Accordingly, 
to be found guilty of an offence is to be publically condemned as a moral wrongdoer. This 
is one of the main reasons why a criminal conviction can result in the stigmatisation and 
social ostracisation of the perpetrator by the rest of the community (Ashworth & Horder, 
2013). This account provides an accurate description of how direct criminalisation 
                                                             
35 For more on the principle of proportionality see 2.3.2. 
36 Although progressive punishment ensures that each sanction affects the perpetrators equally, as noted 
before this approach will cause similar cases to be treated differently based on the perpetrator’s financial 
situation.  
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communicates censure. Nonetheless, it provides no guidance as to how censure can be 
communicated indirectly through non-criminal legislation. This was one of the main 
reservations expressed about the way criminalisation is conceptualised in the academic 
literature.37 
As far as indirect criminalisation is concerned, our starting point should not be the 
label attached to the legal rule at stake, but its implementation. The fact that the legislature 
decided not to classify a particular rule as criminal, indicates that its intention was not to 
publically condemn the behaviour regulated. As discussed earlier, however, certain non-
criminal rules, such as the injunction, appear to allow for the imposition of sanctions akin 
to criminal punishment. In order to examine whether these measures operate as de facto 
criminal rules, it is necessary to look beyond the label attached to them by the legislature 
and investigate what the purpose of the sanctions imposed through these measures is. If 
the purpose of these sanctions is solely to prevent certain undesirable outcomes, such as 
further ASB, and there is no public denunciation of the perpetrator in question, then the 
second prerequisite of the working definition is not satisfied. However, if there is 
evidence to suggest that the purpose of the sanction imposed was to inflict pain and there 
are public forms of stigmatisation attached to it, then this will satisfy the second 
prerequisite of the working definition.  
State actors, such as the police, can purposefully communicate censure through 
various ways. For this reason, an exhaustive list of how censure can be purposefully 
communicated (when moving away from direct criminalisation) cannot be provided. 
Instead, it is necessary to assess each case on its own merits and examine whether the 
sanction imposed on the perpetrator aimed at his public denunciation. To illustrate this, 
consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that Sam is a suspected terrorist and that a 
home curfew has been imposed on him through a TPIMs notice.38 Here, it is important to 
remind ourselves that for the imposition of a TPIMs notice the suspected terrorist need 
not be convicted of any offence. The Secretary of State needs only to establish a prima 
facie case against that individual and that the allegations against that him are not 
                                                             
37 See 3.1.1. 
38 The reason why I am referring here to the TPIMs instead of the injunction is twofold. First, I elaborate 
further on how the injunction can be implemented in a manner that results in the public and purposeful 
condemnation of those subjected to it below (see 4.2.2.2). Secondly, as discussed earlier, other civil 
preventive measures, such as the TPIMs, raise similar considerations as those raised by the ASBOs and 
now the injunction. Hence, it would be instructive to refer to the TPIMs here in order to illustrate this further 
(see ‘Introduction’). 
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‘obviously flawed’.39 It follows that the intention of the legislature was not to label the 
TPIMs as criminal measures. Rather, the legislature intends for these measures to prevent 
terrorism-related activities.  Nonetheless, the police’s counter-terrorism unit decided to 
publicise Sam’s story along with his personal details as a means of reassuring the public 
that action has been taken against a potential terrorist. In this press release colourful 
language has been used against Sam and his behaviour. Following this press release Sam 
has been stigmatised by the rest of the polity as a terrorist sympathiser and aider. Although 
the main objective of this press release was to reassure the public, it is evident that it also 
sought to publically condemn Sam. Clearly, the public denunciation of Sam was not 
incidental. Rather, the use of colourful language suggests that this was amongst the 
purposes of this press-release. In this case, the second prerequisite of the working 
definition is satisfied and thus the home curfew imposed on Sam should be regarded as 
criminal punishment.40 
Thus far, this chapter has scrutinised both the academic literature on 
criminalisation and the anti-subversion doctrine formulated by the ECtHR in Engel. The 
main objective of this analysis has been to explore whether these accounts can lead to a 
single viable test based on which we can distinguish criminal from non-criminal rules. 
Upon closer scrutiny of these accounts, certain problems and inconsistencies have been 
identifying. These problems and inconsistencies necessitated the formulation of a 
working definition of criminalisation. This test does not constitute a complete departure 
from the pre-existing accounts of criminalisation. Rather, these accounts have formed the 
basis for this new test the main objective of which is to identify criminal rules regardless 
of the label attached to them by the legislature. In the remainder of this chapter an 
evaluation of this working definition will be provided.     
3.3 An evaluation of the working definition of criminalisation 
3.3.1 Limitations 
The working definition of criminalisation formulated above can be criticised on four 
grounds. First, it can be criticised for being potentially over-inclusive since it can cover 
any kind of sanction which slightly deprives someone’s liberty. This can be attributed to 
the first prerequisite of the working definition which requires mere interference with the 
                                                             
39 Section 6(3)(a). 
40 I will elaborate further on how the working definition of criminalisation can be applied in practice in 
4.2.2. 
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perpetrator’s liberty. Although at first sight this criticism appears to be valid, it is essential 
to reiterate that in order for a sanction to be regarded as a form of criminal punishment 
both prerequisites must be satisfied. If the sanction imposed interferes with the 
perpetrator’s liberty but does not publically and purposefully communicate censure, then 
the second prerequisite will not be satisfied and the test will not be made out. Moreover, 
it must be borne in mind that this assessment does not relate to the justifiability of 
criminalisation. Rather, this working definition assists us to determine whether the 
restrictions imposed on the perpetrator amount to criminal punishment and thus constitute 
a form of criminalisation. The issue as to whether criminalisation can be warranted should 
form part of a different exercise at a later stage. 
Secondly, concerns can be raised about the fact that if this working definition of 
criminalisation is to be adopted, then a detailed examination of each and every legal rule 
and its implementation will be needed. In the context of the ASB tools and powers, a 
case-by-case analysis of every injunction or a CBO will be needed in order to determine 
whether in each case the sanctions imposed meet both prerequisites of the working 
definition of criminalisation. In some cases, we might conclude that the implementation 
of the injunction amounts to criminalisation whereas in some other instances this might 
not be the case.41 This of course reiterates the ambiguous scope of the law in this area and 
the extensive degree of discretion given to local enforcement agents and the courts 
regarding the implementation of the injunction.42 
Thirdly, another reservation that can be raised about this working definition of 
criminalisation relates to the need to examine how the legal rule in question has been 
implemented in the past. In effect, this means that we can only assess whether the legal 
rule in question has been operating as a de facto criminal measure after the perpetrator 
has already been punished in the absence of the enhanced procedural protections. At first 
sight, therefore, this working definition cannot assist in preventing the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. Rather, it only manages to identify instances 
where non-criminal rules resulted in the imposition of criminal punishment.  
Although this working definition cannot prevent all instances of indirect 
criminalisation, it can still be used by courts to assess how similar rules as the one in 
                                                             
41 See step 5 of Figure 3.1. 
42 See ‘Anti-social behaviour in England and Wales’. 
105 
 
question have been implemented in the past in order to determine its likely status. If there 
is evidence to suggest that on numerous occasions the implementation of the injunction 
has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, then the court 
can take additional steps to ensure that this will not happen in the future. For instance, if 
there is evidence to suggest that local enforcement agents in question have previously 
issued press releases as a means of publically condemning young individuals against 
whom an injunction was issued, the court can issue a ‘section 39 order (Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933) prohibiting publication’ of the perpetrator’s details, such as his 
name and address (Home Office, 2014: 20-21).      
Finally, although this working definition of criminalisation can be a very useful 
tool for legal theorists in order to determine whether the implementation of non-criminal 
rules resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it has to be 
admitted that cases like Engel and McCann illustrate that this approach is unlikely to be 
adopted by courts. As seen earlier, in both cases, emphasis was placed on the legislature’s 
intentions about the legal rules in question. In McCann, the fact that the ASBO was 
introduced as a means of preventing ASB was one of the main factors which led the House 
of Lords to conclude that this was a civil rather than a criminal order (para. 72). In addition 
to this, due to time and resource constraints it seems unlikely for the courts to adopt an 
approach which would require a very detailed analysis of each and every case. Instead, it 
will seem more sensible and practicable for courts to favour a more general approach 
similar to the one adopted in McCann. The above is not to argue that the courts should 
not revise their current approach for scrutinising rules which are susceptible to indirect 
criminalisation. Rather, it is to point out that a shift to a new approach similar to the one 
advanced through the working definition of criminalisation formulated above, is unlikely 
to occur primarily due to practical considerations.    
3.3.2 The advantages of this working definition 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned limitations, the main advantage of this working 
definition is its ability to look beyond the official classification of legal rules. This enables 
us to focus on the nature of the sanctions imposed and investigate whether the 
implementation of a legal rule has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour regardless of the label attached to this rule by the legislature. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this working definition can assist us to determine whether local 
practitioners and the police have created their own localised criminal codes through the 
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implementation of the injunction’s first limb. This of course presupposes a clear 
understanding of what it is to criminalise. To do so, one should pre-determine the 
necessary conditions under which the implementation of a legal rule can lead to the 
imposition of punishment and thus be regarded as a form of criminalisation. The next step 
of this process is for the findings of this study to be analysed in light of the working 
definition for criminalisation formulated above. If there is evidence to suggest that the 
sanctions imposed on those against whom an injunction is issued satisfy all the 
prerequisites of this definition, then this will constitute a form of indirect criminalisation. 
In this case, the injunction should be evaluated as a criminal rather than as a non-criminal 
rule. 
The working definition of criminalisation formulated in this chapter, therefore, 
allows for the adoption a more holistic approach to criminalisation by taking into 
consideration both direct and indirect criminalisation. This enables us to scrutinise not 
only the implementation of the injunction, but the use of any legal rule which, in theory, 
allows for the imposition of restrictions on akin to criminal punishment. Through this 
working definition of criminalisation, we will also be in a better position to identify and 
prevent instances of indirect criminalisation. Consequently, even if this working 
definition of criminalisation is not formally adopted for reasons of practicality in the 
courts (e.g. due to the need to closely examine the implementation of the legal rule in 
question), it remains an essential devise for legal commentators who wish to examine 
more closely potential subversions to the criminal law.   
Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter has been to identify a single viable test for 
distinguishing criminal from non-criminal rules (the second research question of this 
thesis). To achieve this, this chapter has initially focused on how criminalisation has been 
defined in legal and academic discourse and the way courts sought to deal with non-
criminal rules which appear to be susceptible to indirect criminalisation. Through the 
close analysis of both stances a number of problems and inconsistencies have been 
identified. Central to both accounts is the need to focus on the legislature’s original 
intentions with regard to the legal rule in question. If our account of criminalisation is 
contingent upon the legislature’s objectives, then our assessment will be circular in 
application since we would be unable to examine whether non-criminal rules constitute a 
form of criminalisation.   
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The problems and inconsistencies of these pre-existing accounts of 
criminalisation led to the formulation of a new test which enables us to look beyond the 
official classification of legal rules and investigate whether their implementation has 
resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. The working 
definition formulated above is not a new theory of criminalisation nor is it an attempt to 
re-theorise the moral boundaries of the criminal law. Rather, it has been based upon the 
pre-existing accounts of criminalisation scrutinised above, but unencumbered by the 
practical constraints that have artificially restrained the courts’ own approach. Its primary 
objective is to identify the circumstances under which the implementation of a legal rule 
can constitute a form of criminalisation regardless of it is classification and the 
legislature’s objectives. 
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Chapter 4: A theoretical analysis of the law on anti-social behaviour 
 
The impetus to formulate a working definition of criminalisation in chapter 3 emanated 
primarily from the problems and inconsistencies of previous attempts to conceptualise 
criminalisation. One of the main concerns raised about these pre-existing accounts of 
criminalisation related to the need to be able to effectively look beyond the official 
classification of non-criminal rules and examine whether they are operating as de facto 
criminal measures. Central to this thesis is the need to investigate whether the 
implementation of injunction’s first limb has resulted in the indirect criminalisation of 
certain kinds of behaviour. The importance of this investigation is twofold. First, if there 
is evidence to suggest that indeed the injunction’s first limb has been operating as a de 
facto criminal measure, then it is necessary to ensure that those against whom it is issued 
are afforded the same level of protection, i.e. the enhanced procedural protections, as 
those facing criminal prosecution. Secondly, if the injunction’s first limb is operating as 
de facto criminal measure, then we must subject it to the same level theoretical critique 
as criminal rules. Before examining empirically the implementation of the injunction’s 
first limb, it is essential to investigate whether, in theory, it is possible for it to be used in 
a manner that would satisfy both prerequisites of the working definition of criminalisation 
formulated in chapter 3.    
 This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part scrutinises the current law on 
ASB and the most important amendments brought in by the 2014 Act. This provides a 
clear understanding of the law relating to ASB and lays the foundations for the theoretical 
analysis of the injunction’s first limb. Central to this analysis is the shift to a purely civil 
response (i.e. the injunction) and whether this undermines any potential for indirect 
criminalisation.  
In the second part of this chapter, the injunction’s first limb is used as a case study 
in order to investigate if, in theory, this can be implemented in a manner that would satisfy 
both prerequisites of the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3.  
Within this analysis, particular reference is made to the significant degree of discretion 
granted to local enforcement agents and the courts regarding the potential implementation 
of the injunction. This chapter concludes by exploring the possibility for the 
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implementation of the injunction’s first limb to vary considerably from one area to 
another, primarily due to the significant degree of discretion given to local enforcement 
agents. 
4.1 Addressing anti-social behaviour 
Before examining the injunction’s first limb with reference to the working definition of 
criminalisation, it is important to focus on how the injunction and the CBO appear on the 
statute book and scrutinise the major changes brought in by the 2014 Act.1 The reason for 
choosing these measures rather than the TPIMs or other civil preventive measures lies in 
their widespread application and extensive use.  The extensive use of these measures is 
evident by the fact that between April 1999 and December 2013 more than 24000 ASBOs 
have been issued (Home Office & Ministry of Justice, 2014a). 
4.1.1 A critique of the ASBO 
The legislature chose initially to address ASB through the introduction of the ASBO 
under section 1 of the 1998 Act. The ASBO, as mentioned earlier,2 constituted a two-
stage criminalisation process where a civil order was issued against an individual who 
behaved in an anti-social manner (the first stage) (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011). During 
the initial stage of this process, the court examining the application for the issue of an 
ASBO could impose any restrictions deemed necessary on the perpetrator in order to 
prevent further ASB in the future.3 If an ASBO was issued, then the defendant was 
prohibited ‘from doing anything described in the order’.4  Breach of these restrictions 
without any reasonable excuse constituted a criminal offence, the maximum sentence for 
which was five years imprisonment and a fine (the second stage).5 
 The second stage of the ASBO can be characterised as an example of direct 
criminalisation since breach of the order constituted an offence. According to Duff and 
Marshall (2006), this two-stage criminalisation process did not only allow for the 
imposition of criminal punishment during the second stage, but it also allowed for the 
                                                             
1 As noted earlier, the main focus of this thesis is the injunction’s first limb. However, reference will be 
made to the CBO’s first limb and any other informal interventions used by local enforcement agents to 
address ASB as well. This will enable us to explore further whether the use of these measures raises similar 
normative challenges to those raised by the injunction’s first limb. It will also provide a more holistic 
account of how ASB is addressed at a local level. See ‘Research objectives’.  
2 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
3 Section 1(6). 
4 Section 1(4). 
5 Section 1(10)(b). 
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imposition of restrictions akin to criminal punishment at the initial stage as well. On this 
view, it was possible for the first limb of the ASBO to constitute a form of indirect 
criminalisation.  
What also appeared to be problematic about the administration of ASB, was the 
use of certain informal interventions by local enforcement agents before applying to court 
for the issue of an ASBO. Evidence from a study conducted by Crawford et al (2016), 
suggests that the ‘ASBOs represent[ed] only the very tip of a much larger structure of 
proactive ASB interventions’. Their study focused not only on the issue of the ASBO, but 
they also scrutinised the pre-ASBO stage and the use of formal warning letters and ABCs 
issued to young individuals (Crawford, Lewis, & Traynor, 2016). Evidence from 
Crawford et al’s (2016) study suggests that sometimes young people were ‘forced’ to sign 
ABCs out of fear of losing their accommodation. What is important for the purposes of 
this thesis is the nature of the restrictions imposed on those against whom these informal 
interventions were used and whether they amount to a form of criminal punishment in 
their own right.  
4.1.2 Scrutinising the 2014 amendments 
The most important amendment brought by the 2014 Act has been the repeal of the ASBO 
with a purely civil injunction. 6  As a result of this, those found in breach of their 
injunctions cannot be arrested immediately unless a power of arrest has been attached to 
the injunction. Due to the hybrid nature of the ASBO, if the police had evidence which 
proved that an individual breached their ASBO, then they could arrest the perpetrator 
immediately. This is not the case, however, under the new scheme. The court examining 
the application for the issue of an injunction can attach a power of arrest to it only if it is 
satisfied that: (i) the respondent used or threatens to use violence against others; or (ii) 
that ‘there is a significant risk to others’ due to the respondent’s behaviour.7 If a power of 
arrest is attached to the injunction, then the police can arrest the perpetrator without any 
warrant (House of Commons, 2013). Otherwise, the police must apply for the issue of a 
warrant (House of Commons, 2013). This shift towards a purely civil approach also 
means that breach of the injunction will not appear on the perpetrator’s criminal record.8 
                                                             
6 See ‘The current law on anti-social behaviour’.  
7 Section 4(1) of the 2014 Act. 
8 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000 regulation 3(1)(a). 
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Previously, breach of the ASBO constituted a recordable offence and those who breached 
the terms of their orders had to carry the stigma of a criminal conviction. 
Another major development has been the introduction of positive obligations. 
Under the 1998 Act those against whom an ASBO was issued could only be prohibited 
from doing anything mentioned in the order. If there was, for example, evidence to 
suggest that Sam, who was an alcoholic, was congregating with others in the town centre 
after midnight causing ASB, then the court examining the application for the issue of an 
ASBO could allow for the imposition of a home curfew during night hours on the 
defendant in order to prevent him from behaving in the same manner in the future. The 
imposition of restrictions alone, however, could not necessarily address the underlying 
causes of ASB and thus provide permanent relief to local communities. Evidence suggests 
that the imposition of exclusion zones or other forms of prohibitions did not provide long 
term relief from ASB. Rather, according to a number of studies, 9  such as the one 
conducted by Matthews et al (2007: 4), the imposition of these prohibitions led to the 
‘displacement of crime and anti-social behaviour both within’ the same town and nearby 
places. Instead of addressing the underlying causes of ASB, these prohibitions 
encouraged the perpetrators to move to a different area where they would be able to 
continue causing problems uninterrupted.10  
The 2014 Act sought to provide local agencies with a more effective legal 
framework which would enable them to address the underlying causes of ASB (Home 
Office, 2014). In order to achieve this, under the new scheme a court examining an 
application for the issue of an injunction or of a CBO can impose both negative and 
positive obligations on the perpetrators.11 In the case of Sam, for instance, he can be 
prohibited from entering the town centre and at the same time ordered to attend an 
alcohol-related rehabilitative programme. Thus, the 2014 Act starts from the premise that 
the imposition of some bland prohibitions on the perpetrators cannot be a sufficient 
response to ASB.12 As the Home Office (2014: 23) points out, it is the responsibility of 
the institutions applying for the issue of an injunction ‘to tailor the positive requirements 
                                                             
9 See, for example, Edwards and Hughes (2008).  
10 As Sager and Jones (2001) point out, this was particularly evident in the case of prostitution where the 
imposition of exclusion zones simply resulted to the relocation of the problem. 
11 Section1(4) and section 22(5) of the 2014 respectively. 
12 Evidence from a study conducted by Lewis et al (2016) suggests that positive obligations were already 
used at the pre-ASBO stage by some local practitioners and the police. This is in line with the findings of 
this study which will be discussed in more detail in 5.2.2.     
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in each case to address the respondent’s individual circumstances, behaviour and needs’. 
Hence, the new scheme enables local practitioners and the police to actually shape the 
terms of an injunction and to decide what is the best strategy for combating the ASB at 
stake.  
Although the introduction of these positive requirements has the potential of 
addressing the underlying causes of low-level criminality and ASB, it also raises concerns 
as to the constraints placed on the perpetrators’ liberty and whether these can constitute a 
form of criminal punishment in their own right. This assumption should be examined in 
light of the conditions that need to be met in order for an injunction to be issued. As the 
2014 Act appears on the statute book, the issue of an injunction seems much easier now 
when compared to the ASBO. Under the 1998 Act, an ASBO could only be issued if the 
court examining the application was satisfied that the order was ‘necessary to protect 
relevant persons from further anti-social acts’ by the defendant (emphasis added).13 In 
contrast, under the section 1(3) of the 2014 Act, the court examining an application for 
the issue of an injunction must consider ‘it just and convenient to grant the injunction for 
the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour’. The 
imposition of a lower threshold can partly be compensated by the abolition of the ASBO’s 
minimum duration requirement. Whilst ASBOs lasted for a minimum period of two 
years,14 under the 2014 Act there is no such a requirement. In the case of a minor, an 
injunction can last no longer than twelve months.15  
Finally, it is worth noting that under the new legal framework there has been a 
change in the forum of the proceedings for the issue of an injunction. The vast majority 
of the applications for the issue of an ASBO were examined by the Magistrates’ Court 
(Hoffman & MacDonald, 2010) whereas under the 2014 Act in the case of an adult the 
application for the issue of an injunction is examined by the County Court or the High 
Court and for those under the age of 18 by the Youth Court.16 In principle, the 2014 Act 
has transformed the ASBO to a purely civil and multipurpose injunction (House of 
Commons, 2013). 
                                                             
13 Section 1(1)(b). 
14 Section 1(3).  
15 Section 1(6). 
16 Section 1(8). 
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It follows from the above analysis of the 2014 amendments that under the new 
legal framework the ASBO (the hybrid nature of which attracted most of the criticisms) 
has been repealed by a purely civil instrument. Nonetheless, the introduction of positive 
obligation makes, at least in theory, the first limb of this two-step regulation model 
potentially more restrictive than before. Although breach of the injunction does not 
constitute an offence, the 2014 Act appears to allow the imposition of more restrictions 
on the perpetrators’ liberty when compared to the pre-2014 legal framework. This 
expansion in the kind of restrictions that can be imposed on the perpetrators’ liberty 
should of course be examined in light of section 1(3) of the 2014 Act which makes the 
imposition of certain restrictions much easier than before. The importance of this study, 
therefore, does not only remain unaffected by the repeal and replacement of the ASBO, 
but it is instead heightened by the potentially more restrictive nature of the injunction’s 
first limb.       
As far as the CrASBO is concerned, this has been repealed under Part 2 of the 
2014 Act by the CBO which retains the two-stage criminalisation process. Similar to the 
CrASBO, the CBO is a post-conviction order which can only be imposed on those found 
guilty of an offence. As with the pre-2014 legal framework, there is no need for the 
offence that triggers the issue of a CBO to be associated with the perpetrator’s ASB. 
Moreover, similar to the injunction, both positive and negative obligations can be 
imposed on those against whom such an order is issued. At first sight, therefore, the first 
limb of the CBO is potentially more restrictive than the first limb of the CrASBO as well.  
4.2 A form of criminalisation? 
Thus far, the main objective of this chapter has been to scrutinise the current law on ASB 
and the most important amendments brought by the 2014 Act. An equally important 
objective has been to reflect on these amendments and emphasise that despite the move 
to a civil injunction it is important to remain mindful of the restrictions imposed both 
prior to the use of any formal interventions, and during the initial stage of this two-stage 
regulatory process. As noted above, the importance of this assessment is heightened by 
the fact that under the 2014 Act the first limbs of the injunction and of the CBO are 
potentially more restrictive than their predecessors. It is also clear from the above analysis 
of the 2014 amendments that the nature and severity of the restrictions and/or obligations 
that can be imposed on those against whom an injunction or a CBO is issued can vary 
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considerably depending on how local enforcement agents decide to use the significant 
degree of discretion granted to them.  
The next part of this chapter proceeds to examine the current law in this area with 
reference to the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3. The 
underlying objective of this analysis is to explore whether the injunction’s first limb can 
be implemented in a manner that can result in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour.  
4.2.1 The legislature’s objectives 
To obtain an enhanced understanding of the ASB tools and powers, it is essential to begin 
our analysis of these measures by examining in more detail the legislature’s main 
objectives with regard to the 2014 amendments. According to the Government, the new 
ASB legal framework has two primary objectives. First, the 2014 Act aims to provide a 
more effective and flexible legal framework to local communities (House of Commons, 
2013). As the Home Office (2012) maintains, ASB can be best addressed through early 
interventions by using informal pre-enforcement tools, such as the ABC. For this reason, 
it has been argued that local enforcement agents should be afforded more discretion in 
order to be able address ASB more swiftly and effectively without the need to resort to 
any form of legal action against the perpetrator (Home Office, 2012).   
Secondly, the new legal framework does not only seek to prevent low-level 
criminality and ASB, but it also aims to adopt a more victim-oriented approach (Home 
Office, 2014). For Duggan and Heap (2014: 8), what is important about the 2014 
amendments is that what started as an attempt to address neighbour disputes ‘has [now] 
transformed into an area which currently focuses on protecting vulnerable and/or repeated 
victims from a wide range of ASB types’ including hate motivated ASB. As the Home 
Office (2014: 1) explains, ‘in many cases, the behaviour is targeted against the most 
vulnerable in our society and … when targeted and persistent, can have devastating 
effects on a victim’s life’. This acknowledgement of ASB’s potential impact has led to 
the conclusion that victims should ‘become the focus of the [new] response’ by paying 
particular attention to the level of risk faced by them (Home Office, 2014: 2). 
The first issue to be addressed here is what a victim-oriented approach entails and 
how this can affect the administration of ASB. In the context of hate crimes, Iganski 
(2008) contends that a victim-oriented approach must be adopted as a means of 
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conceptualising crimes of this nature. Based on his account, if a victim of an assault felt 
that the perpetrator’s conduct was motivated by ethnic or religious prejudice,17 then this 
behaviour should be treated from the outset as a hate incident (Iganski, 2008). On this 
view, a hate crime is to be conceptualised subjectively based on how the victim has 
perceived the perpetrator’s behaviour rather than based on an objective interpretation of 
the incident in question. This approach, according to Iganski (2008), enables us to 
understand the actual impact of hate crimes on victims and through this enhanced 
understanding be in a better position to repair the harm suffered.  It follows that a victim-
oriented approach does not only aim to repair the harm suffered by the victim, but it also 
aims to involve victims in the process of shaping the crime policies at stake. This 
approach does not only enable victims to be heard, but it also allows them to actively 
engage in certain parts of the process.18  
In the context of ASB, one of the most important developments towards the 
adoption of a more victim-oriented approach has been the provisions under Part 6 of the 
2014 Act which aim to give victims a more active role in terms of managing and shaping 
ASB strategies at a local level (Home Office, 2014).  As the title of Part 6 suggests, its 
main objective is to promote ‘local involvement and accountability’ through the 
introduction of two new tools: (i) the Community Remedy; and (ii) the Community 
Trigger. Greater local involvement, in this context, is to be achieved by allowing local 
communities to develop their own unique Community Remedy. The Community Remedy 
is an ‘out-of-court punishment’ available for those who have committed minor criminal 
offences and ASB (Home Officer, 2014: 11). A statutory duty under section 101(1) of the 
2014 Act has been imposed on every Police and Crime Commissioner to draft a list of 
possible actions that the perpetrator might be asked to do (after consulting with local 
enforcement agents and the public) ‘when a community resolution is to be used’, e.g. a 
written apology to the victim (Home Office, 2014: 12). Victims should be invited to 
choose what they think the most appropriate action in each case should be (Home Office, 
2014).  
As far as the Community Trigger is concerned, its main objective is to enable 
victims to initiate an investigation into a potential incident of ASB (Home Office, 2014). 
                                                             
17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 section 28. 
18 This is currently the approach adopted when hate crimes and incidents are reported to the police (College 
of Policing, 2014). If the victim believes that the crime/incident reported was motivated by racial hostility, 
then the police will record this as a hate crime/incident.  
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This, according to the Home Office (2012: 3), will ‘compel agencies to respond to ASB’ 
and address what really matters to their community whilst enabling victims to actively 
engage with local ASB strategies.  
At first glance, a victim-oriented approach in this context appears to provide local 
communities with the necessary flexibility needed to address what really affects the 
vitims’ lives and have their voices heard. For Duggan and Heap (2014), the adoption of 
a victim-oriented approach is not a panacea to ASB and low-level criminality. Rather, as 
they rightly point out, such an approach can result in the introduction of more punitive 
legislation in the name of victim protection (Duggan & Heap, 2014). This can be 
attributed to the phenomenon of penal populism and its potential adverse effects on crime 
policies. For Garland (2001: 142), what is problematic about this phenomenon is that 
‘policy measures are constructed in ways that privilege public opinion over the views of 
criminal justice experts and professional elites’. The reason for this lies with politicians’ 
desire to gain public support, something which it is often achieved through populist 
statements, such as the ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ (Blair, 1999), 
and often leads to the adoption of a more punitive approach towards crime, e.g lengthier 
custodial sentences (Garland, 2001). As Ericson (2007) explains, in contemporary 
Western societies criminalisation is risk-driven. Imaginary risks are overemphasised by 
politicians in order to create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity amongst the public 
(Ericson, 2007). As a result of this sense of uncertainty and insecurity, society is more 
eager to accept less liberty for greater security (Simon, 2007). 
Although the adoption of a more punitive approach is not always based on expert 
evidence, it is often justified on the basis that this in line with what victims and the general 
public demand (Garland, 2001). As Duggan and Heap (2014: 34) contend, the underlying 
rationale for meeting society’s expectations lies in the inability of the state to ‘guarantee 
the prevention of crime … [and for this reason politicians] might instead seek to address 
(or deflect some of the responsibility for) existing victims’ expectations, experiences and 
needs’. As Garland (2001: 143) explains, however, ‘the voice [victims] are given is not 
necessarily theirs [since they have] been carefully stage-managed to ensure that it fits the 
political message of which it now forms a part’.  
What can be problematic about the adoption of a victim-oriented approach in the 
context of ASB is that victims and their alleged opinion/demands can be used by local 
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politicians and enforcement agents as an excuse for the adoption of a more punitive stance 
towards low-level criminality and ASB. This more punitive approach can be, for example, 
in the form of tougher restrictions on the liberty of those against whom an injunction or a 
CBO is issued. As part of this more punitive approach, the scope of the ASB measures 
can be extended to behaviour which goes well beyond what was originally intended by 
the legislature expanding the net of social control ‘potentially “‘all spheres of life’” 
(Stephen, 2008: 321-322). 
The above is not to suggest that a victim-oriented approach will inevitably result 
in the adoption of a more punitive stance towards low-level criminality and ASB. Rather, 
it is to reiterate that the officially stated objectives of the Government and the label 
attached to a particular legal rule by the legislature should not automatically determine 
whether the rule in question is criminal or non-criminal. The introduction and 
implementation of a victim-oriented strategy should not be used as a Trojan horse for 
indirect and/or unwarranted criminalisation. Although the injunction has been presented 
by the legislature as a purely civil measure which aims to prevent ASB via the adoption 
of a victim-oriented approach, it is still necessary to examine whether its implementation 
amounts to a form criminalisation regardless of its officially stated objectives. The label 
attached is indicative of the legislature’s intentions with regard to the legal rule in 
question, but the main criterion should be how this legal rule has been implemented in 
practice and whether this led to the criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. 19  This 
is not to undermine the importance of the legislature’s intentions. These can be further 
scrutinised at a later stage during the theoretical critique of the injunction’s first limb 
especially if there is evidence to suggest that this has been operating as a de facto criminal 
measure.   
4.2.2 Applying the working definition of criminalisation 
At a theoretical level, we can investigate whether the injunction’s first limb has been 
operating as a de facto criminal measure by analysing the relevant statutory provisions in 
light of the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3. To reiterate it 
here, in order for a legal sanction to amount to criminal punishment and thus constitute a 
form of criminalisation it must:  
(i) Restrict the perpetrator’s liberty; and 
                                                             
19 See Figure 3.1. 
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(ii) It must publically and purposefully communicate censure to society.  
To facilitate my analysis, I will rely on the following two hypotheticals. A, Andrew and 
his friends live at the outskirts of the town, but during the weekends they tend to meet at 
a particular park in the town centre where they get drunk and use abusive language 
towards other members of the public. B, Sam, who is an alcoholic, tends to congregate 
with a number of rough sleepers in the town centre. During weekends, Sam and his friends 
tend to get drunk and use abusive language towards other members of the public.  
4.2.2.1 Restrictions on liberty  
In order for the first prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation to be 
satisfied, it must be proven that the legal rule at stake allows for the imposition of 
restrictions on the perpetrator’s liberty. Liberty, in this context, is to be interpreted as a 
set of basic and/or fundamental freedoms to which every individual in this jurisdiction is 
entitled to through the HRA 1998.20 These freedoms include amongst others, freedom of 
movement, freedom of expression, the right to enjoy our property and every other right 
and freedom guaranteed through the HRA 1998.   
As discussed earlier, under the 2014 Act both positive and negative obligations 
can be imposed on those who behave in an anti-social manner.21 To illustrate how this 
can be used in practice, let us revisit the above hypotheticals. Suppose that local 
enforcement agents successfully applied for the issue of an injunction against both 
Andrew and Sam. The court has decided that both of them should be prohibited from 
being drunk in a public space and from using abusive language towards other members 
of the public. Andrew has also been prohibited from visiting the park where he tends to 
meet with his friends, whilst Sam is prohibited from entering the entire town centre. In 
addition to these negative obligations, the court has decided that a positive obligation 
should also be imposed on Sam in order to attend an alcohol-related treatment. As part of 
his treatment, Sam is required to attend lengthy daily sessions for four months with a 
specialist in late afternoon at his local alcohol rehabilitation centre. For the court, this is 
the only way to permanently address Sam’s behaviour.  
What is important for the purposes of our analysis here is whether the 
restrictions/obligations imposed on Andrew and Sam can satisfy the first prerequisite of 
                                                             
20 See 3.2.1. 
21 See 4.1.2. 
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the working definition of criminalisation.  As far as Andrew is concerned, he can claim 
that there has been an interference with his liberty, since he is not allowed to enter that 
particular park. This can satisfy the first prerequisite of the working definition since this 
negative obligation interferes with Andrew’s freedom of movement under Article 5 of the 
ECHR. As noted earlier, the interference with one’s liberty needs not be significant in 
order to satisfy the first prerequisite.22 Mere interference with one’s ability to move freely 
in places which are open to the rest of the public would be sufficient in this context. Using 
abusive language towards other members of the public though can hardly qualify as a 
basic and/or fundamental freedom since no such freedom is guaranteed through the HRA 
1998.  
Although this may appear to extend the reach of the working definition of 
criminalisation too far, it should be remembered that both prerequisites must be satisfied 
in order for the restriction imposed on Andrew to amount to criminal punishment. The 
working definition formulated in chapter 3 purposefully avoids the imposition of a 
severity threshold that each restriction must meet in order for the first prerequisite to be 
satisfied.23 This was attributed to the need to avoid any unnecessary ambiguities as to 
what qualifies as a severe interference with someone’s liberty. This omission allows us 
to move beyond paradigmatic forms of criminal punishment, such as imprisonment, and 
include into our assessment alternative forms of legal sanctions, such as the imposition 
of exclusion zones similar to the one imposed on Andrew.   
As far as Sam is concerned, he cannot argue either that using abusive language 
towards other members of the public constitutes a basic and/or fundamental freedom. His 
exclusion, however, from the entire town centre satisfies the first prerequisite of the 
working definition of criminalisation as this interferes with his freedom of movement, as 
per Article 5 of the Convention. Moreover, due to his exclusion from the town centre, 
Sam can argue that he is unable to associate with his friends who live in that area, 
potentially breaching Article 11 of the Convention.  
In relation to the positive obligation imposed on Sam, it is again necessary to 
examine the impact that the injunction will have on Sam’s liberty and whether 
compulsory attendance to this treatment interferes with one of his fundamental freedoms 
                                                             
22 See 3.2.1. 
23 See 3.2.1. 
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and rights. At first glance, it is evident from the facts in scenario B that these positive 
obligations will have a significant impact on Sam’s life. Sam, for instance, will be unable 
to spend time with his daughter (or anyone else) because he has to spend his afternoons 
at the local alcohol rehabilitation centre. Although in this case the imposition of this 
positive obligation aims to address the underlying causes of Sam’s ASB, it also interferes 
with Sam’s freedom to enjoy his ‘private and family life’ (Article 8 of the Convention). 
Again, it should be remembered that the objective of this positive obligation can assist 
our theoretical evaluation of the sanction imposed, but it cannot really assist us to 
determine whether this sanction constitutes a form of criminal punishment. In this case, 
the imposition of a positive obligation which amounts to criminal punishment can be 
criticised for undermining Sam’s individual autonomy. As Ashworth and Horder (2013: 
25) point out, if individual ‘autonomy is to be respected, the State should leave individuals 
to decide for themselves and should not take decisions “in their best interests”’. 
As far as the second limb of the injunction is concerned, although this does not 
fall within the remit of this study it is instructive to investigate if its implementation can 
also result in the imposition of restrictions on the perpetrators’ liberty. As mentioned 
earlier,24 breach of the injunction does not constitute an offence, but being in contempt of 
court carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and an unlimited fine (Home 
Office, 2014). This is not to suggest that those who are found in breach of their injunctions 
are going to receive the maximum penalty available. As the Court of Appeal held in 
Turnbell [2003] EWCA Civ. 1327, the imposition of the maximum penalty in cases where 
the defendant has been found in contempt of court ‘should be reserved for the worst cases’ 
(para. 30). Evidence suggests that the vast majority of those who breached their ASBOs 
received a custodial sentence of less than six months (Home Office & Ministry of Justice, 
2014b). A similar approach appears to be followed under the new legal framework. As a 
number of recent cases illustrate, those found in breach of their injunctions tend to receive 
a custodial sentence of no longer than three months.25  
The above discussion illustrates that despite the shift to a purely civil measure, 
breach of the injunction can still result in the imposition of a lengthy custodial sentence.26 
Although in the context of the criminal law imprisonment remains a paradigmatic form 
                                                             
24 See 4.1.2. 
25 See, for example: London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Tanbir Hussain (Case No: C00BO096).  
26 It is for this reason that it has to be proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant has breached 
one of the terms of their injunction in order to be found in contempt of court (Home Office, 2014).  
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of punishment, we still need to be mindful of how other legal sanctions can interfere with 
the perpetrators’ liberty. Imposing a custodial sentence on Sam and Andrew for breaching 
their injunctions would clearly satisfy the first prerequisite of the working definition. 
Similarly, the imposition of a fine would constitute an interference with their right to 
enjoy their property and thus satisfy the first prerequisite of the working definition of 
criminalisation as well (Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR).  
It follows from the above theoretical analysis of how the injunction can be 
implemented in practice that despite its civil nature there is clearly a potential for it to be 
implemented in a manner that would satisfy the first prerequisite of this thesis’ working 
definition of criminalisation. In theory, it is possible for the restrictions/obligations 
imposed on those who behave in an anti-social manner to amount to criminal punishment. 
In practice, of course, this working definition requires a case-by-case analysis of the 
restrictions/obligations imposed on the perpetrators in order to determine whether they 
interfere with their liberty. Moreover, the above discussion highlights the significant 
degree of discretion given by the relevant statutory provisions to local enforcement agents 
and the courts as to the nature and extent of the restrictions and/or obligations that can be 
imposed on those against whom the injunction is used.   
4.2.2.2 To communicate censure 
The restrictions/obligations imposed on Andrew and Sam will only amount to criminal 
punishment if both prerequisites of the working definition are satisfied. It is, therefore, 
essential to investigate whether the implementation of the injunction’s first limb can 
purposefully result in the public denunciation of both Andrew and Sam. Failure to satisfy 
both prerequisites will result in the classification of these restrictions/obligations as mere 
“sanctions” that interfere with the perpetrators’ liberty. 
As far as the first limb of the injunction is concerned, our analysis should start 
with the ASBO and the concerns raised under the old scheme regarding the way it 
purposefully communicated censure, stigmatising those individuals against whom such 
an order was issued. One of the main criticisms raised against the implementation of the 
ASBO related to the ‘naming and shaming’ practices followed in certain areas by local 
practitioners and the police.27 One of the most illustrative examples was the ‘wall of 
                                                             
27 See, for instance, the concerns expressed by a number of legal commentators and non-governmental 
organisations to the Home Affairs Committee (2005) regarding the ‘naming and shaming’ practices used 
by certain local authorities. 
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shame’ in Guildford where pictures and information about those who received an ASBO 
were posted ‘for public information’ (Squires & Stephen, 2005a: 523). Although the 
publication of certain information about those against whom an ASBO was issued could 
facilitate the better policing of the orders and the reintegration of the perpetrators to the 
community, the ‘naming and shaming’ practices used by local enforcement agents led to 
a ‘campaign of vilification’ which resulted in the further isolation of those who were 
‘already excluded’ (Squires & Stephen, 2005a: 523).     
The practice of publicising the recipients’ personal details was challenged in R. 
(on the application of Stanley) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWHC 
2229. In this case the claimants, who were young and had a long history of violence and 
ASB (para. 3), sought a judicial review of their local CSP’s decision to distribute ‘leaflets 
and publicise other materials’ which contained their pictures and other personal 
information following the issue of ASBOs against them. 28 Although proceedings for the 
issue of these ASBOs have been covered extensively by local and national press (para. 
16), according to the claimants, the publication of this information by their local CSP was 
unlawful and in breach of their right to ‘private and family life’ under Article 8 of the 
ECHR (para. 1).  
The defendants submitted that it was not their intention to punish or victimise the 
claimants and they sought to justify the publication of this information on three grounds: 
(1) ‘to restore public confidence, (2) to assist in enforcing the ASBOs, and (3) to deter 
others and maintain peace in the community’ (para. 31). In dismissing the claimants’ 
application, the trial judge held that although colourful language was issued against the 
claimants, the publication of this information was necessary for the enforcement of the 
orders (para. 40). It was, therefore, acknowledged that local residents should have been 
informed about the identity of the claimants and the restrictions imposed on them in order 
to be able to identify and report any possible violations of the orders. Nevertheless, the 
trial judge highlighted the need for ‘publicity [to be] confined to what is reasonable and 
proportionate’ (para. 42). 
In effect, the decision in Stanley was echoed by the Home Office’s (2005) 
guidance on publicising ASBOs which explicitly stated that the main objective of this 
                                                             
28 ‘Other materials’ included information publicised on the CSP’s website concerning the claimants. The 
leaflets were distributed in the exclusion zone included in the ASBOs issued against them (para. 1). 
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practice is the prevention of further ASB rather than to punish those against whom an 
order was issued. According to the Home Office (2005), the publication of certain 
information was an essential tool for local enforcement agents against ASB since the 
ASBOs could only be effective if those affected by this behaviour were made aware of 
the terms of the orders. It has also been argued that the publication of certain information 
would deter others in the future from behaving in a similar way (Home Office, 2003: 50-
51).  
A similar approach regarding the publication of the perpetrators’ details has also 
been adopted by the 2014 Act. As explained in the Statutory Guidance, informing the 
public about the issue of an injunction is vital in terms of both enforcement and 
heightening the public’s confidence in local enforcement agencies (Home Office, 2014). 
Moreover, similar to the pre-2014 era, it is for the local authorities and the police to decide 
whether the recipient’s details should be publicised (Home Office, 2014). For cases 
involving young persons, section 39 of the 2014 Act gives the court examining an 
application for the issue of an injunction ‘the discretion to restrict the publication of 
certain information in order to protect the identity of the child or young person, for 
example: his or her name, address, school, etc.’ (House of Commons, 2013: para. 123). 
Though the effectiveness of the injunction depends largely on public involvement, 
it can be asserted that publicising the perpetrators’ pictures and personal information can 
under certain circumstances result in their social reprobation, especially in cases 
involving young persons. Similar to those found guilty of an offence, members of the 
public are likely to view those against whom an injunction has been issued as moral 
wrongdoers who are worthy of reprobation.29 Simply put, members of the public can 
perceive the publication of this information as an invitation by the state and its agents to 
condemn both the perpetrators and their behaviour. This will inevitably result in the 
stigmatisation of the perpetrators and possibly to their social ostracisation (Squires & 
Stephen, 2005a).  
In a recent study conducted by Matthews et al (2007) with ASBO recipients and 
their families, there was evidence to suggest that the ‘naming and shaming’ practices used 
by some local enforcement agents and the increased media attention led to the 
stigmatisation of a perpetrator’s entire family. As one of the interviewees noted in that 
                                                             
29 See 2.1. 
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study, that after receiving an ASBO he/she was constantly accused by the local 
community and the police for various offences he/she had not actually committed 
(Matthews et al, 2007). Furthermore, after the implementation of the orders many of the 
ASBO recipients noted that they struggled with employment and accommodation 
(Matthews et al, 2007).  
The potentially stigmatising effects of ASBOs can be attributed directly to the 
‘naming and shaming’ of the perpetrators. In Stanley, the relevant CSP did not only 
publicise the pictures and the personal details of the claimants, but they also decided to 
use colourful language against them in order to highlight the severity and 
blameworthiness of their actions. For instance, on the CSP’s website which was widely 
accessible by all members of the public, the claimants were ‘described as thugs and bully 
boys engaging in animalistic behaviour’ (para. 24). This was not a mere appeal for 
information in case there was a breach of the ASBOs issued against these young 
individuals. Instead, the wording used and the extensive publication of these materials 
suggest that the CPS (i.e. state actors) publically and purposefully sought to censure the 
claimants for their behaviour.  
The pressing question here is whether the mere publication of certain information 
regarding both the perpetrators and the restrictions imposed on them would automatically 
satisfy the second prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation. The fact that 
some ‘naming and shaming’ practices have been used as a means of deterrence or to 
inform the public about an order does not necessarily mean that these were not also used 
to purposefully condemn the perpetrators for their behaviour. This is not to dispute the 
need to inform those immediately affected by ASB about the restrictions imposed on the 
perpetrators. Rather, it is to argue that if this process of informing the public aimed at 
purposeful communication of censure, then the second prerequisite of the working 
definition will be satisfied. Similar to what has already been said about the label attached 
to each legal rule, the officially stated objectives of local enforcement agents can be used 
to evaluate these interventions.30  
As with Stanley, the starting point is to examine the language used by local 
enforcement agents. The use of colourful language, for instance, against the perpetrators 
would clearly satisfy the second prerequisite since the purpose of publicity is not just to 
                                                             
30 See 4.2.1. 
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inform the public about the perpetrator’s behaviour, but is to publically condemn them 
for their behaviour. Moreover, as part of our investigation we can also scrutinise the 
extent of this ‘naming’ and whether its underlying objective is to facilitate enforcement 
or to communicate censure. To illustrate this, let us revisit scenario A. Suppose that after 
the issue of the injunction against Andrew, his local CSP has decided to hold a press 
conference and distribute leaflets across the entire town which contained information 
about the restrictions imposed on Andrew along with a picture of him. According to the 
CSP, the extensive publicity has been deemed necessary to facilitate the enforcement of 
the injunction. Andrew’s behaviour, however, affected only a very small part of the 
community, those who used or lived nearby the park. Informing the entire community 
about Andrew’s behaviour appears to be a rather disproportionate response. In this case, 
the purpose of this extensive publicity is not only to facilitate the effective policing of the 
injunction, but it is also to publically condemn Andrew. Such a scenario could potentially 
satisfy the second prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation and the 
restriction imposed on Andrew would have constituted criminal punishment.  
Suppose now that instead of informing the entire local community, the CSP has 
decided only to inform local enforcement agents and those who had been affected by 
Andrew’s behaviour. Clearly, in latter scenario, the purpose of sharing information is to 
facilitate the effective policing of the injunction, rather than to publically condemn 
Andrew. It is less likely that this case would satisfy the second prerequisite of the working 
definition of criminalisation. Similarly, if Andrew was publically condemned through 
local media’s actions, rather than through the actions of state actors, such as local 
enforcement agents, then this would also be unlikely to satisfy the second prerequisite of 
the working definition of criminalisation. In order for the second prerequisite to be 
satisfied, it is essential for state actors to publically and purposefully condemn Andrew 
through the implementation of the injunction.    
As far as the second limb of this two-step regulatory process is concerned, it is 
important to reiterate that breach of the injunction does not constitute a criminal offence. 
Consequently, our analysis should focus again on the nature of the sanctions imposed on 
those who are found in contempt of court and whether through this process the 
perpetrators are publically and purposefully condemned for their behaviour. Similar to 
the first limb of the injunction, if both prerequisites of the working definition of 
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criminalisation are satisfied, then the sanction imposed would amount to criminal 
punishment. 
It is clear from the above theoretical analysis that despite the repeal and 
replacement of the ASBO, it is possible for the injunction to be implemented in a manner 
that would satisfy both prerequisites of this thesis’s working definition of criminalisation. 
What is also evident through the above theoretical examination of the injunction, is the 
significant degree of discretion granted by the 2014 Act to local enforcement agents 
regarding not only the scope of the law in this area, but also regarding the nature and 
extent of the restrictions and/or obligations that can be imposed on those against whom 
these measures are used. In effect, what this means is that the implementation of the 
injunction can vary considerably from one area to another depending on how local 
enforcement agents decide to utilise the discretion granted to them. This reiterates the 
need to examine the implementation of the injunction’s first limb empirically and 
investigate whether this has led to the creation of localised criminal codes (the third 
research question of this thesis).      
Conclusion 
This chapter began by scrutinising the current law on ASB through a critical evaluation 
of the most important changes introduced under the 2014 Act. Although the ASBO has 
been replaced by a purely civil injunction, it is evident through the analysis of the relevant 
legislation that the injunction’s first limb is potentially more restrictive than the first limb 
of the ASBO. The main reason for this is that the 2014 Act allows for the imposition of 
both negative and positive obligations on those against whom an injunction is issued. This 
has led to the conclusion that despite the repeal and replacement of the ASBO it is 
essential to investigate if, in theory, the restrictions and/or obligations imposed on those 
subjected to the injunction can amount to criminal punishment.    
The second part of this chapter examined how the injunction might be 
implemented in practice, with reference to the working definition of criminalisation 
formulated in chapter 3.  The close examination of the injunction, as this appears on the 
statute book, revealed that it is possible for this measure to be implemented in a manner 
that would satisfy both prerequisites of the working definition of criminalisation. 
Although at a theoretical level this appears to be possible, it has been noted during the 
analysis of the injunction that the implementation of the ASB measures can vary 
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significantly across England and Wales primarily due to the significant degree of 
discretion granted to local enforcement agents. 
The theoretical analysis of the injunction and the possibility of criminalising 
indirectly certain kinds of behaviour through its implementation, reiterates the need to 
examine empirically how the injunction’s first limb has been used by local enforcement 
agents. The data collected through this empirical study, can be then examined in light of 
the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3 in order to determine 
whether the injunction should be regarded as a criminal measure. If there is evidence to 
suggest that indeed the injunction has been operating as a de facto criminal rule, then it is 
necessary for criminal law theorists to subject it to the same theoretical critique as 
criminal offences.    
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Chapter 5: Implementing anti-social behaviour policies at ground level 
 
This chapter presents the findings of an empirical study conducted with local practitioners 
and police officers in two counties in England regarding the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb.  Central to this study has been the need to examine whether the 
implementation of the injunction’s first limb has led to the indirect criminalisation of 
certain kinds of behaviour. This investigation has provided the basis for examining 
whether localised criminal codes have been created through the use of the injunction.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. The chapter begins by providing a brief 
summary of the methodology adopted and elaborates on the scope and limitations of this 
research project. The second part presents the findings of this research which are based 
on four pillars:  
(i) the way ASB has been conceptualised at a local level;  
(ii) the implementation of the 2014 amendments; 
(iii) the procedure followed by local enforcement agents when dealing with a 
potential incident of ASB; and  
(iv) the nature of the sanctions imposed on those against whom these measures 
have been used.  
5.1 The scope of this study 
Before presenting the empirical findings of this study it is imperative to elaborate on its 
scope, its limitations and its contribution to the academic debates on criminalisation and 
ASB. The importance of this task lies with the rich pre-existing academic literature on 
the ASB tools and powers, especially at a theoretical level.1 The initial decision to tackle 
ASB through a hybrid method of social control, for instance, was criticised by a number 
of academics, such as Duff (2010) and Ashworth and Zedner (2010), who argued that the 
ASBO was guilty of blurring the normative distinction between the criminal and the civil 
law. Other critics of the ASBO, such as Cornford (2012: 3), focused on the alleged over-
inclusiveness of ASB’s statutory definition and the possibility of extending the reach of 
                                                             
1 See ‘Anti-social behaviour in England and Wales’ and 4.1.1. 
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social control to behaviour which is ‘merely offensive’ and/or to ‘minor infractions 
commonly associated with young people’ (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016).  
At an empirical level, a number of small-scale studies have already been 
conducted focusing on specific aspects of the ASBO and related measures. Bullock and 
Jones (2004), for instance, scrutinised the use of the ABCs in the London Borough of 
Islington. According to their findings, although forty-three per cent of the ABCs signed 
in Islington had been breached, this method of informal intervention had been very 
successful with many young people (Bullock & Jones, 2004). Based on their findings, 
there was a significant reduction in the levels of ASB committed by those who signed an 
ABC (Bullock & Jones, 2004). 
In another study conducted by Koffman (2006: 599), the main objective was to 
examine empirically whether the ‘ASBO and other measures’ used by local enforcement 
agents in East Brighton targeted particular social groups, such as young people. Based on 
his findings, eighty per cent of the ASBOs in this area were issued to people aged twenty 
or below (Koffman, 2006: 599-600). Nonetheless, in most of the cases the ASBO was 
reserved for the most prolific perpetrators rather than as a first resort measures against 
ASB (Koffman, 2006: 600). An equally important finding of this study was that the 
ASBO was used on many occasions to address behaviour which was already proscribed 
by criminal law (Koffman, 2006: 601). 
In another small-scale study, Matthews et al (2007) focused on the use of the 
ASBO and its impact on the perpetrators, the victims and local communities. This study 
found that the issue of the order had different impacts on those against whom it was issued 
in terms of their future behaviour (Matthews et al., 2007). Whilst some of them viewed 
the issue of an ASBO as a ‘wake-up call’, others perceived the ASBO as a ‘weaker 
alternative’ to prosecution (Matthews et al., 2007: 33-34). This study also revealed that 
the issue of an ASBO had a significant societal effect on both the perpetrators and their 
families. Evidence from this study suggests that both the perpetrators and their families 
were stigmatised by the rest of society (Matthews et al., 2007). The researchers also found 
an increased reliance by local enforcement agents on the CrASBO, rather than on the 
ASBO (Matthews et al., 2007).     
In a study published in 2010, Donoghue (2010: 88) examined the administration 
of both the ASBO and the CrASBO across Britain from a socio-legal perspective focusing 
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on how due process considerations and ‘judicial power and discretion intersect[ed] to 
shape’ the implementation of these measures. One of the most important findings of this 
study was that many members of the judiciary were concerned about the fact that they 
could only impose negative obligations on those against whom an ASBO or a CrASBO 
was to be issued (Donoghue, 2010). According to her findings, there was evidence to 
suggest that on many occasions judges were aware of the underlying causes of the 
perpetrator’s behaviour, such as alcohol and drug addiction, and that the imposition of 
bland prohibitions could not permanently address the behaviour at stake (Donoghue, 
2010). This study also found a lack of co-operation amongst the various local enforcement 
agents (Donoghue, 2010).         
Finally, the findings of a large-scale research study conducted by Crawford, 
Lewis, and Traynor (2016) were recently published. This latter study was conducted in 
four different sites in England between 2008 to 2012 and examined ‘the use of formal 
ASB warning letters, ABCs and ASBOs and the interrelations between these tools and 
the wider preventive and support services allied to them’.2 Based on their findings, the 
use of the abovementioned measures in the sites under investigation was in contrast with 
their preventive nature since those against whom these measures had been used had 
‘already engaged in serious or persistent offending’ (Lewis, Crawford & Traynor, 2016: 
8). Moreover, although this study confirmed the existence of ‘a pyramidal system of 
regulation’ with regards to the administration of ASB, it found that in each site there were 
‘myriad variations’ in terms of ‘the numbers of tiers in the pyramidal structure’ (Lewis, 
Crawford & Traynor, 2016: 9).    
This study examined the implementation of the new legal framework across two 
counties in England. As part of this project, twenty-nine interviews were conducted with 
local practitioners and police officers who had an everyday interaction with ASB and had 
been responsible for the implementation of the relevant tools and powers. In particular, 
nineteen interviews were conducted in Site A (ten with local practitioners and nine with 
police officers) and ten in Site B (six with local practitioners and four with police 
officers).3  
                                                             
2 The findings of this study were presented in two different journal articles (Crawford, Lewis, & Traynor, 
2016: 6; Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016). 
3 For a more detailed account of the methodology adopted see 1.4. 
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The contribution of this empirical study to the current academic literature on ASB 
and criminalisation is twofold. First, in contrast to the above empirical studies, which 
focused on the pre-2014 tools and powers, this is the first empirical data collected (that I 
am aware of) on the 2014 amendments. This empirical study provides an insight into how 
ASB is managed and addressed after the repeal and replacement of the ASBO and 
explores how local enforcement agents have utilised positive obligations.4 It should be 
borne in mind that the use of these measures can vary considerably from one area to 
another due to the extensive discretion afforded to local enforcements agents regarding 
both the scope of the law in this area and the nature of the sanctions that can be imposed 
on those who behave in an anti-social manner.5 Thus, it is necessary to approach the 
findings of this study with caution since they might not be representative of how the ASB 
tools and powers have been implemented across the country. Rather, they are only 
representative of the two sites under study. 
Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the implementation of the 2014 
amendments and of the ASB legal framework in general are examined through the lenses 
of indirect criminalisation and in light of the working definition of criminalisation 
formulated in chapter 3. Although at a theoretical level the ASBO’s first limb has been 
criticised for allowing for the indirect criminalisation of a wide range of behaviour, this 
is the first study that examines empirically the validity of this claim. The importance of 
this examination is heightened by the earlier theoretical analysis of both indirect and 
under-criminalisation.6 
5.2 Research findings 
The prime objective of this research project has been to examine whether localised 
criminal codes have been created through the implementation of the injunction’s first 
limb. To achieve this, I first had to illustrate the importance of this task by emphasising 
the need to maintain the moral distinction between criminalisation and other forms of 
social regulation (the first research question). I then formulated a working definition of 
criminalisation which identifies the conditions that must be met in order for a legal 
sanction to amount to criminal punishment and thus constitute a form of criminalisation 
                                                             
4 As mentioned in 4.2.1, under the 2014 Act a number of other tools and powers have been introduced as 
well, such as the Community Remedy and the Community Trigger. These measures are beyond the reach 
of this study. See ‘Research objectives’. 
5 See 4.2.2. 
6 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’ and 2.1. 
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regardless of the label attached to the legal rule in question (the second research question). 
To reiterate it here, a legal sanction amounts to criminal punishment if:  
(i) it interferes or threatens to interfere with the perpetrator’s liberty; and  
(ii) if it publically and purposefully condemns the perpetrator.7   
The interviews conducted with local enforcement agents were structured in four pillars 
all of which related to the primary research question. The findings of this study are 
presented according to these pillars. The first pillar relates to the kinds of conduct labelled 
as anti-social by local enforcement agents and thus addressed through the use of these 
measures. It also scrutinises the basis upon which a particular kind of behaviour has been 
classified as anti-social. If there is indeed evidence to suggest that the implementation of 
the injunction led to the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it is 
imperative to scrutinise the kinds of behaviour criminalised. 
The second pillar focuses on the 2014 amendments in legislation and how these 
have affected the administration of ASB at a local level. The main focus of this pillar is 
the move from the hybrid ASBO towards a civil injunction. An equally important task of 
this pillar was to investigate the introduction of positive obligations and what impact this 
might have on those against whom the injunction is used.   
The third pillar relates to the procedure followed prior to and after the issue of an 
injunction. It excludes, however, the procedure followed after someone was taken back 
to court for breaching the injunction issued against him. As discussed earlier, the main 
objective of this study is to investigate whether the restrictions imposed on those against 
whom an injunction is issued (the first limb of the injunction) constitute a form of 
criminalisation in their own right.  
 The final pillar focuses on the nature of the restrictions imposed on those against 
whom an injunction has been issued. The findings from this pillar will then be examined 
in light of the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3 in order to 
determine whether the sanctions imposed through the injunction’s first limb constitute a 
form of criminal punishment. This pillar will provide the basis for addressing the primary 
research question of this thesis. 
                                                             
7 See 3.2. 
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5.2.1 First Pillar: What are the true limits of anti-social behaviour? 
One of the most concerning features of the pre-2014 legal framework was the statutory 
definition of ASB which, according to its critics, expanded the net of social control to 
everyday ‘trivial, sub-criminal, or nuisance behaviour’ (Koffman, 2006: 611-612). As 
noted earlier, this can be attributed to the fact that the statutory definition of ASB focused 
on the actual and/or potential impact of someone’s behaviour on others rather than on the 
actual nature of the wrong committed.8 The Government sought to defend the broad 
drafting of the statutory definition on the basis that each local community faces its own 
problems and they should be allowed a certain magnitude of discretion in order to be able 
to address what really matters to them (Home Office, 2011b).  
Under the current statutory definition, ASB ranges from conduct which causes 
mere ‘nuisance and annoyance’ to behaviour that causes ‘harassment, alarm or distress’.9 
The flexibility of the statutory definition is further evidenced by the fact that the 2014 Act 
has retained the ‘caused or likely to cause’ clause. This enables local enforcement agents 
to adopt a proactive approach by ‘highlight[ing] to [suspected perpetrators] that if they 
continue or escalate their behaviour what action can be taken’ against them (Int.17 (LP) 
Site B).  
 The ambiguous limits of the statutory definition were confirmed when research 
participants were asked about how they would personally define ASB. In both sites, the 
majority of the participants felt that it was quite difficult to conceptualise ASB precisely 
or provide examples of behaviour that would definitely fall within the ambit of the 
statutory definition. As one police officer noted ‘almost everything fits under the ASB 
legislation’ (Int.12 (PO) Site B). This was further evident by the participants’ responses 
when asked to provide some examples of behaviour that could possibly be regarded as 
anti-social in their own localities. It was clear from the examples provided that ASB could 
range from behaviour which at the face of it appears to be part of everyday life to conduct 
which is already proscribed by criminal law. As a local practitioner noted:  
There are a lot of types of behaviour that we do not like or as a 
society we say are unacceptable such as noise, nuisance, it could 
be drug dealing for some people, substance abuse for other people 
who find it quite upsetting and anti-social (Int.4 (LP) Site A). 
                                                             
8 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
9 Section 2 of the 2014 Act. 
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This statement also highlights the subjective nature of ASB. What can be regarded as 
anti-social by one person might be ignored as harmless behaviour by another. 
 As far as the lower end of the spectrum is concerned, it was clear that ASB covers 
primarily behaviour which appears to be part of everyday social interaction and not 
directly regulated by law, such as ‘drinking [alcohol and] … being loud’ whilst being in 
a public place (Int.3 (LP) Site A). Although consuming alcohol in a public space is not 
prohibited by law,10 local enforcement agencies can seek to prevent people from doing 
this if it leads to ASB (Woodhouse & Ward, 2015). As Woodhouse and Ward (2015) 
explain, local enforcement agents can use, for instance, a Public Space Protection Order 
to prohibit the consumption of alcohol in a particular area if they deem this as one of the 
underlying causes of ASB.11 Although the use of the 2014 Act as a means of regulating 
otherwise legal activities appears to be contentious,12 it is clear that the ASB provisions 
provide a further flexible tool to local enforcement agents since these measures do not 
require the formalities of direct criminalisation.   
5.2.1.1. Impact and persistence   
At first sight, using the ASB tools and powers to address street drinking, can be criticised 
for widening the net of social control to what is otherwise a lawful activity. However, as 
fifty-five per cent of the interviewees noted, the regulation of otherwise legally 
permissible activities through these measures can be attributed to the impact that these 
activities had on others, as against the actual nature of the conduct in question. Several 
interviewees highlighted the fact that while some activities appear, in isolation, to be of a 
trivial nature, their cumulative effect on people’s lives can in fact be devastating. On 
many occasions, ASB ‘will determine where people want to live, it will determine their 
friendships, their family [and] it can put strains on relationships’ (Int.16 (LP) Site A). 
Moreover, as the case of Fiona Pilkington illustrates, victims of prolonged ASB ‘have 
gone on to commit suicide because they felt that what they were reporting had no impact 
and they were dismissed’ (Int.4 (LP) Site A).  
                                                             
10 Being disorder in a public space whilst drunk constitutes an offence under section 91 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967. 
11 Under section 58 of the 2014 Act a local authority can issue such an order as a means of addressing or 
preventing a certain kind of behaviour in a public space which has or is likely to have a ‘detrimental effect 
on the quality of life of those in the locality’. Breach of the order or failure to comply with the requirements 
of an order constitutes an offence under section 67 and can result in the issue of a fixed penalty notice 
(section 68 of the 2014 Act).  
12 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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Although ‘there [was] no specific number of incidents’ (Int.19 (PO) Site A) 
required in order for local enforcement agents to classify someone’s behaviour as anti-
social, it was clear from the data collected that either the perpetrator’s behaviour must 
have a significant effect on victims’ lives ‘over a period of time’ (Int.24 (LP) Site A) or 
that its impact had been so severe that immediate action was needed. As one of the 
participants put it:   
We are going to review [each incident] and if we think that it is 
too high or has been going on for a long time and nothing that we 
have done seems to have worked…we will then look at 
enforcement (Int.19 (PO) Site A).13   
The above testimonies suggested that the key factor that is considered when determining 
whether something is classified as ASB is the actual or potential impact on others, which 
is often marked by persistent and repetitive conduct.  This approach is in line with the 
Home Office’s guidelines regarding the way ASB is to be conceptualised at a local level. 
According to these guidelines, ‘the right response in each case will depend on a range of 
factors, but most importantly, on the needs of the victim and the impact the behaviour is 
having on their lives’ (Home Office, 2012: para. 1.3). 
5.2.1.2 Discretion and common sense 
According to half of the interviewees, the focus on the impact that certain kinds of 
behaviour have on others also helps to explain the reason why similar activities can be 
treated differently (i.e. as non-anti-social) depending on the context in which they take 
place. One police officer explained:  
Having a house party where no one can hear it for three miles is 
not going to be anti-social. But if you put that same incident … in 
the middle of a town centre it is likely to cause harassment, alarm 
or distress ... So, same people doing the same thing, different 
locations, massively different impact (Int.26 (PO) Site A).   
This need for a flexible legal framework was further evident when participants were asked 
about the 2014 amendments with regards to the way ASB is defined. Under the 2014 Act 
the definition of ASB has been extended in two ways. First, the consolidation of a number 
of instruments, such as the ASBI, into a single multi-purpose injunction has led to the 
expansion of ASB to behaviour that causes ‘nuisance and annoyance’ in a housing-related 
                                                             
13 Most of the participants used the term ‘enforcement’ to describe the process of taking formal legal action 
against someone, such as applying for the issue of an injunction or of a CBO. 
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context (House of Commons, 2013). Secondly, under the 1998 Act ASB was defined as 
conduct which ‘caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more 
persons not of the same household as himself’.14 This was modified by the 2014 Act and 
now includes behaviour that ‘causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
any person’.15  
As many of the participants noted, the ‘same household as himself’ clause caused 
ambiguities and ‘grey areas’ (Int.5 (LP) Site A) especially when the alleged incident of 
ASB took place in hostels and houses of multiple occupancies. The abolition of this clause 
was regarded as a positive development by most of the research participants who 
perceived this as a necessary amendment. According to one local practitioner ‘it is 
broadening the net…the behaviour can be monitored wider’ (Int.6 (LP) Site A). 
The great magnitude of discretion afforded to enforcement agents regarding the 
way ASB is to be conceptualised at a local level conforms to the Government’s promise 
for a new legal framework that will be capable of ‘provid[ing] faster, more visible justice 
for victims and communities…and that act[s] as a real deterrent’ (Home Office, 2012: 1). 
For the majority of the participants this flexibility in the statutory definition, particularly 
the ‘likely to cause’ clause, was vital for the protection of vulnerable victims since it 
enabled them to adopt a more proactive approach towards ASB. This allowed local 
enforcement agents to intervene at an early stage and ‘stop [the perpetrators’] anti-social 
behaviour rather than leave them to escalate’ (Int.6 (LP) Site A). According to a police 
officer ‘by keeping “likely” to occur it gives us greater scope to assess cases and put 
measures if we need to protect those vulnerable members of community’ (Int.12 (PO) 
Site B).  
This does not necessarily mean that the police or local practitioners applied for 
the issue of an injunction in cases where someone’s behaviour was only likely to cause 
‘harassment, alarm or distress’. To be used in this way would have constituted a 
significant and possibly unjustifiable expansion of the scope of the law in this area. 
Nevertheless, as Sanders and Young (2008: 281) explain, ‘the importance of legal powers 
[given to the police] is not so much that they are actually invoked frequently, but that 
they could be’ (emphasis in the original). On this view, what is important about the ‘likely 
                                                             
14 Section 1. 
15 Section 2(1)(a). 
137 
 
to cause’ clause is not so much its actual implementation, but that it can be used by law 
enforcement agents at their own discretion when this is deemed necessary. Although, in 
both sites the local enforcement agents have not actually used the ASB tools and powers 
to regulate behaviour which did not actually cause any of the abovementioned negative 
experiences to other people, we still need to ensure that this will not happen in the future.  
Although the majority of the participants held that a certain degree of flexibility 
is necessary when dealing with ASB, four interviewees (two from each site) highlighted 
the risks associated with the broad drafting of the statutory definition by characterising it 
as ‘frighteningly subjective’ (Int.8 (LP) Site B). According to one local practitioner:  
It is becoming potentially quite powerful for local authorities for 
addressing behaviours that they just decide they do not like…my 
concern for that it is that it could be used inappropriately and 
disproportionately against people who maybe do not have a voice, 
[such as] members of the street community (Int.4 (LP) Site A).  
Another participant criticised the expansion of the statutory definition of ASB to 
behaviour that causes ‘nuisance and annoyance’. As that local practitioner stated ‘my 
concern is with the new tools and powers because there is a lower threshold and you might 
get that perfectly innocent activities’ (Int.5 (LP) Site A). It was, therefore, acknowledged 
by some of the participants that these measures must be used with caution.16  
5.2.1.3 Managing expectations  
Some participants noted that the broad statutory definition of ASB created a lot of 
misconceptions amongst members of the public as to nature of the behaviour dealt with 
through these measures, something which had led to higher expectations as to what local 
enforcement agents can achieve through the implementation of the relevant tools and 
powers. Some interviewees, for example, noted that members of the public tend to 
perceive these measures as a ‘panacea in solving their problems’ (Int.17 (LP) Site B). 
Consequently, some members of the public believed that the scope of the law in this area 
should be extended in order to address what they personally believed to be anti-social. In 
theory, this can be further facilitated through the introduction of the Community Trigger 
which imposes an obligation on local enforcement agents to formulate a review procedure 
with regard to the public’s complaints relating to ASB (Home Office, 2014).17 This can 
                                                             
16 I will elaborate further on the procedure followed in 5.2.3. 
17 For more on the Community Trigger see 4.2.1. 
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possibly put extra pressure on local enforcement agents to extend the net of social control 
to ‘potentially “all spheres of life’” (Stephen, 2008: 321-322). These increased 
expectations do not only impose a higher burden on local enforcement agencies which 
have to administrate them, but they can also have a negative impact on society’s tolerance 
level and interpersonal relationships. An expansion in the net of social control can 
encourage people to report/complain about behaviour which would have been previously 
ignored or considered to be part of everyday social interaction. The following testimony 
is a good illustration of the possible adverse consequences of these increased 
expectations: 
What we find is that we will get residents who report issues with 
their neighbours without having to address them themselves and 
as you know as soon as the landlord gets involved you can end up 
breaking up a relationship (Int.16 (LP) Site B).  
As for the upper end of the spectrum, there was an overlap between ASB and behaviour 
that already constituted a criminal offence, such as drug dealing. Koffman (2006) 
contends that this overlap between the two can be attributed to the fact that a precise 
distinction between ASB and criminality cannot always be drawn. Koffman’s conclusion 
is consistent with most of the participants’ testimonies in this study. One of the 
participants pointed out:  
Although it is a crime it can also be anti-social behaviour… so it 
can be down to graffiti, words spoken, some of the stuff written 
on the walls can be either interpreted as hate crime or as directed 
anti-social behaviour, homophobic (Int.18 (PO) Site A).  
Although ‘using threatening or abusive words’ can constitute an offence under section 
5(1) of the 1986 Act, this kind of behaviour can also be regarded as anti-social if it is 
likely to cause ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ to both the victim and any other member 
of the community who witnessed it. Consequently, if the offender is found guilty of the 
section 5 offence, then the police, through the CPS, can apply for the issue of a CBO 
against that individual (Home Office, 2014). 
The overlap between the two raises a number of issues for both local enforcement 
agents and criminal law theorists. The main issue raised here relates to the method of 
social control that must be used in order to address this kind of behaviour. The use of the 
injunction would constitute a form of under-criminalisation since criminal behaviour is 
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addressed through non-criminal measures.18 For an advocate of the last resort approach, 
however, the use of the criminal law would be unwarranted if an alternative method of 
social control, such as the injunction, can adequately address the behaviour in question 
(Husak, 2004). Equally, if both methods of social control are used through the issue of a 
CBO, then this can be criticised as a disproportionate response to the wrong committed.19 
Moreover, this can potentially lead to the inconsistent application of the law where in 
some parts of the country a particular criminal wrong is dealt with through criminal 
prosecution whereas in other parts of the country is dealt with through the injunction.  
The above testimonies suggest that the main factor determining whether 
someone’s behaviour is to be classified as anti-social is its impact on other members of 
the community. The findings of this research also echo the findings of previous studies 
which revealed both an overlap between ASB and criminality and the possibility of 
regulating otherwise ‘permissible legal activities’ through the implementation of these 
measures (Lewis, Crawford & Traynor, 2016). This was an expected discovery primarily 
due to the way ASB is defined under section 2 of the 2014 Act. As discussed earlier, one 
of the main criticisms against ASB’s statutory definition is its reliance on the impact or 
likely impact of someone’s behaviour rather than on the nature of the conduct in 
question.20 Nonetheless, it was evident from the data collected that the relevant tools and 
powers were only utilised in serious cases where the behaviour in question was impactful 
and most commonly repetitive.  
The concerns raised above, therefore, regarding the expansion of the net of social 
control to ‘all spheres of life’ through the implementation of ASB tools and powers are 
not evidenced empirically. Rather, it was evident that local enforcement agents used the 
discretion granted to them in a sensible manner focusing only on behaviour that had a real 
impact on others. As discussed earlier, however, what is important about the powers 
granted to law enforcement agents is not always the way they are currently used. Instead, 
what really matters, according to Sanders and Young (2008), is the fact that these powers 
are available to them if they wish to invoke them. Although Sanders and Young (2008) 
are referring here to the ability of police officers to search people even without making 
use of the powers granted to them by law, their argument is readily applicable in the 
                                                             
18 I will elaborate further on this issue in 6.2.2. 
19 I will return on the overlap between ASB and the criminal law in 5.2.4.1. 
20 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
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context of the ASB tools and powers as well. Although in both sites ASB has not been 
conceptualised in an arbitrary manner, it is still necessary to formulate mechanisms 
through which we can ensure that changes in the implementation of these measures will 
not result in the expansion of the net of social control.21         
5.2.1.4 Other relevant factors 
Although it was evident that the main focus of local enforcement agents was the impact 
rather than the actual nature of a particular behaviour, there was evidence to suggest that 
their decisions tend to be informed by a number of other factors as well.  
(i) Focusing on victims and their experiences 
In Site A, there was strong evidence to suggest that victims’ perceptions were central to 
the way ASB was conceptualised. It was evident from the data collected that if the 
complainant was negatively affected by someone’s behaviour or if they deemed their 
behaviour as anti-social, then the investigation of this incident would start from the 
premise that it constituted ASB. The next testimony is illustrative of this victim-oriented 
approach adopted in Site A in terms of conceptualising ASB: ‘it is a victim led, victim 
witness led process. When a victim reports us that they have felt harassment, alarm or 
distress then that very much informs whether we are going to take it on as a case’ (Int.5 
(LP) Site A). A similar approach was also adopted by the relevant police force. According 
to one of its members ‘a common theme within policing is…that it is actually better to 
deal with something as it has been identified rather than to justify why it is not anti-social’ 
(Int.28 (PO) Site A). For this reason, ‘if there is a hate element to it then [the victim’s] 
perception [of the behaviour in question] is really important because there is a perception 
that it is a hate incident. It is a hate ASB and then we will deal with it accordingly’ (Int.29 
(PO) Site A).  
 The above is not to suggest that local enforcement agencies structured their 
investigation and response solely on the alleged victim’s perception of an incident in the 
absence of any other credible evidence. As one of the participants pointed out ‘if we 
obtain evidence … that suggests otherwise we will then make adjustments to that’ effect 
(Int.21 (PO) Site A). Instead, the above is to illustrate the importance attributed by these 
institutions to victims and the possible adverse consequences that persistent low-level 
                                                             
21 See 6.1. 
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criminality and ASB can have on them. This is in line with the Government’s promise to 
depart from the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the past (Home Office, 2012: 3). As the 
Home Office (2012: 3) explains, ‘anti-social behaviour is a fundamentally local issue, 
one that looks and feels different in every area, in every neighbourhood and to every 
victim’. Accordingly, the views of the victims should not be dismissed outright since what 
might appear to be of trivial nature to local enforcement agents, can have a devastating 
effect on the complainant’s life. 
As far as Site B is concerned, three out of the ten participants from this site noted 
that they would take into consideration whether the alleged victim perceived a particular 
kind of behaviour as anti-social. However, the overall impression from this area was that 
a victim’s perception of an incident would not affect significantly, or at least not to the 
extent that this did in Site A, the way local enforcement agents conceptualise ASB. As 
noted by a police officer ‘if we are getting repeated calls about the same thing…we are 
going to look at it to determine [whether we] actually need to do something about it 
because there is a risk to the public’ (Int.14 (PO) Site B).  
From a victim’s perspective, an approach similar to the one adopted in Site A, 
offers assurance to the complainants that their reports ‘are taken seriously’ by the 
authorities and that they are not going to be dismissed outright without any further 
investigation (Home Office, 2012). Moreover, as with ‘hate crimes’ (CPS, 2016), 
focusing on the alleged victim’s perception of an incident can increase the public’s 
confidence in law enforcement agencies, tackle under-reporting and ensure that equal 
protection is offered to every social group (College of Policing, 2014). Although the 
adoption of a more victim-oriented approach by local enforcement agents echoes the 
Government’s promise of ‘putting victims first’ (Home Office, 2012), recourse to this 
approach should not be viewed as a panacea in addressing ASB.22 As Duggan and Heap 
(2014) maintain, victims and their needs can be used as a Trojan horse for the adoption 
of a more punitive response to ASB. According to Sanders and Jones (2007: 282-283), in 
the context of criminal trials ‘all too often the rights of the accused are portrayed as 
obstacles in the way of fair treatment for victims’. For this reason, according to them, we 
must be mindful of the ‘trade-off[s]’ between the rights of the accused and the needs of 
                                                             
22 See 4.2.1. 
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the victim (Sanders and Jones, 2007: 282-283). Our main objective should be to strike a 
fair balance between the two.  
In the context of ASB, this shift towards a victim-oriented approach can be used 
as a means to expand the net of social control to behaviour that falls within the remit of 
everyday interaction, such as ‘kids playing football in the street’ (Int.2 (LP) Site A). As 
Crawford, Lewis and Traynor (2016: 7) contend, adopting a more inclusive approach in 
terms of the way ASB is to be defined can result in a ‘regulatory overload [and to] net 
widening’. 
The concerns expressed by Duggan and Heap are further justified by the 
significant variations in communities’ tolerance levels reported particularly in Site B. 
Evidence collected from this site suggests that people in more affluent areas and/or areas 
with lower crime rates tend to be less tolerant towards ASB. In contrast, in areas with 
high crime rates people tend to report only the most serious incidents of ASB ‘because 
they have to deal with [criminality] on a daily basis…it becomes part of their normal 
lives’ (Int.14 (PO) Site B). The following statement is illustrative of a number of 
responses given by many research participants in Site B through which these variations 
were highlighted: ‘you will find this in the more affluent areas. The lowest level of anti-
social behaviour will be reported there’ (Int.13 (PO) Site B). It follows that the way 
different social groups perceive and approach ASB can vary considerably since this is 
influenced by their socio-economic background. This can also explain the reason why 
local enforcement agents in Site B are less inclined to adopt a victim-oriented approach 
in terms of the way ASB is to be conceptualised. It would be wrong to assume, however, 
that the adoption of a more victim-oriented approach in this context would inevitably lead 
to the expansion of the net of social control. As will be discussed below, the ambit of the 
law in this area is shaped by a number of factors most of which tend to narrow it down 
rather than to expand it.  
(ii) Review procedure 
It was evident from the data collected that the behaviour under scrutiny needed to be more 
than merely offensive or to cause something more than mere discomfort in order for it to 
fall within local enforcement agents’ mandate. As one of the participants noted, each 
complaint/incident ‘has to be taken by a degree of common sense because again lots of 
different people find lots of different things offensive’ (Int.9 (LP) Site B).   
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In chapter 2, it was noted that a distinction must be drawn between behaviour 
which is merely offensive and behaviour which is more than merely offensive.23 The 
former refers to behaviour that causes mere offence, and if the state was to regulate this 
behaviour it would have done so solely on the basis that it caused offence. The latter refers 
to behaviour which is worth regulating because it is not only offensive, but because it also 
undermines one of society’s core values, e.g. it causes or threatens to cause harm to others.  
As the next testimony from Site A illustrates, the same distinction was adopted by 
local practitioners and the police as well since they tended to focus only on the latter 
category of offensive behaviour:  
People have their eccentricities. I do not have any problem with 
those eccentricities … but if your habit is having an impact on the 
community and it is affecting people’s lives then something needs 
to be done about it (Int.24 (LP) Site A).  
As this local practitioner then explained: ‘although [the ASB provisions] have been 
described as being draconian, in my mind they are only asking people to behave in a 
reasonable manner’ (Int.24 (LP) Site A). 
 The testimony of this local practitioner is representative of the overall impression 
given by participants in Site A. Evidence suggests that there was a review procedure in 
place through which local enforcement agencies tried to strike a fair balance between 
victims’ needs and expectations and behaviour which was really worth addressing.     
As far as Site B is concerned, most of the participants also highlighted the need 
for their ‘response to be measured’ (Int.11 (PO) Site B) and to focus on behaviour that 
does not fall within the realm of everyday social interaction. For instance, as a local 
practitioner argued:  
If it is simply that someone is having children and their children 
are using their own back garden and they are causing nuisance to 
their neighbours because they do not want to hear children, then 
that is not anti-social behaviour and we will not deal with that. 
That is living sound (Int.16 (LP) Site B).  
                                                             
23 See 2.2.5. 
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Overall, there was little to no evidence to suggest that these measures were used by either 
Site A or B in an irrational manner against behaviour which was merely offensive, caused 
mere discomfort or behaviour that was part of daily social interaction.  
This finding is further strengthened by the fact that in most of the participating 
institutions the initial decision to classify someone’s behaviour as anti-social ‘goes 
through several layers of review’ (Int.28 (PO) Site A). As a police officer put it, ‘it is not 
just one officer on their own’ who decides whether the behaviour at stake should fall 
within the ambit of the ASB legislation (Int.12 (PO) Site B). Rather, as the following 
testimony elucidates, cases were constantly reviewed both internally and externally: 
We have discussions on a weekly basis about the behaviour that 
has been reported and we have a team discussion about whether 
we would class that as anti-social behaviour and secondly whether 
it is something that falls within the rim of our team. Then we go 
to wider city meetings, the multi-agency assessment and targeting 
meetings. So we kind of get wider city consent as to what anti-
social behaviour is (Int.5 (LP) Site A). 
Although an internal review procedure was not available in three housing associations, it 
was noted by the research participants from these institutions that they tend to collaborate 
closely with their local CSPs. One of them also mentioned that their institution 
participates sometimes in ‘wider city meetings’ as well.24 
(iii) Availability of resources 
It was clear from the data collected from both sites that the implementation of the ASB 
legal framework relied heavily on the amount of resources available at a local level. In 
nineteen interviews the lack of resources and/or the costs of implementation of these 
measures were highlighted as one of the main factors that local enforcement agents would 
take into consideration when determining whether a particular incident should be 
regarded as anti-social. For instance, one local practitioner from Site A noted that:  
Because the resources are becoming a little bit more stretched we 
try to prioritise the cases where there is a personal harm of anti-
social behaviour. We try to move away from the neighbour 
disputes and that sort of things (Int.20 (LP) Site A).  
                                                             
24 I will return to this collaboration between local partners in 5.2.3.2. 
145 
 
As the above account illustrates, the limited availability of resources has led local 
enforcement agents to concentrate on the most serious incidents reported to them. This is 
behaviour that is situated in the upper end of the ASB spectrum. As one police officer 
pointed out, ‘there has to be a realistic understanding…we have reductions in the number 
of police officers. We have to focus on risk and harm’ (Int. 11 (PO) Site B). The foregoing 
testimonies accurately reflect a number of responses provided by participants who 
emphasised that the limited resources available for tackling ASB and criminality forced 
them to focus on behaviour that had a significant and detrimental impact on people’s 
quality of life rather than on everyday incivilities, such as minor neighbour disputes.    
This can also explain to a certain extent the overlap between ASB and criminality. 
As discussed in more detail below, evidence from this study also suggests that the amount 
of resources available was likely to have an impact on the procedure followed after 
someone’s behaviour was labelled as anti-social.25 
Taken as a whole, it was evident from the interviews conducted in both sites that 
behaviour is not arbitrarily labelled as anti-social. Instead, in both sites there was a review 
mechanism in place through which local enforcement agencies tried to ensure that they 
focused only on behaviour that really had an impact on people’s lives.  
5.2.2 Second Pillar: The 2014 amendments 
Before elaborating on the procedure followed after a potential incident of ASB was 
reported to the relevant authorities, research participants were asked to comment on the 
2014 amendments and whether these had any impact on the daily administration of ASB 
at a local level. Particular emphasis was paid to the following three issues: (i) the 
widening of ASB’s statutory definition; (ii) the repeal and replacement of the ASBO; and 
(iii) the introduction of positive obligations. Since the first issue has already been 
discussed above, I will now turn my attention to the remaining two issues.   
5.2.2.1 The move to a purely civil response 
Although the ASBO’s hybrid nature was one of its most contentious and heavily criticised 
features academically,26 its abandonment attracted mixed responses from the research 
participants. For the majority of the participants the move to a purely civil injunction was 
unlikely to have any significant effect on the daily administration of ASB. According to 
                                                             
25 See 5.2.3. 
26 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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the data collected during this study, there are three possible explanations for this. First, 
the majority of interviewees noted that the ASBO was just one out of the many tools and 
powers in their arsenal in dealing with ASB and criminality. As one of the interviewees 
noted: ‘we have got offences with which we can still deal with people for and I am not 
overly concerned that the breach is not an offence anymore as long as we can still deal 
with it effectively’ (Int.13 (PO) Site B). This is in line with the above findings and with 
the findings of previous studies which highlighted the overlap between ASB and 
criminality (Koffman, 2006; Lewis, Crawford & Traynor, 2016).  
 Secondly, reference was made in both areas to the way courts used to deal with 
those who were found in breach of their ASBOs. Two participants from Site B argued 
that the shift to a purely civil mechanism was unlikely to have any impact on the way 
they were dealing with ASB since the ASBO ‘was anyway a toothless tiger’ (Int.14 (PO) 
Site B). According to one police officer, ‘under the old legislation we would go back [to 
court] after breaches time after time and nothing would happen to that person. So, I do 
not think that it particularly concerns me’ (Int.14 (PO) Site B). In contrast to this, two 
interviewees from Site A noted that they were ‘quite confident’ (Int.4 (LP) Site A) that 
‘if you are having lots of breaches the next time they go back to court it will obviously be 
taken a lot more seriously’ (Int.7 (LP) Site A). A possible explanation for these 
contradictory statements was, according to one police officer, that judges tend to treat 
perpetrators differently:   
She breached it again within 4 days. So she went back to court and 
unfortunately we sat before a different judge and he actually 
deferred that case until January. But if she was to come back again 
in front of him she would definitely get a custodial (Int.18 (PO) 
Site A). 
Thirdly, for some interviewees this shift towards a purely civil injunction was unlikely to 
have any real effect on certain individuals. According to them, the main reason for this 
was that some perpetrators would simply not comply with a court order or an injunction 
regardless of the possible consequences. One interviewee noted that ‘you are still going 
to get the twenty per cent who did not care. They did not care because they had other 
issues’ (Int.8 (LP) Site A).  
Ten interviewees expressed their concerns as to whether a purely civil response 
will be as effective as the ASBO used to be in dealing with ASB. Many of the participants 
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focused on the effectiveness of the ASBO as a ‘bargaining tool for working with a person 
and getting them to understand the consequences of their behaviour’ (Int.4 (LP) Site A). 
It had been suggested that the criminal nature of the ASBO’s second limb acted as a 
leverage for the perpetrators to change their behaviour. Consequently, this shift to a purely 
civil method of regulation means that those who act in an anti-social manner are no longer 
provided with ‘prudential reasons for desistence’ (von Hirsch, 1993: 12). More than a 
third of the interviewees argued that the abolition of the hybrid model will have a 
detrimental impact on the injunction’s overall deterrent effect. As one police officer 
explained ‘it is a real shame…I think it has taken some of the bite away from the 
legislation’ (Int.12 (PO) Site B). 
Another cause for concern for many participants was the fact that a power of arrest 
is not automatically attached to an injunction. Whilst breach of the ASBO constituted an 
offence and thus the police were able to immediately arrest anyone found in breach of his 
order, this is not the case with the new injunction. Under section 4(1) of the 2014 Act, the 
institution applying for the issue of an injunction must demonstrate either that the 
respondent has a history of violence or that that he poses ‘a significant risk to others’ in 
order for a power of arrest to be attached. According to some participants, obtaining a 
power of arrest is not as easy as it might appear to be:  
There is no point in even bothering looking at an injunction for 
him because he does not even care…In reality it will be unlikely 
to get a power of arrest attached to the injunction for him despite 
him having more aggravated offences on his record than anybody 
else in our city. The standard criminal justice has acted and it 
seems that it had no deterrent effect on him behaving in that way 
and an injunction without a power of arrest attached it would not 
have any effect. He is someone who actually if anything is to work 
is the imminence of arrest and significant sanction. An injunction 
would not do that (Int.1 (LP) Site A). 
The abovementioned concerns in conjunction with the limited amount of resources 
available led many of the participants to express their reservations as to whether they 
should be applying for the issue of an injunction. According to one of the interviewees ‘it 
makes me think what the point is. One of the things is that it costs a lot of money and if 
it is not a criminal offence, then for what purpose?’ (Int.3 (LP) Site A). This finding was 
further supported by a number of other testimonies based on which local enforcement 
agents are now more focused on getting a CBO rather than an injunction. As one 
interviewee pointed out, ‘I think that there is more pressure to get a criminal order because 
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(a) you have the power of arrest more or less kind of automatic and (b) in theory the court 
will cost less’ (Int.15 (PO) Site A). This should be linked with our earlier discussion about 
the impact that the limited availability of resources had on the way ASB was 
conceptualised by local enforcement agents.27 
This focus on the post-conviction order is not a new phenomenon. Between 2002 
and 2013 the number of CrASBOs issued was almost twice the number of ASBOs 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014b). The above finding, however, raises fundamental questions 
about the administration of justice which appears to be driven to a large extent by the 
amount of resources available at a local level rather than by principles of justice.  
Most importantly, it undermines the preventive nature of the civil injunction. The 
introduction of the civil preventive measures was premised on the assumption that the 
state should be able to address ASB at an early stage in order to prevent it from escalating 
to serious criminality (Crawford, 2009). The focus on the CBO, however, means that local 
enforcement agents will have to wait for someone to be found guilty of an offence in 
order to address their ASB. This is in line with the findings of Lewis, Crawford and 
Traynor (2016: 3) who found that the implementation of the ASB tools and powers 
‘refute[s] the logical sequencing of prevention’ because some of those against whom 
these measures were used had ‘already engaged in serious or persistent offending’.  
5.2.2.2 The introduction of positive obligations 
The introduction of positive obligations under the 2014 Act was regarded by the 
Government as a necessary addition to the new tools and powers since ‘in many cases, 
there are underlying causes of the anti-social behaviour’ (Home Office, 2014: 19). The 
perpetrator does not simply choose to act in an anti-social manner. Instead, in many cases 
the perpetrator’s behaviour has deeper causes which cannot be addressed through the 
imposition of bland prohibitions. Through the introduction of positive obligations local 
enforcement agents are invited to engage with these underlying causes and provide 
perpetrators with the necessary support needed in order to address these causes (Home 
Office, 2014). In the case of an alcoholic, for example, these positive obligations can be 
utilised in order for the perpetrator to attend an alcohol-related treatment. 
                                                             
27 See 5.2.1.4. 
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 There was strong evidence to suggest from this study that the majority of the 
interviewees perceived this addition as a positive development, since it enables them to 
work with the perpetrators to address the underlying causes of their behaviour. As one of 
the interviewees pointed out ‘in a lot of cases you can only address anti-social behaviour 
if you address the underlying causes…and sometimes I think people need to be pushed 
or even ordered to seek help with some things’ (Int.2 (LP) Site A). In addition to this, it 
was noted by some interviewees that positive obligations can also be used to repair the 
harm caused to victims by, for instance, ‘mak[ing] someone clean up street graffiti’ 
(Int.26 (LP) Site A). According to some of the participants, positive obligations were 
already used through the ABCs. A police officer explained that the ABCs were not just 
used to put restrictions on the perpetrator’s behaviour, but they were used as a means of 
referring people to ‘juvenile services or attend this club six times a week’ (Int.29 (PO) 
Site A). The foregoing testimony is consistent with the findings of Crawford, Lewis and 
Traynor (2016: 3) who found that positive obligations were already imposed ‘by way of 
support services to be accessed by the individual’. Nevertheless, it was evident from the 
testimonies provided that for the majority of the participants the introduction of positive 
obligations is a step in the right direction. 
Although compulsory attendance to an alcohol-related treatment can be perceived 
as an interference with that person’s liberty and autonomy (Gert & Culver, 1976), this 
can be justified on the ground that this can potentially enhance the ‘welfare…of the 
person being coerced’ (Husak, 2012: 468). It can also be justified on the ground that these 
paternalistic interventions are capable of providing permanent rather than temporary 
relief to those affected by the perpetrator’s behaviour. As discussed earlier,28 however, 
paternalistic interventions through criminalisation can be very contentious if ‘limited state 
intervention of a civil character is justified’ (Simester & von Hirsch, 2011: 148). 
Consequently, it is imperative to examine whether these measures are operating as ad hoc 
criminal rules. 
5.2.3 Third Pillar: Procedure followed 
The third section of the interviews focused on the procedure followed by local 
enforcement agents after someone’s behaviour was labelled as anti-social until the point 
of applying to court for the issue of an injunction. It was not my intention to examine in 
                                                             
28 See 2.2.4. 
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depth any specific informal interventions used in the sites under study.  Rather, the main 
objective of this section was to: (i) gain an insight on how incidents of ASB were managed 
in these sites; (ii) examine whether resorting to enforcement was a ‘last resort’ measure; 
and (iii) the basis for resorting to enforcement.   
5.2.3.1 Actuarial justice 
It was clear through this study that the administration of ASB was primarily risk driven. 
When local enforcement agencies were notified about an incident of ASB a risk 
assessment was carried out in order to assess the level of risk faced by the victim. Central 
to this risk assessment was the impact that someone’s behaviour had on others. This of 
course is in line with the Government’s promise for a more victim-oriented approach with 
regards to ASB (Home Office, 2012). It is also consistent with the more general shift in 
governmental policies towards preventive-led interventions discussed earlier. 29  As 
Zedner (2009: 35) explains, these interventions aim ‘to calculate, anticipate and forestall 
harms before they occur’. 
The next testimonies are illustrative of the procedure followed in both areas when 
a potential incident of ASB was reported to them and the importance attributed to the 
level of risk faced by victims. One interviewee from Site A noted that ‘initially if a person 
phones up and says that they are suffering from this or the other, even from the telephone 
stage there is a risk assessment done by the call-taker’ (Int.21 (PO) Site A). As another 
police officer from Site B explained, this risk assessment comprised of ‘a series of 
questions which would be asked to the victims of anti-social behaviour to identify what 
risk level they are at: being standard, medium or high’ (Int.12 (PO) Site B). The risk-
assessment carried out in both areas is in line with the Statutory Guidance issued by the 
Home Office. Based on these guidelines, it is considered as good practice for local 
enforcement agents to premise their investigation on the impact that the behaviour 
reported ‘is having on the victim, particularly if repeated incidents of anti-social 
behaviour are having a cumulative effect on their well-being’ (Home Office, 2014: 19). 
What was clear from the evidence collected in both areas was that the level of risk 
faced by the victim informed the entire procedure followed by local enforcement agents 
and not just the initial stage of their investigation. According to one police officer, the 
level of risk faced by the victim ‘will [be] monitored until we have reduced that risk right 
                                                             
29 See ‘Introduction’. 
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down to a level where we can say actually “we have solved this problem. The person is 
no longer at risk”’ (Int.18 (PO) Site A).   
5.2.3.2 Multi-agency approach 
As far as the high-risk cases are concerned, no significant variations were reported 
between the two areas with regard to the procedure followed. Evidence collected from 
both areas suggests that high-risk cases were regarded as a top priority and were discussed 
at the local CSP’s multi-agency meetings which were held on a regular basis. As one 
police officer noted ‘once a week we will meet with the local authority and we will 
basically discuss all of our high-risk cases and just check that we are doing everything 
that we can in a timely manner and that we have not missed anything’ (Int.12 (PO) Site 
B).  
It was evident from this study that the ultimate objective of local enforcement 
agents was to gather as much information as possible about the alleged perpetrator. This 
was not only achieved by conducting their own investigation, but also through their 
collaboration with other agencies and their information-sharing agreements. The next 
testimony is illustrative of the multi-agency approach adopted in both areas:  
We must make sure that other agencies are aware of that 
person…so it is really the case that a lot more agencies are 
involved now. Obviously in the past it was unstructured. The 
police would do their thing, the council would do their thing and 
it was not always connected to each other…with this new 
computer system we can put entries into the system which the 
council can read instantly (Int.15 (PO) Site A).  
To emphasise the importance of these information-sharing agreements, one of the 
interviewees made reference to the tragic case of Fiona Pilkington: ‘we all knew a little 
bit about it and this is where the sharing of information comes in. Each individual person 
had bits and pieces but it was never joined up and brought together and hence the reason 
why this database was brought in’ (Int.18 (PO) Site A).     
What was also important about this multi-agency approach was that high-risk 
cases were examined from various perspectives and a collective decision was taken as to 
the best way forward. Most of the participants made explicit reference to their 
collaboration with other local partners and its potential benefits. The following narrative 
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explains how the police’s attitude towards members of the ‘street community’30 changed 
due to their collaboration with other local practitioners who had a social care background 
and more experience in dealing with this group of people: 
The police had a very negative attitude to them because they saw 
them as a bit of a pain where they were breaking up fights. So it 
was always a crisis intervention. So one of the cultural changes 
for the police back in those days was – we had to work together 
for two weeks solid and they had a no arrest policy and we got 
them to take off their hats, they still had uniform, to start breaking 
down those barriers which we found very difficult (Int.3 (LP) Site 
A). 
Although under section 6 of the 1998 Act a duty is imposed on local authorities, the police 
and other public service providers to cooperate and formulate strategies through which 
they should address crime and disorder in their ‘local government area’, it was clear from 
the data collected from both sites that there was an effective ‘responsibilisation strategy’ 
in place (Garland, 2001: 124). As Garland (2001: 124) explains, the ‘responsibilisation 
strategy’ refers to the process of connecting ‘state agencies…with practices of actors in 
the “private sector” and “the community”’ in order to delegate the responsibility of crime 
management and prevention to other relevant stakeholders. According to one interviewee, 
‘if they are social housing tenants or private sector tenants we will get in touch with their 
landlord…because obviously landlords also have an obligation to deal with anti-social 
behaviour’ (Int.9 (LP) Site B). 
As the following testimony demonstrates, this shift of responsibility can be partly 
attributed to the limited resources available to state agencies, such as the police, to deal 
with crime and ASB: ‘there are not enough police officers as they used to be to deal with 
this and in theory you have partners who are trying to deal with it as well’ (Int.8 (LP) Site 
B). Another possible explanation can be that ‘good governance came to be identified with 
dependency on expertise, as the locus of objective knowledge required for scientific and 
professional management of the social’ (O’Malley & Palmer, 1996: 140). On this view, 
the management of crime and ASB should be left to those who hold the necessary skills 
and experience needed. As one police officer explained, ‘we will always look at a sort of 
multi-agency approach. If there are other agencies that can be involved in order to get 
                                                             
30 Street community includes primarily street drinkers, rough sleepers and beggars. 
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them the kind of support they need in order to prevent them from committing further 
offences’ (Int.27 (PO) Site A).    
There was an impression that the procedure followed by local enforcement agents 
was well structured and complied with the statutory guidance issued by the Home Office 
(2014). This is not to suggest that local enforcement agencies simply tried to follow the 
Home Office’s guidelines. Rather, there was an impression from both sites that the 
majority of the participants strongly believed that a multi-agency approach was the best 
way forward both in terms of information-sharing and the administration of high-risk 
cases. This well-established multi-agency approach in both sites contradicts the findings 
of previous studies according to which there was ‘a lack of joined-up approaches within 
and between partners’(Crawford, Lewis & Traynor, 2016: 7) and ‘inconsistent attitudes 
towards information sharing’ (Donoghue, 2010: 99-100). As discussed earlier, some 
possible explanations for this include the lack of resources and the realisation by local 
enforcement agents that on many occasions ASB is the precursor of a number of other 
issues that need to be addressed if a permanent solution is to be achieved.  
5.2.3.3 Informal interventions 
As evidence from previous studies suggests, applying to court for the issue of an ASBO 
was not, in general, a first resort measure for local enforcement agents (Koffman, 2006). 
Instead, according to Lewis, Crawford, and Traynor (2016: 9-10), the measures used at a 
local level to address ASB ‘form[ed] a pyramidal system of regulation’ with the ASBO 
being located at the top end. Based on this ‘pyramidal system’, those whose behaviour 
was deemed as anti-social would initially receive a warning letter urging them to alter 
their behaviour (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 9-10). Failure to comply with this 
warning letter would result in the issue of an ABC (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 
9-10). The final stage would include an application for the issue of an ASBO (Lewis, 
Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 9-10). Based on their findings, although the existence of this 
‘pyramidal system’ was confirmed, in practice they found that there were ‘myriad 
variations’ amongst the sites under investigation with some of them adding extra layers 
of regulation (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 9-10).  
 Evidence collected by this study confirms the existence of this ‘pyramidal system 
of regulation’ in both sites with the injunction located at its top end. Nevertheless, it was 
evident that there has been some departure from out-of-court interventions which purely 
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aim to achieve compliance through the threat of sanctions. In particular, there was strong 
evidence to suggest that in both sites there was a shift towards a more restorative justice 
(RJ) approach.  
 Before elaborating further on the informal interventions used in both sites, it is 
instructive to engage with the principles underpinning RJ and some of its processes which 
will be referred to in this study, such as victim-offender mediation. Central to any RJ 
process is the need for the relevant stakeholders to come together in order to discuss the 
behaviour in question and reach to a commonly agreed solution (Ashworth, 2004). As 
Johnstone and van Ness (2006: 5) explain, what really distinguishes RJ from other forms 
of social control is that it departs from the state-centred administration of justice towards 
a more ‘community-based reparative justice’ model. Consequently, what makes RJ 
processes appealing is their ‘commitment to combating oppressive state structures of 
inhumane reliance on prisons’ (Braithwaite, 2002: 564). Thus, as far as criminal wrongs 
are concerned, RJ offers an alternative to criminal prosecution through which the wrong 
committed by the offender can be addressed without the need to resort to the most 
coercive means of social control.  
Although RJ processes share many characteristics, they can vary considerably 
both in terms of their structure and possible outcome. As to the former, some of these 
processes target the community at large rather than individual victims (Dignan, 2007). 
An example of this would be community conferences (or citizen panels) which primarily 
aim to address ‘victimless’ crimes which have a detrimental impact on the community’s 
quality of life (Kurki, 2003: 304-305). Another key objective of these conferences is to 
‘strengthen community solidarity’ (Kurki, 2003: 311). In contrast to community 
conferences, central to the victim-offender mediation is the participation of the victim 
who is given an active role in the management of their case (Kurki, 2003). As Walters 
(2014b: 37) explains, this type of mediation usually involves ‘a single mediator who acts 
as an impartial facilitator of direct dialogue between the parties’ involved. Vital to this 
process is the need for the wrongdoer to assume ‘responsibility for their actions and to 
repair the harms they have caused directly to the victim’ (Walters, 2014b: 37). 
As to the latter, the outcome of every RJ practice can vary depending on the merits 
of each case (Walters, 2014b). For instance, in cases where no physical harm or any 
damage to the victim’s property was caused, it might be decided that the perpetrator needs 
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to offer an apology. Similarly, if damage was caused to the victim’s property, it might be 
agreed that the perpetrator should repair the damage themselves or compensate the victim 
for it (Walters, 2014b).     
Although some of the interviewees made reference to community conferences, 
most of them noted that the most commonly used process was victim-offender mediation. 
This is not to suggest that warning letters or ABCs were not used in these sites. Rather, it 
is to argue that it was clear through this study that RJ practices were amongst the most 
commonly used informal interventions in these sites. The following testimony provided 
by a local practitioner in Site A is illustrative of this shift both in terms of their approach 
towards the victim and the alleged perpetrator:  
We support people, additionally called victims, but we are trying 
to move away from that to a more restorative type of language and 
approach …We try to consider what restorative options might be. 
So, somebody has come to our attention for the first time and they 
are willing to engage we will try and look at restorative options. 
We will they be willing to write a letter of apology? We will they 
be willing to meet and have like a community conference with 
different parties there? (Int.4 (LP) Site A). 
A similar shift was also observed in Site B. As one of the interviewees pointed out ‘we 
are using more of the restorative justice side of things…a lot of us have received RJ 
training and we are trying to get the local communities to solve the problem. It is about 
trying to talk with your neighbours’ (Int.8 (LP) Site B). It is also worth noting that explicit 
reference was made by most of the participants from Site B to the use of victim-offender 
mediation as one of the most commonly RJ practices used. As one ASB officer from a 
Housing Association pointed out they have ‘a contract with a mediator’ and they tend to 
use his/her services especially when the behaviour at stake involves ‘counter allegations’ 
between neighbours (Int.16 (LP) Site B).  
The importance of this shift towards a more RJ approach should not be 
underestimated. The use of victim-offender or community mediation in the context of 
hate crimes has been very successful in ‘reducing [victims’] emotional harm and 
preventing further hate incidents from recurring’ (Walters, 2014b: 239). This was also 
confirmed by one local practitioner who argued that their ‘best success rate is around 
mediation’ (Int.9 (LP) Site B).  
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Moreover, RJ provides victims of ASB with an opportunity to be heard, ‘to play 
a part in repairing the harm and finding a positive way forward’ without resorting to any 
formal legal action (Ministry of Justice, 2014a: 3). This enhanced role given to victims 
was not limited to their participation in mediation or any other form of RJ used. Especially 
in Site A, there was strong evidence to suggest that victims and their needs had a pivotal 
role in the management of their case. The following testimony illustrates the victim’s role 
in this process: ‘we will not do anything without their permission. If they give us 
permission to address or talk to the person that they believe is causing the harm we will 
approach them as a team’ (Int.4 (LP) Site A). The importance attributed to victims of 
ASB in this area was further evidenced by the fact that they were ‘kept informed about 
what was happening with their case’ (Int.2 (LP) Site A). As one of the interviewees 
pointed out, the fact that they were kept informed about the management of their case 
‘helped them [to] feel safer’ (Int.1 (LP) Site A).  
5.2.4 Fourth Pillar: Resorting to enforcement  
It was clear from the evidence collected by this study that in most of the cases ‘a warning 
letter or a conversation with an individual or the alleged perpetrator will stop the 
behaviour’ at stake (Int.9 (LP) Site B). In both sites, there was a genuine belief that 
applying to court for the issue of an injunction or a CBO should be generally reserved as 
a last resort measure. According to one police officer, ‘there are reasons for this behaviour 
so we need to look into it. I need to work with these people’ (Int.18 (PO) Site A). Their 
initial objective, therefore, was to identify the underlying causes of ASB and ‘try to look 
at a support network’ (Int.11 (PO) Site B) for that individual. As one local practitioner 
explained, ‘taking it to court, for me personally is failure on what we can do otherwise to 
remove the anti-social behaviour’ (Int.10 (LP) Site B). The following testimony is 
representative of the approach adopted in both sites: 
When we go to court for an injunction I want to be sure of two 
things. We can present the evidence that the person has behaved 
anti-socially, but also that we can show that everything else we 
have done and tried to address it because that is in a way what 
gives you the argument to argue for necessity or that is why it is 
reasonable to issue the order (Int.2 (LP) Site A). 
Figure 5.1 is illustrative of the procedure followed by local enforcement agents in both 
sites with regard to the management of ASB incidents. 
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Figure 5.1: The standard process of regulation followed in sites under study 
 
Although Figure 5.1 is illustrative of the standard procedure followed when someone’s 
behaviour was labelled as anti-social, evidence from both sites suggests that when the 
level of risk posed by that person was high, then the perpetrator would move through the 
above steps very quickly. One interviewee noted that ‘if their behaviour is quite serious 
we will move to enforcement quickly. If there is physical violence or if there is a hate 
element it will be much more likely to go to court and speed it up. So we do look at the 
severity and the harm that is caused’ (Int.5 (LP) Site A). This replicates the findings of 
previous studies based on which the use of formal legal action against those who behaved 
in an anti-social manner was neither a first nor a last resort measure (Crawford, Lewis, & 
Traynor, 2016; Koffman, 2006). Instead, this was done ‘on a case by case 
basis…depending on the specific facts of the incidents reported’ (Int.3 (LP) Site B).  
Taken together, the above accounts suggest that applying to court for an injunction 
or a CBO was generally reserved in both sites as a ‘last resort’ measure unless the level 
of risk posed by the perpetrator was high. As far as the injunction is concerned, if the 
behaviour in question was regarded as a high-risk incident, then local enforcement agents 
would not follow each step of the process outlined in Figure 5.1. As one local practitioner 
noted, ‘if it is a high-risk case then we will create a separate action plan’ (Int.16 (LP) Site 
B). Similarly, the overall impression from both sites was that if the perpetrator committed 
an offence and there was already a long history of persistent ASB and criminality, then 
they will apply for the issue of a CBO.   
5.2.4.1 Overlap between anti-social behaviour and criminality  
As noted earlier, research participants were asked to define and provide examples of 
behaviour that they would classify as anti-social. For the majority, ASB can range from 
behaviour which at the face of it appears to be harmless and part of every social interaction 
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(the lower end of the scale) to behaviour that is already proscribed by criminal law (the 
upper end of the scale). 31  Some common examples cited by the majority of the 
participants included common assault and criminal damage. This study collected 
evidence on how participants and their institutions dealt with this kind of behaviour. In 
particular, police officers were asked whether an incident situated in the upper end of the 
scale would be dealt with as a criminal offence, as ASB, or a combination of the two (i.e. 
to apply for a CBO). Similarly, local practitioners were asked whether they would address 
this kind of behaviour themselves or if this was a matter for the police to deal with.   
  In Site A, the majority of the police officers noted that ‘the criminal aspect will 
always take precedence’ (Int.15 (PO) Site A). Simply put, if a criminal offence was 
committed, then the criminal justice route would be followed. As one police officer 
argued, this was the ‘rule of thumb…when a criminal act’ was committed (Int.15 (PO) 
Site A). This was reaffirmed by most of the local practitioners from Site A who argued 
that if an offence was committed, then the police would deal with it as a crime. One local 
practitioner noted, for instance, the following: ‘I have met beggars making £500 per week 
easy…Sometimes it is money by deception. When I used to do targeted work with the 
police is that nine out of ten times the police will deal with them as a beggar’ (Int.2 (LP) 
Site A).  
Six out of the nine police officers who participated in this study from Site A noted 
that if they are dealing with a prolific offender, then they will ‘apply for a CBO in looking 
at ways of actually preventing that from happening’ (Int.23 (PO) Site A). According to 
the majority of the police officers from Site A, the main reason for this is the inability of 
the criminal law to deal effectively with prolific low-level offenders. The following 
testimony is illustrative of the general dissatisfaction of police officers with the criminal 
law:  
They can be dealt with as crimes. However, as I said earlier, 
individuals who have been dealt with numerous times for 
harassment, public order offences and continue to offend, they 
continue to go before the court. Sometimes an injunction with a 
stronger power needs to be put in place to try and prevent that 
person…The CBO and the civil injunction hold a higher penalty 
and if it means that we have to deal with them with the higher 
                                                             
31 See 5.2.1. 
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penalty than the penalty for the criminal offence then so be it 
(Int.18 (PO) Site A). 
In contrast to the foregoing testimony and what the majority of their colleagues argued, 
two police officers noted that they would use the ASB tools and powers as an ‘addition 
to their criminal investigation. As a holistic approach to actually solving the problem’ 
(Int.21 (PO) Site A). As most of the local practitioners from Site A pointed out, the 
criminal law alone cannot adequately address the underlying causes of criminality. One 
of the local practitioners, for instance, noted that ‘going to prison it is such a short stain. 
It is not long enough in order to have the results that you need. To change someone’s 
behaviour it takes time. It takes work. It does not happen overnight’ (Int.7 (LP) Site A). 
Consequently, the use of a CBO is sometimes necessary in order to ‘bring that long-term 
change’ (Int.5 (LP) Site A) through the imposition of certain positive obligations. 
Finally, one police officer noted that in the case of non-prolific offenders the 
injunction will be used as a means of diverting them away from criminality. Based on this 
testimony ‘if it is one off low-level then no we are no way near that…If there is a fifteen-
year-old who does graffiti for a first time are we going to criminalise this person? Or is it 
better to make him face the victim and scrape this off the wall themselves?’ (Int.26 (PO) 
Site A).   
 As far as Site B is concerned, mixed responses were received as well. For many 
of the participants behaviour that constitutes an offence should and is dealt with by the 
police as a crime. As one police officer explained, if the behaviour at stake ‘does not quite 
meet the criminal standard’, then:  
We will always try to see the civil application because they are 
quicker and therefore you get more effective turnaround for your 
victims. Whereas if you go on the back of a criminal conviction, 
then some cases might take a year if not more to actually be heard 
at court. And if you are waiting for that you still have that person 
playing up. It is not going to do anyone any favours (Int.12 (PO) 
Site B).  
The officer then continued to explain that ‘if there is a criminal offence that will be dealt 
with there and then. The anti-social behaviour element and its tools and powers are 
coming in as a secondary, almost a support, measure to ensure that everything else is 
looked at as well’ (Int.12 (PO) Site B). On this view, if a criminal offence was committed, 
then they would try to secure a conviction and if necessary obtain a CBO.  
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For another group of participants (three out of nine) the use of the criminal law 
should be reserved as a last resort measure. One police officer noted that ‘if we can deal 
with somebody without criminalising them, then this is ideally what we want to do’ 
(Int.13 (PO) Site B). As one interviewee explained, their main objective was to ‘divert 
[people away from criminality] rather than implementing the full power straight away’ 
(Int.10 (LP) Site B). 
The use of the CBO as a means of compensating for the inability of the criminal 
law to deal effectively with persistent low-level criminality raises a number of 
fundamental issues. One of the most important issues raised here is whether we can 
modify the criminal law in such a way as to make it effective against persistent low-level 
criminality without the need to resort to ‘multiple sanctions and strategies of behaviour 
regulation’ (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 11). As far as the use of the injunction 
as an alternative to the criminal law is concerned, concerns can be raised as to the 
legitimacy of this approach and the fact that it constitutes a form of under-
criminalisation.32  
5.2.4.2 Applying for the issue of an injunction or a criminal behaviour order 
The impetus for initiating this research project partly came from the possible restrictions 
that can be imposed on someone’s liberty during the initial phase of the two-stage 
regulation process rather than the sanction received if found in breach of the injunction. 
As Duff and Marshall (2006) contend, although breach of the ASBO (the second stage) 
constituted an offence, we should also be mindful of the restrictions/obligations imposed 
on those against whom an ASBO was issued (the first stage) because they had the 
potential to constitute a form of criminal punishment in their own right.33 In order to test 
the validity of this contention, it is necessary to examine more closely the 
restrictions/obligations imposed on those against whom the ASB tools and powers are 
used. The findings of this analysis can then be examined with reference to the working 
definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3, in order to investigate whether they 
indeed amount to criminal punishment.  
                                                             
32 See 6.2.2. 
33 This argument is still valid for those ASBOs still in force. As explained before, there is a five-year 
transitional period for the ASBOs issued prior to the 2014 Act. 
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 (i) Imposing negative obligations  
As expected and in line with the findings of a previous study, according to many 
participants, the most common types of restrictions imposed on those against whom these 
measures were used included: ‘(i) people being prohibited from doing certain things; (ii) 
going to certain places; (iii) be with certain people; and (iv) being out and about in certain 
times, i.e. curfews. I think geographical exclusion is the most common’ (Int.2 (LP) Site 
A) (see also Matthews et al, 2007). One police officer, for instance, made reference to the 
case of a street drinker who was prohibited from entering into a ‘particular road...and not 
to have an open can in a public space’ (Int.15 (PO) Site A). 
 As acknowledged by one interviewee, congregating with certain individuals, 
entering into specific parts of town or feeding pigeons ‘appear to the surface to be 
everyday lawful activities’ (Int.4 (LP) Site A). Prohibiting someone from engaging in 
those otherwise lawful activities appears to be very contentions for two main reasons. 
First, certain activities, such associating with others, fall within the ambit of liberty as this 
was conceptualised in chapter 3. 34  Based on this formulation of liberty, rights and 
freedoms which are protected under the ECHR and brought into domestic law by HRA 
1998 should be regarded as basic and/or fundamental for this society. Accordingly, 
interference with these rights and freedoms will satisfy the first prerequisite of the 
working definition of criminalisation.  
Secondly, the imposition of the abovementioned restrictions can be criticised for 
creating personalised prohibitions which only apply to certain individuals rather to the 
entire society (Gil-Robles, 2005). In theory, the creation of these personalised 
prohibitions allow local enforcement agents to criminalise indirectly specific groups of 
people whilst circumventing the enhanced procedural protections afforded to those facing 
the prospect of direct criminal punishment.  
(ii) Imposing positive obligations 
Most of the participants made particular reference to the imposition of positive 
obligations and their potential benefits. Some of the most commonly cited examples 
included: (i) attending drug or alcohol related treatments; and (ii) engaging with the 
‘mental health services’ (Int.8 (LP) Site B). As one police officer noted, positive 
obligations ‘are very handy’ since they can be used to address the underlying causes of 
                                                             
34 See 3.2.1. 
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the behaviour at stake (Int.15 (PO) Site A).  The importance of this, according to many 
of the participants, lies with the fact that if ‘someone is addicted to drugs and you just tell 
them to stop, then they will not stop’ behaving in an anti-social manner (Int.16 (LP) Site 
B). For this reason, local enforcement agents tried to impose certain positive obligations 
that they deemed appropriate to address the underlying causes of the problem: 
If you have got somebody who has mental health issues, then you 
have to tackle the mental health issues rather than on putting 
restrictions on their activities. You have to make sure that they 
engage with the mental health services, the psychiatric nurses, the 
doctors and anything else (Int.8 (LP) Site B).      
Moreover, the foregoing account highlights once again the presence of a 
‘responsibilisation strategy’ where local enforcement agents seek to ‘enlist wider actors’ 
in their ASB strategies (Crawford, 2009: 811).   
 Although the imposition of certain positive obligations aimed to address the 
underlying causes of ASB, it was a common belief amongst most of the participants that 
they had to convince the court examining their application that these obligations were 
both essential and that they had ‘the necessary infrastructure in place to support’ them 
(Int.17 (LP) Site B). As a local practitioner noted, if the necessary infrastructure and 
support mechanisms are not in place, then ‘you will be setting the client up to fail’ (Int.17 
(LP) Site B).   
 Nonetheless, it was evident from the data collected that on many occasions the 
restrictions/obligations imposed interfered with the perpetrators’ liberty. On many 
occasions, for example, those against whom an injunction was issued were prohibited 
from associating with certain individuals and/or accessing certain public spaces and 
roads. Both of these rights and freedoms are protected under the ECHR. For the purposes 
of this study, therefore, they should be regarded as basic and/or fundamental.35  
The foregoing conclusion can be criticised for failing to take into consideration 
the purpose of the restrictions/obligations imposed on the perpetrators. It could be argued, 
for instance, that the imposition of certain restrictions on those who behaved in an anti-
social manner should not be regarded as an interference with their liberty since their 
                                                             
35 Article 5 and article 11 of the ECHR respectively. These rights and freedoms should be read in light of 
the way liberty has been conceptualised in this study (see 3.2.1).  
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ultimate objective was to prevent further ASB and criminality.36 Although the purpose of 
these restrictions/obligations appears to be legitimate, we still need to be mindful of the 
impact of these measures on the perpetrators. Moreover, it should be remembered that in 
order for these restrictions to amount to criminal punishment, they also need to publically 
and purposefully convey censure. Otherwise, these restrictions will simply constitute non-
punitive sanctions.           
(iii) Were the perpetrators publically and purposefully condemned?  
The implementation of the ASBO was heavily criticised due to the ‘naming and shaming’ 
practices used by many local enforcement agencies around England and Wales in 
previous years.37 Despite the concerns raised, in Stanley, the publication of the ASBO 
recipients’ personal details along with the restrictions imposed on them was deemed 
compatible with the provisions of Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to ‘private and family 
life’ (para. 31). More precisely, it was held that the publication of this kind of information 
was essential for the effective enforcement of the ASBOs (para. 40). A similar approach 
with regard to the publication of this kind of information is adopted under the 2014 Act 
with the Statutory Guidance emphasising the need to reassure victims and local 
‘communities that action is being taken’ (Home Office, 2014: 24). Although the 
publication of certain information can be necessary under certain circumstances, it was 
evident in some cases, such as in Stanley, that this could also be used as a means to 
publically condemn the ASBO recipients. The pressing question, therefore, is whether the 
implementation of ASB measures purposefully resulted in the public condemnation of 
those against whom these measures were used.   
In Site A, most of the participants stated that they would publicise information 
about the perpetrator and the obligations/restrictions imposed on them only to those 
‘affected’ by their behaviour (Int.19 (PO) Site A). As one local practitioner explained, 
‘you have to be very proportionate as to how you ensure that people are aware of the 
order…if a person is banned from going to Co-op you do not need to inform the national 
press about it. You just let people who enforce it and the Co-op staff’ (Int.26 (LP) Site 
A). This need for targeted publicity was further evident by a number of other testimonies 
according to which publicity should be limited only to what is absolutely necessary for 
                                                             
36 I will elaborate further on local enforcement agents’ intentions in 5.2.4.3. 
37 See 4.2.2.2. 
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the effective policing of the measures put in place. To illustrate this, one interviewee made 
reference to a case where ‘local residents were given a photo pack. They all had to sign 
the Data Protection and they would have different photos of that person. Not giving their 
identities but showing them so people could report the behaviour that was going on’ (Int.3 
(LP) Site A).   
Moreover, what was clear from the evidence collected is that for the majority of 
the participants it was important to ensure that ‘each case [was] dealt with on its own 
merits’ (Int.21 (PO) Site A). The following account given by one local practitioner is 
representative of most of the testimonies given in Site A: 
Every case needs to be risk-assessed…there will be a multi-
agency risk assessment that will need to take place. What are the 
risks to the individual if the public finds out about what they have 
done? You look at age. You look at personal circumstances. You 
look at the impact upon the victim…It is not publicised in every 
occasion, but everything you do is revisited and reassessed in 
order to make sure that it is proportionate (Int.9 (LP) Site A) 
(emphasis added). 
The need to take into account the potential impact that the publication of certain 
information might have on the perpetrator was emphasised by many participants, 
especially in cases involving young people. As one local practitioner mentioned, 
publicising information about a young individual can be counterproductive because it is 
likely to ‘increase the fear of harm and the negative views about young people’ (Int.2 
(LP) Site A).  
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the Statutory Guidance according 
to which ‘each case should be decided carefully on its own facts’ striking a fair balance 
between the perpetrator’s right to privacy and the effective enforcement of these measures 
(Home Office, 2014: 24-25). Moreover, they reiterate that the administration of ASB in 
this site was mainly risk-driven.   
Although for most of the participants publicising information about the 
perpetrators and the behaviour should be confined only to those immediately affected by 
this kind of behaviour, many participants noted that under certain circumstances 
information should be shared more widely. They noted that this would only happen in 
cases where the ‘victim is at real risk and any further anti-social behaviour by the 
perpetrator…can make them really suffer’ (Int.29 (PO) Site A).  
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For a small minority (three out of the nineteen) of participants, however, it 
appeared that ‘the norm is that if you are dealing with an adult, then you are going to 
inform the public’ (Int.23 (PO) Site A). There was an impression that this seemed to be 
particularly the case with police officers when dealing with persistent offenders. One 
police officer noted the following: ‘I think it is not necessarily a bad thing. I think that 
other people from the wider society have a right to know if somebody has breached the 
law in a sense and has certain conditions in order to safeguard and protect them’ (Int.21 
(PO) Site A). This officer then went on to explain that through this process the public are 
also made ‘aware [of the conditions and] are able to notify the police that they breached’ 
either their injunction or their CBO (Int.21 (PO) Site A).      
In Site B, five out of the ten participants mentioned that certain pieces of 
information were only shared with those affected or likely to have been affected by the 
perpetrator’s behaviour. As one local practitioner explained:  
We will always consider to who we are telling about this. We do 
not publicise things…so we told the estate what has actually been 
done because we obviously believed that everyone would have 
been affected because of the nature of the behaviour and because 
of where the behaviour was happening (Int.16 (LP) Site B). 
As one interviewee noted, to publicise information to people who have not been affected 
by the perpetrator’s behaviour ‘would be a disproportionate’ response (Int.17 (LP) Site 
B). Again, it was clear that the sharing of information was ‘case specific’ (Int.8 (LP) Site 
B). A risk-assessment was carried out in advance taking into consideration the impact of 
the perpetrators’ behaviour and any personal issues they might be facing, such as ‘mental 
health issues’ (Int.8 (LP) Site B). One interviewee noted that in order for them to publicise 
the issue of an injunction the behaviour in question must have had a ‘community impact’ 
(Int.8 (LP) Site B). They stated, however, that their aim was to ‘inform [the public] rather 
than to identify’ the perpetrators (Int.8 (LP) Site B). 
As far as the remaining five participants are concerned, there was an impression 
that ‘the public at large need to be advised as well because clearly that person has not 
changed from all the efforts you have put in beforehand’ (Int.22 (LP) Site B). The 
following statement is illustrative of this approach: 
It is incredibly difficult to prove that somebody has breached the 
sanctions that they have been placed upon them without the 
community taking ownership. It was never a particular popular 
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concept across the country. You know the old ‘name it and shame 
it’. You know posting people’s pictures. Did it breach their human 
rights? My personal opinion is that the rights of the victims should 
be held at a higher level than the rights of the perpetrator…they 
solely engage in negative lifestyle which is having a bad impact 
upon everybody and people are getting frightened. So, I liked it 
when we could ‘name and shame’. Put pictures on the internet, on 
a billboard or to the local press (Int. 9 (LP) Site B).          
The above testimony is not to suggest that these aforementioned ‘name and shame’ 
methods were used in Site B. Rather, it is to illustrate that half of the participants from 
Site B were in favour of a broader approach in terms of how information about the 
perpetrator and their behaviour should be managed.  
Moreover, the foregoing testimony is consistent with many other accounts which 
emphasised that these measures can hardly be monitored and for this reason local 
enforcement agents should ‘rely on the community…to inform’ (Int.17 (LP) Site B) them 
about any possible violations of the restrictions imposed on the perpetrators. In fact, it 
was clear from the evidence collected in both areas, that the limited availability of 
resources was one of the main reasons for publicising information about the perpetrators 
and their behaviour.  As one police officer pointed out ‘unfortunately, there are not 
enough of us to police every single injunction or CBO. So, we rely upon whoever sees or 
if the victim sees to come forward with the details of the breaches’ (Int.13 (PO) Site B). 
According to one local practitioner this cooperation between the public and the local 
enforcement agents was vital because ‘once [the perpetrators] realise that they can get 
away with it they are not bothering’ (Int.1 (LP) Site A). Hence, it was stated that in order 
for these measures to be ‘effective you have to advertise’ (Int.10 (LP) Site B) them.  
Although there was evidence to suggest that on a number of occasions information 
about the perpetrators was publicised to people who were not directly affected by their 
behaviour, this does not necessarily mean that the restrictions imposed on those 
individuals amounted to criminal punishment. As noted earlier, the purpose (or at least 
one of the purposes) of publicity must be the public condemnation of the individual at 
stake in order for the restrictions imposed on them to amount to criminal punishment.38 
The fact that certain pieces of information about the perpetrator were publicised will not 
automatically satisfy the second prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation. 
                                                             
38 See 3.2.2. 
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To illustrate the distinction between the two, let us consider the following two 
testimonies. When one of the participants was asked to describe the circumstances under 
which they would let the entire community know about the issue of an injunction his/her 
response was the following: ‘it is something that we try, not in a negative way, to say that 
this person has got this and get the feeling to the public that to let them know that action 
has been taken against that particular person’ (Int.27 (PO) Site A). Let us now compare 
the foregoing account with the following one:  
With adults we have gone a long further. We had deliberately put 
some articles in the [local newspaper]. That guy was extremely 
racially and homophobic abusive to a few people and this was not 
the first time he had done it and he had some previous convictions 
for racially aggravated offences…We did a press release in the 
[local newspaper] when we got an ASBO for him because it was 
really important. Members of the community who had 
experiencing hate incidents were there (Int.1 (LP) Site A). 
Whilst both testimonies describe the circumstances under which information about the 
perpetrator was made available to the community at large, it is evident that only in the 
latter case the purpose or at least one of the purposes of publicising certain information 
was to publically condemn the perpetrator and his behaviour. Conversely, in the first case 
it is clear that the purpose of sharing information was to reassure the public that the ASB 
has been dealt with.  
To illustrate how censure was communicated in the latter case let us a draw a 
parallel with direct criminalisation. As discussed earlier, direct criminalisation 
symbolises the intentional and unequivocal denunciation of certain kinds of wrongs by 
the state.39 As Duff (2001) explains, through direct criminalisation a message is conveyed 
to society that the wrong proscribed is so blameworthy that needs to be publically 
condemned. This is not a wrong against the individual victim (if there is one), but a moral 
wrong against the entire society (Duff & Marshall, 2004). This is a wrong that violates 
some of society’s core values and for this reason a collective response by the community 
is needed (Duff & Marshall, 2004). Seen in this way, those who are found guilty of an 
offence should be viewed by society as moral wrongdoers rather than as individuals who 
merely violated a legal rule (Ashworth & Horder, 2013). 
                                                             
39 See 2.1. 
168 
 
As far as non-criminal legislation is concerned, the intention of the legislature is 
not to publically condemn the behaviour at stake. Censure, however, can still be 
communicated when state actors publically and purposefully condemn both the 
perpetrator and the behaviour in question. Although the ASBO constituted a civil order, 
it is evident that one of the purposes of the press release (second testimony) was clearly 
to publically condemn both the perpetrator and his behaviour. 
Based on the data collected from both sites, in most of the cases information about 
the perpetrators was only shared with those directly affected by the behaviour in question 
as a means of facilitating the effective policing of the restrictions imposed. There was 
evidence to suggest, however, that on certain limited occasions the main purpose (or at 
least one of the main purposes) of information sharing was to publically condemn the 
perpetrators and their behaviour. In these limited cases the implementation of the ASB 
tools and powers satisfied both prerequisites of the working definition and thus 
constituted a form of indirect criminalisation.    
5.2.4.3 Assessing the legitimacy of enforcement 
Although it was evident from the data collected that in most of the cases the 
implementation of the injunction’s first limb did not constitute a form of indirect 
criminalisation, we need still to focus on these few cases where both prerequisites of the 
working definition were satisfied. Similar to direct criminalisation, our starting point here 
should be to scrutinise the legitimacy of this form of criminalisation and whether this can 
be warranted.  
(i) Necessity and proportionality   
Although certain interventions could amount to an interference with the perpetrator’s 
liberty, for most interviewees this interference was warranted because there was always 
a connection between the perpetrators’ past behaviour and the restrictions/obligations 
imposed on them. For them, the objective of these interventions was not to ‘prevent 
someone from having a normal life’ (Int.19 (PO) Site A). Rather, their objective was to 
‘prevent them from conducting behaviour which is not acceptable’ (Int.19 (PO) Site A). 
The following testimony provided by one police officer is illustrative of the majority’s 
responses when asked about whether the restrictions imposed on the perpetrators result 
in the prohibition of otherwise lawful activities:  
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If somebody has not stepped over the line they will be allowed to 
carry on doing what they were doing. If they have stepped over 
the line to a point where we feel that we need to have some kind 
of order on them, then yes it would stop them doing something 
that might be legitimate to them, such as walking down the high 
street (Int.14 (PO) Site B). 
To support the justifiability of these restrictions, most of the participants emphasised the 
need for these to be deemed as necessary and proportionate. As one local practitioner 
noted:  
We always say ‘Is it necessary to ask for that restriction?’ and ‘Is 
it proportionate to ask for that restriction?’. These are the two 
questions we will ask ourselves in the whole preparation that is 
what we will be asking ourselves. If we do not feel that we have 
the evidence to support and say ‘yes’ to both of these questions, 
then we would not have included them. So, if somebody is just 
committing anti-social behaviour in a particular street to exclude 
them from the whole city will not be proportionate (Int.4 (LP) Site 
A). 
The foregoing accounts represent what the majority of the interviewees believed about 
the imposition of these restrictions. This finding, contradicts with some of the theoretical 
concerns raised earlier regarding the issue of the injunction.40 The 2014 Act was criticised 
for imposing a lower threshold than the one imposed by the 1998 Act. Whilst under the 
1998 Act an ASBO and the CrASBO could only be issued if it was regarded as a 
necessary means for the protection of those affected by the perpetrator’s behaviour,41 
under the 2014 Act the issue of the injunction needs only to be regarded as a ‘just and 
convenient’ measure for the prevention of further ASB.42 As far as the CBO is concerned, 
its issue needs only to ‘help in preventing the offender from’ behaving in a similar manner 
in the future.43 Upon closer scrutiny of the findings of this study, it is evident that these 
criticisms do not reflect how the law had been implemented in the two sites under 
investigation.  
 To further support the need for these restrictions to be necessary and 
proportionate, many of the participants claimed that applying successfully to court for 
the issue of an injunction or a CBO is not an easy task. Instead, according to them, they 
‘need to justify’ (Int.15 (PO) Site A) these restrictions because ultimately the decision to 
                                                             
40 See 4.1.2. 
41 Section 1 and section 1C respectively. 
42 Section 1(3). 
43 Section 22(4). 
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‘impose certain restrictions on someone’ lies with the court (Int.2 (LP) Site A). One 
interviewee noted, for instance, that in order to apply successfully to court ‘you have to 
have hard core evidence and you have to have hard core statements. So, it is not an easy 
process to do. And you are not going to do it unless you can push it forward’ (Int.11 (PO) 
Site B). As one local practitioner explained, ‘we would not use the injunction … to shove 
a lot of things that are not actually relevant and judges are very strict on that. We would 
not even be able to bring that up. You would be hugely criticised’ (Int.16 (LP) Site B).  
The last two testimonies are consistent with the earlier finding of this study 
regarding the presence of a review procedure in both sites. As mentioned above, in both 
sites a multi-agency approach was adopted not only in terms of how ASB is to be 
conceptualised, but also in terms of how local enforcement agencies tried to address this 
kind of behaviour. Evidence collected by this study revealed that this multi-agency 
approach also extended to the restrictions and/or obligations that local enforcement agents 
sought to impose on those who behaved in an anti-social manner. The following 
testimony provided by one police officer is illustrative of this multi-agency approach 
adopted in both areas: ‘I will sit down with the Community Safety Team, with our 
colleagues and generally before we apply for a CBO we will have a professionals’ 
meeting and we will come up with a list of prohibitions…that would suit that individual’ 
(Int.23 (PO) Site A). According to another interviewee, this pre-enforcement process is 
not as straightforward as it might appear to be since ‘it is notoriously difficult to get all 
the agencies to agree’ to these restrictions and/or obligations (Int.28 (PO) Site A). 
(ii) The purpose of enforcement  
During the final section of the interviews, the research participants were asked about the 
purpose(s) that enforcement serves. Based on their responses two main purposes were 
identified: (i) the prevention of further ASB; and (ii) the rehabilitation of the perpetrator. 
 Twenty seven out of the twenty-nine interviewees noted that the primary objective 
of an injunction or a CBO is to ‘try and prevent that behaviour, to try and stop that 
behaviour’ (Int.18 (PO) Site A). As one interviewee explained ‘if we are to punish 
somebody then we will find a law to do so … This, however, is prevention. This is an 
attempt to prevent a pattern of behaviour’ (Int.11 (PO) Site B). These accounts are in line 
with the New Labour Government’s position according to which the ASB tools and 
powers ‘aimed at stopping the problem behaviour, rather than punishing the offender’ 
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(Home Office, 2003: 6). Regardless of the preventive nature of these measures, criminal 
law theorists should not be averted from examining whether the implementation of these 
measures resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB. As far as local 
enforcement agents are concerned, they should constantly be mindful of the potential 
implications of these restrictions on people’s lives.  
 The second major objective identified through the data collected was the 
rehabilitation of the perpetrators. Seventeen out of the twenty-nine interviewees stated 
that enforcement was used as a means of working with the perpetrator in order to address 
the underlying causes of their behaviour. As the following testimony illustrates, if the 
perpetrator refused to utilise the services provided to them, then local enforcement agents 
could apply for the issue of an injunction or a CBO on purely paternalistic grounds: ‘For 
me is about using enforcement as a tool to get people to engage in social care and make 
significant sustainable changes in their life style. That is the only way it will sit 
comfortably with me’ (Int.3 (LP) Site A). As another local practitioner noted that 
obtaining an injunction or a CBO is not a panacea for addressing the underlying causes 
of ASB: ‘if we know that someone would never stick to anything, then we would never 
want to set up someone to fail’ (Int.20 (LP) Site A). Rather, based on their account these 
measures should only be used if there is a realistic prospect of success.   
At first sight, the use of these measures on purely paternalistic grounds can be 
criticised for denying perpetrators the opportunity to reject treatment. This finding, 
however, should be examined in light of the multi-agency approach adopted in both sites. 
As mentioned earlier, the adoption of a multi-agency approach is a very positive 
development because incidents of ASB were examined from various perspectives.44 
Participants to these multi-agency meetings had different skills, backgrounds and 
experience all of which were brought together in order to reach to a collective decision as 
to the best way forward.   
Finally, the research participants were asked whether the use of formal legal action 
was used as a means of punishing those who acted in an anti-social manner based on their 
own understanding of punishment. For twenty three out of the twenty-nine interviewees, 
the restrictions imposed on the perpetrators did not amount to punishment. The following 
testimony provided by a local practitioner is illustrative of the majority’s responses on 
                                                             
44 See 5.2.3.2. 
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this question: ‘I have never thought an ASBO as a punishment for an individual. I always 
thought it as a means to protect individuals and the wider community from the behaviour 
of somebody’ (Int.9 (LP) Site B).  The foregoing testimony is consistent with the 
majority’s belief based on which the main reason for resorting to enforcement was to 
prevent the perpetrator from behaving in the same manner in the future. 
For the remaining six interviewees, the restrictions imposed on those who 
received an injunction or a CBO were ‘quite punitive’ (Int.1 (LP) Site A) or included an 
‘element of punishment’ (Int.7 (LP) Site A). As to the former, one police officer argued 
that the implementation of the relevant legislation ‘can be quite punitive’ because it 
enables local enforcement agents to address ASB ‘as if it was an offence’ (Int.21 (PO) 
Site A). As to the latter, three interviewees noted that ‘although [the imposition of these 
restrictions] is a punishment in a sense’, their main objective was ‘to support and divert 
people from’ ASB (Int.10 (LP) Site B). 
It was evident by the data collected from both sites that the decision as to the 
imposition of certain restrictions/obligation on those who behaved in an anti-social 
manner was clearly informed by the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
Moreover, it was clear that the intention of the majority of the interviewees was to use 
these measures as a means to prevent further ASB and criminality by the perpetrator in 
question. Most of them were also quick to dismiss the claim that these measures were 
used as a form of punishment. However, for some, there remained scope for these 
measures to be used as a means of partly punishing perpetrators of ASB. 
Conclusion 
This empirical study has revealed that the decision to classify someone’s behaviour as 
anti-social was informed by a number of factors which partly compensated for the 
apparent broadness of ASB’s statutory definition. More precisely, three main factors have 
been identified. First, it was evident that the prime factor determining whether someone’s 
behaviour should be deemed as anti-social was its impact on other people’s lives. 
Although for most of the participants the flexibility of ASB’s statutory definition was 
vital, there was evidence to suggest that this increased public’s expectations as to the 
ambit of the law. Secondly, another important factor was the amount of resources 
available to local enforcement agents to address ASB. Based on the evidence collected, 
the limited availability of resources led local enforcement agents to raise the severity 
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threshold that a particular incident must have met in order for it to be classified as anti-
social. Thirdly, it was clear upon closer scrutiny that in both sites there was a review 
mechanism in place which ensured that totally irrational and/or unsubstantiated 
complaints were dismissed. Although focusing on the impact that someone’s behaviour 
had on others appears to impose no barriers to the reach of the ASB tools and powers, it 
was evident from the data collected that the behaviour dealt with through these measures 
was really impactful and in most of the cases persistent.     
Another important finding of this study relates to the repeal and replacement of 
the ASBO by the new civil injunction under Part 1 of the 2014 Act. For most interviewees, 
the abovementioned change in legislation barely affected the daily administration of ASB. 
As noted by most of them, the ASBO was one out of many mechanisms that could be 
invoked against those whose behaviour was deemed problematic. So viewed, local 
enforcement agents can simply choose a different mechanism of social control if the 
injunction cannot adequately address the behaviour at stake. 
 For many interviewees, however, this shift towards a purely civil method of 
social regulation was approached with great deal of scepticism. For them, the hybrid 
nature of the ASBO acted as a good bargaining tool since the imminent threat of 
prosecution and the imposition of a lengthy custodial sentence was very effective in terms 
of deterrence. Consequently, the abandonment of this hybrid form of regulation was an 
unfortunate development for them. Some also noted that the move to a civil injunction 
led to a shift of attention towards the CBO. It will be instructive to examine therefore 
whether this shift toward a purely civil approach will eventually force local enforcement 
agents to rely solely on the CBO. 
As far as the procedure followed after someone’s behaviour was classified as anti-
social is concerned, this study has revealed that this was primarily risk-driven. Initially, a 
risk assessment would be conducted in order to determine the level of risk faced by the 
victim. The outcome of this assessment would inform the procedure followed by local 
enforcement agents. High-risk incidents, for instance, were regarded as priority and were 
discussed at the local multi-agency meetings. There was also strong evidence to suggest 
that enforcement was not kept as last resort measure for high-risk incidents.    
It is also worth noting that in both sites there was a shift towards a more RJ 
approach with regard to the administration of ASB. Most of the interviewees noted that 
174 
 
prior to taking any formal legal action against the perpetrator they would seek to address 
the behaviour at stake through a RJ process, primarily victim-offender mediation.  This 
was an unexpected discovery since a previous study on the implementation of the ABCs 
and the ASBOs found that local enforcement agents aimed to address ASB primarily by 
threatening those who lived in rented accommodation with eviction or by moving to the 
next tier of the ‘pyramidal system of regulation’ (Lewis, Crawford, & Traynor, 2016: 6).  
 The final set of findings relates to whether the implementation of these measures 
resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. More precisely, it 
relates to the obligations/restrictions imposed on those against whom an injunction or a 
CBO was issued and whether these constitute a form of criminal punishment. As far as 
the first prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation is concerned, there was 
evidence to suggest that on many occasions the imposition of certain restrictions indeed 
interfered with perpetrators’ liberty.  As far as the second prerequisite of the working 
definition is concerned, it was clear in both sites that for the majority of the interviewees 
publicising information about the perpetrators should be confined only to those directly 
affected by their behaviour. According to them, extensive information sharing should be 
reserved for the most serious cases where the perpetrator’s behaviour had a wider impact 
on the community. This was particularly the case when dealing with young persons. It 
should be remembered, however, that publicising certain information about the 
perpetrator did not automatically satisfy the second prerequisite of the working definition. 
This was only satisfied in a limited number of cases where the purpose or at least one of 
the purposes of information sharing was to publically condemn the perpetrators and their 
behaviour. 
 The final set of findings relates to the legitimacy of this form of regulation. From 
a theoretical perspective, if the implementation of these measures constitutes a form of 
criminalisation, we must then evaluate them as criminal rules. In order to assess the 
legitimacy of these interventions, particular attention was paid to the intentions of local 
enforcement agents with regard to the implementation of these measures. In both sites, 
for the majority of the interviewees the prevention of further ASB was the primary reason 
for applying to court for the issue of an injunction or a CBO. An equally important 
objective for them was the rehabilitation of the perpetrator. For the majority of the 
research participants the abovementioned objectives had to be achieved only through the 
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imposition of restrictions/obligations which would adhere to the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. 
 Based on the findings of this study, it would be unjustifiable to conclude that 
localised criminal codes were created through the implementation of ASB tools and 
powers. In both sites under study, the implementation of these measures rarely constituted 
a form of indirect criminalisation. Nevertheless, the study did expose the potential for 
indirect criminalisation in some cases. As such further reflection on the factors that have 
contributed to this outcome is required, and, in turn, the formulation mechanisms through 
which indirect criminalisation can be prevented.       
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Chapter 6: An evidence-based analysis of the law on anti-social 
behaviour  
 
In Chapter 5, the findings of the empirical study conducted in two counties in England 
with local practitioners and police officers were presented. The primary objective of the 
empirical study was to obtain an enhanced understanding of the implementation of the 
injunction’s first limb and ultimately examine whether this has resulted in the creation of 
localised criminal codes. It was evident from the data collected that in most instances the 
implementation of the injunction’s first limb did not amount to criminalisation as this was 
defined in chapter 3. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to reflect on those instances where 
certain kinds of behaviour have been criminalised indirectly and examine how this can be 
prevented in the future.  
This chapter is structured in two parts. The first part focuses on the minority of 
cases where ASB may be indirectly criminalised through the implementation of the 
relevant tools and powers. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, if there is evidence to suggest that 
the implementation of the injunction’s first limb has resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, even in a minority of cases, then some kind 
of reform is needed in order to prevent this from happening in the future. In this part, 
three reform options are identified and analysed in depth bearing in mind the findings of 
this study and how likely it is for each of these options to be acted upon by the legislature.  
The second part focuses on the implications of this study’s findings as to our 
broader understanding of criminalisation.  Particular attention is paid as to how the 
findings of this study can inform our understanding of criminalisation in general, and of 
over and under-criminalisation in particular. This further illustrates the importance of this 
thesis and its contribution to the current academic literature on criminalisation.    
6.1 Preventing indirect criminalisation 
In most of the cases explored within this study the restrictions and/or obligations imposed 
on those against whom the ASB tools and powers were used satisfied the first prerequisite 
of the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3, i.e. they interfered 
with the perpetrators’ liberty. However, only in a few cases did the implementation of 
these measures purposefully lead to the public denunciation of the perpetrators in 
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question, i.e. the second prerequisite of the test. 1 One of the most illustrative cases used 
to demonstrate the indirect criminalisation of ASB was the one where local enforcement 
agents hold a press release and purposefully publicised articles on a local newspaper in 
order to publically condemn the perpetrator and his behaviour.2  
Although in most of the cases the implementation of the ASB tools and powers 
did not constitute a form of indirect criminalisation, it is still important to reflect back on 
those minority cases where certain kinds of behaviour have been criminalised indirectly. 
The importance of this lies with the need to formulate mechanisms through which the 
indirect criminalisation of ASB can be prevented in the future. 3  
Indirect criminalisation is morally problematic primarily for two reasons.4 First, 
this form of social control allows for the imposition of criminal punishment in the absence 
of the enhanced procedural protections provided to those facing criminal prosecution. As 
Husak maintains, criminalisation is the most coercive method of social regulation 
primarily due to the nature of the sanctions imposed on those who commit criminal 
wrongs (Husak, 2011). Accordingly, additional procedural protection should be afforded 
to those facing criminal prosecution. Moreover, as Henry and King (2016: 8) explain, the 
imposition of criminal punishment in the absence of the enhanced procedural protections 
is morally problematic because it undermines the rule of law, i.e. a set of normative 
‘standards that ought to be applied and maintained’. 5  Based on their account, these 
standards include amongst other certain ‘minimal procedural standards that politics and 
law are required to uphold’ (Henry & King, 2016: 18). What is important about these 
‘minimal procedural standards’ is that they put in place (and guarantee) certain limits on 
the ability of the state to impose criminal punishment (Henry & King, 2016). 
Secondly, indirect criminalisation undermines the moral distinction between the 
criminal law and other forms of social control used by the state.6 In order to maintain this 
                                                             
1 See 5.2.4.2. 
2 See 5.2.4.2. 
3 See Figure 3.1. 
4 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
5 Henry and King (2016) are referring here to instances of under-criminalisation where hybrid methods of 
social control (such as the CBO) are used to address behaviour which is already proscribed by criminal law. 
Their argument is readily applicable in this context as well since criminal punishment can be imposed 
through the injunction’s first limb in the absence of the ‘enhanced procedural protections’. 
6 See 2.1. 
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moral distinction, it is essential for the criminal law to remain ‘importantly dissimilar 
from other kinds of law’ (Husak, 2004: 211). 
In 6.1, three possible reform options will be presented and analysed, taking into 
account various factors including the need to address persistent low-level criminality and 
ASB, the findings of the empirical study, how courts sought to address rules susceptible 
to indirect criminalisation and the working definition of criminalisation formulated in 
chapter 3. 
6.1.1 First reform option: Repeal and replace the injunction 
Since there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the ASB tools and powers 
has resulted (at least on some limited occasions) in the indirect criminalisation of certain 
kinds of behaviour, it could be argued that it is necessary for the legislature to repeal and 
replace the injunction’s first limb. Central to this new legal framework should be the 
prevention of indirect criminalisation.  
Any new or reformed injunction should ensure that the restrictions/obligations 
imposed on those against whom the ASB tools and powers are used do not satisfy both 
prerequisites of this thesis’s working definition of criminalisation. Although it might be 
impracticable to prohibit the imposition of restrictions/obligations that could potentially 
satisfy the first prerequisite of the working definition (i.e. interference with the 
perpetrator’s liberty),7 this new legal framework can impose constraints on the public and 
purposeful denunciation of the perpetrators by the relevant state actors (i.e. the second 
prerequisite).  
The new legal framework, for instance, could prohibit the publication of any 
information about the perpetrator unless permission from the court with certain conditions 
is granted. This will be similar to the procedure followed by local enforcement agents 
when applying for a power of arrest to be attached on an injunction.8 The institution 
applying for permission to publicise information about the perpetrator and the 
restrictions/obligations imposed on him will need to convince the court that this is 
                                                             
7 As discussed earlier, there is no need for the restriction/obligation imposed on the perpetrator to severely 
interfere with his liberty in order for the first prerequisite of the working definition of criminalisation to be 
satisfied. Mere interference with the perpetrator’s liberty will be sufficient. Consequently, it will be almost 
impossible for the legislature to amend the 2014 Act in a way that the restrictions/obligations imposed on 
those who behave in an anti-social manner will not satisfy the first prerequisite of the working definition. 
For this reason, it would be more sensible to focus on the second prerequisite. See 3.2.1 and 3.3.1.    
8 For more on this issue see 4.1.2. 
179 
 
necessary for the policing of the order as opposed to the public condemnation of the 
perpetrator. In their application, local enforcement agents should provide a detailed 
account of how this information will be communicated and to whom. If the court is 
convinced that indeed the publication of certain information about the perpetrator and the 
restrictions/obligations imposed on him is necessary, proportionate and that its purpose 
is not to publically condemn the perpetrator, then permission should be granted.   
The pressing question is whether the abovementioned recommendations can 
realistically be implemented by the legislature. Clearly, for these recommendations to be 
acted upon extensive reform of the current legal framework is required. Such a reform 
process is likely to severely restrict local enforcement agents’ discretion regarding the 
implementation of the injunction. This will inevitably undermine the flexibility and 
possibly the effectiveness of the ASB tools and powers, something which is in stark 
contrast with the Government’s promise for ‘faster and more effective powers’ (Home 
Office, 2012: 3). Moreover, as the findings of this study suggest, a flexible legal 
framework, both in terms of how ASB is to be conceptualised and in terms of the nature 
and extent of the restrictions/obligations imposed on the perpetrators, is essential for local 
enforcement agents.9 It enables them to address behaviour that really has an impact on 
their local communities and it allows them to tailor their response in order to deal with 
the underlying causes of ASB. 10  As such, political will to act upon these 
recommendations may be in short supply. It should also be borne in mind that the existing 
tools and powers have been recently amended through the 2014 Act. In the current 
political climate, it seems highly improbable that this first reform option would be taken 
up by the legislature.  
6.1.2 Second reform option: Amending the current legal framework 
Although a complete departure from the existing legal framework appears unlikely to be 
taken forward, a more viable option could be to amend the current legal framework. As 
discussed earlier, one of the main concerns raised about indirect criminalisation is the 
imposition of criminal punishment in the absence of the enhanced procedural protections. 
11  Hence, instead of replacing the existing legal framework on ASB, an alternative 
solution could be to ensure that those facing the prospect of criminal punishment are 
                                                             
9 See 5.2.1.2. 
10 See 5.2.4.2. 
11 See ‘Introduction’. 
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afforded all of these enhanced procedural protections given to those who are prosecuted 
for the commission of an offence. This can mitigate against some of the concerns raised 
earlier regarding the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB.12 Although, in 
theory, the implementation of the injunction’s first limb could still result in the imposition 
of criminal punishment, this will not be in the absence of the enhanced procedural 
protections. 
 In order for the full enhanced procedural protections to be provided two reform 
options can be acted upon. First, the 2014 Act can be amended in a way that in 
proceedings for the issue of an injunction and/or a CBO all of the enhanced procedural 
protections are afforded to the defendant. In effect, this will mean that every criminal 
procedural and evidential rule will need to apply. As a result of this, the relevant authority 
that applies for the issue of an injunction (or the prosecution in the case of a CBO), for 
instance, will not be able to submit hearsay evidence in order to prove that the defendant 
behaved in an anti-social manner. Although this appears to be warranted in cases where 
there is evidence to suggest that the relevant authority in question systematically applies 
the injunction’s first limb in a manner that satisfied both prerequisites of the working 
definition, it should be borne in mind that the implementation of the ASB tools and 
powers can vary considerably across the country.13 Moreover, it should be remembered 
that one of the main reasons which led to the introduction of the ASBO was criminal 
law’s procedural and evidential rules which imposed many obstacles for local 
enforcement agents dealing with ASB and low-level criminality.14     
Perhaps a more viable option which does not require any legislative amendments, 
is for the courts examining the issue of an injunction (or of a CBO) to utilise the working 
definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3. To illustrate how this can work in 
practice consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that a CSP decides to apply for the 
issue of injunction against Sam. The court examining the application for the issue of the 
injunction will need to assess how the CSP has implemented the injunction in the past. 
This assessment should be conducted with reference to this thesis’s working definition of 
criminalisation. If there is evidence to suggest that the CSP in question has implemented 
                                                             
12 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
13 See 4.2.2. 
14 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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the injunction’s first limb in a manner that satisfies both prerequisites of the working 
definition, then all enhanced procedural protections should be afforded to Sam.15   
The above is not to suggest that CSPs can freely implement the injunction or any 
other ASB measure in a manner that results in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds 
of behaviour as long as the enhanced procedural protections are provided to the 
perpetrators. As discussed earlier, indirect criminalisation should also be prevented due 
to the fact that it undermines the moral distinction between the criminal law and other 
methods of regulation.16 Rather, it is to argue that since we are unable or unwilling to 
repeal and replace the injunction, then it is essential to put in place mechanisms which 
will ensure that criminal punishment is only imposed in cases where the full enhanced 
procedural protections have been provided.  
Although this option does not undermine the flexibility of the ASB tools and 
powers (at least not to the extent that the first reform option does), it is also unlikely to 
be adopted. As discussed during the evaluation of this thesis’s working definition of 
criminalisation, courts are unlikely to adopt such a test because this will require a detailed 
analysis of how the injunction has been implemented in the past.17 This can be particularly 
problematic in cases where there has been a mixed implementation of the injunction’s 
first limb. Instead, as cases like Engel and McCann illustrate, courts are more likely to 
favour a universally applicable solution, such as the anti-subversion doctrine.18 
6.1.3 Third reform option: Code of practice 
Thus far, two possible reform options have been presented and analysed. These options 
required either a complete or a partial reform of the current legal framework on ASB. 
Although both of these options are capable of preventing the injunction and the CBO (the 
first limb of each measure) from operating as de facto criminal rules, it has been argued 
that neither option is likely to be adopted by the legislature. The main reason for this is 
that both options are expected to undermine the flexibility and/or effectiveness of the 
existing tools and powers.  
                                                             
15 It will be for Sam to produce any relevant evidence to convince the court on the balance of probabilities 
that the CSP has in the past implemented the injunction’s first limb in a manner that satisfied both 
prerequisites of the working definition of criminalisation.  
16 See 2.1. 
17 See 3.3.1. 
18 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’ and 3.1.2. 
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A more viable option would be to retain the existing legal framework and try to 
prevent indirect criminalisation through a code of practice for local enforcement agents. 
This is not only capable of preventing indirect criminalisation, but it can also contribute 
to the consistent application of the relevant statutory provisions whilst retaining a flexible 
legal framework. To this end, we can reflect back on the data collected and the majority 
of cases where the implementation of the ASB tools and powers did not result in the 
imposition of criminal punishment in order to identify factors which can potentially 
prevent the indirect criminalisation of ASB. These factors can assist us to formulate 
policies through which indirect criminalisation can be prevented. These policies can form 
the basis of this code of practice and inform the implementation of these measures at a 
local level. 
It has to be noted from the outset that the Home Office (2014) has already 
published its Statutory Guidance to local enforcement agents regarding the 
implementation of the ASB tools and powers. The Statutory Guidance provides 
guidelines about the instruments included in the 2014 Act and the procedure that must be 
followed when these are applied in practice. Thus, the pressing question is whether a code 
of practice is really necessary. The code of practice proposed below is a universally 
applicable instrument formulated with reference to the findings of this study and deals 
explicitly with the issue of indirect criminalisation. 
6.1.3.1 Multi-agency approach 
It was evident upon closer scrutiny of the data collected from both sites that in most of 
the participating institutions there was a review procedure in place. This review procedure 
was both internal and external. As to the former, most of the interviewees pointed out that 
‘it is not just one officer on their own’ (Int.12 (PO) Site B) who decides whether 
someone’s behaviour is anti-social and whether they should apply for the issue of an 
injunction or a CBO. The procedure followed by local enforcement agents was largely 
determined by the outcome of the risk assessment carried out after a potential incident of 
ASB was reported to them.19 After the initial assessment conducted by the ‘call taker’ 
(Int.21 (PO) Site A), the case was then assigned to an ASB officer who would review this 
incident further. As pointed out by one police officer, the next step is for the case to ‘be 
referred to [the] supervisor who will then confirm that grading’ (Int.19 (PO) Site A). It 
                                                             
19 See 5.2.3.1. 
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was clear that they were a number of review layers throughout this process in order to 
make sure that the administration of these tools and powers adhered to the guidelines 
issued by ‘people in high command’ (Int.15 (PO) Site A).  
 The presence of these internal review procedures cannot necessarily guarantee 
that the sanctions imposed on those against whom the ASB tools and powers are used do 
not amount to criminal punishment. This is the main reason why the factors discussed in 
6.1 should not be examined in isolation, but as integral and interconnected parts of future 
ASB strategies at a local level. If the right policies (i.e. policies that include the other two 
factors as well) are put into place, these internal review procedures will enable the 
relevant institutions to apply these measures consistently whilst ensuring that this does 
not result in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. 
As to the latter, reference was made by most interviewees to the local multi-
agency meetings held on a regular basis. The main objective of these meetings was to 
review high-risk cases.20 It was evident through the data collected that these multi-agency 
meetings provided a forum for local enforcement agents where they could bring together 
their different sets of skills and expertise. This allowed for a more holistic examination of 
the ASB at stake adding at the same time an extra layer of review. The presence of this 
review mechanism is reflected by the following testimony given by one local practitioner 
who noted that enforcement ‘is a lengthy process … because you have a number of people 
who are considering the evidence at different levels and they require a significant level 
of evidence if you are going to court’ (Int.24 (LP) Site A).  
It was evident from the data collected by this study that in both sites this multi-
agency approach extended beyond mere information sharing agreements. Rather, it 
included policy planning and decisions taking as well. Although this can potentially cause 
delays in the administration of ASB, the potential benefits of a multi-agency approach 
should not be overlooked.  
6.1.3.2 Focus on the underlying causes 
Another important factor that appears to have set barriers to the creation of localised 
criminal codes through the implementation of the relevant legislation was the fact that 
most of the interviewees acknowledged that in many cases ASB involved complex 
                                                             
20 See 5.2.3.2. 
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situational and contextual causal variables. For many interviewees ASB was viewed as 
being the result of deep-seated social problems that required careful attention. This led 
them to the realisation that a purely enforcement driven approach is not always the answer 
to ASB. Rather, the administration of ASB should be complemented by an attempt to 
address the underlying causes of this behaviour. Central to this realisation was the need 
to work with the perpetrators in order to divert them away from criminality and/or ASB.21 
Consequently, there was a shift towards a more social care driven approach as a means 
of providing the perpetrators with the necessary support needed in order to tackle what 
really causes them to act in an anti-social manner. As many research participants pointed 
out, some of the main causes of this behaviour included alcoholism, drug misuse and 
other socio-economic problems which created a vicious circle of ASB and criminality.  
Although most of the interviewees highlighted the limited availability of 
resources, it was evident through the data collected that their intention was to manage 
these resources as effectively as possible in order to formulate ‘a support network’ (Int.11 
(PO) Site B) for the perpetrators. This was further evident by the readiness of local 
enforcement agents to contact other local service providers that ‘can be involved in order 
to get them the kind of support they need’ (Int.27 (PO) Site A). The foregoing testimony 
of course is intertwined with the need for a multi-agency approach both in terms of 
decision taking and information sharing. On this view, local service providers and the 
various institutions dealing with ASB need to work closely together in order to properly 
identify and address what really causes the perpetrator’s behaviour. The close cooperation 
between the various institutions that participated in this study was fundamental to the 
adoption of a ‘social care driven … rather than a top-down penalisation’ (Int.1 (LP) Site 
A) approach in the sites under investigation.  
Central to the proposed code of practice, therefore, should be the need for local 
enforcement agents to focus on the underlying causes of ASB and criminality. Although 
this can still result in the imposition of restrictions/obligations that interfere with the 
perpetrators’ liberty, the adoption of a social care driven approach is unlikely to result in 
the public and purposeful condemnation of those individuals. Local enforcement agents 
will focus on how they can best address the underlying causes of the perpetrator’s 
behaviour, rather than to publically and purposefully condemn him.  
                                                             
21 See 6.2.2. 
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6.1.3.3 Contemplating the impact of enforcement 
Another decisive factor that contributed towards a more social care driven approach to 
ASB was the fact that many local enforcement agents planned their strategies whilst 
contemplating what the potential implications of their actions on the perpetrator would 
be. As the following testimony illustrates before applying to the court for the issue of an 
injunction or a CBO, local enforcement agents tried to design the proposed 
obligations/restrictions in a manner that would not pose barriers to the perpetrator’s 
needs: ‘It has to be specifically related to their offending behaviour. You know you cannot 
just say “You cannot go to retail shops because you are a shoplifter”. That person is going 
to say: “How am I supposed to buy my shopping?”’ (Int.26 (PO) Site A). This need to 
consider what the potential implications of their decisions on the perpetrator could be, 
was particularly prevalent when deciding the level of publicity required for each case. For 
the majority of the research participants, information about the perpetrator and the 
obligations imposed on them should only be shared with those who ‘need to know… [If] 
the decision is made to go public if other people, agencies or partnerships have objections 
about the effect that this might have on the client we will have a discussion about it’ (Int.5 
(LP) Site A).22  
By contemplating the potential implications of their decisions, local enforcement 
agents will be able to move away from a censure oriented approach towards a social care 
driven strategy of addressing ASB and criminality. It is necessary to ensure, however, 
that this shift towards a social care driven approach is consistently followed by all local 
enforcement agents.  
Although allowing local enforcement agents to determine what constitutes ASB 
and how this can best be addressed can result in the creation of localised criminal codes, 
it was evident through this study that a certain degree of flexibility is vital. As evidence 
from this study suggests, ASB can take various forms and on many occasions it is the 
direct result of a number of other situational factors. It is, therefore, imperative for local 
enforcement agents to tailor their response based on the specificities of each case. Whilst 
the current law on ASB provides local enforcement agents with the necessary means to 
achieve this, it is still necessary to ensure that the implementation of the relevant statutory 
provisions does not result in the indirect imposition of criminal punishment. This can be 
                                                             
22 See 5.2.4.2. 
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achieved through the formulation of a code of practice explicitly designed to provide 
guidance to local enforcement agents regarding the implementation of the ASB tools and 
powers. This code of practice should be structured around the three factors that have been 
identified above and which are capable of preventing indirect criminalisation.  
An integral part of this code of practice should be the presence of a review 
procedure in every institution dealing with ASB. This procedure should include several 
layers of review and be both internal and external ensuring that the relevant tools and 
powers are used in a non-arbitrary and consistent manner. At an internal level, this review 
procedure is also capable of promoting professional accountability. At an external level, 
this will result in the adoption of a multi-agency approach which will enable local 
enforcement agents to combine their knowledge and expertise leading to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the perpetrators’ behaviour and needs. This multi-
agency approach should not be limited to information-sharing agreements, but it must 
also include a close collaboration between the various institutions and collective decision 
taking.   
Moreover, the code of practice must include policies which will state explicitly 
that the primary objective of the ASB tools and powers is to tackle the underlying causes 
of the perpetrators’ behaviour and that these measures should not be used as a means of 
punishment. It is necessary to emphasise that a purely enforcement-led approach is 
unlikely to permanently address the ASB in question. Each restriction and obligation 
imposed should be tailored to address the underlying causes of ASB. It is also important 
for local enforcement agents to be constantly mindful of the potential implications that 
their decisions might have on the perpetrators’ lives. These will provide clear guidance 
to CSPs about the factors that should be taken into consideration before applying for the 
issue of an injunction or a CBO. 
The presence of a code of practice will not only bring clarity and consistency to 
the implementation of the ASB tools and powers, but it is also capable of permanently 
shifting emphasis towards a more social care driven approach.  
6.2 Theoretical implications: Over and under-criminalisation 
After elaborating on how the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB can be 
prevented in the future, it is instructive to reflect back on the findings of this study and 
examine their impact on our theoretical understanding of criminalisation. In particular, I 
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will focus on how the findings of the study contribute to the academic debates on over 
and under-criminalisation. 
6.2.1 Over-criminalisation: Assessing the reach of punitive interventions 
In recent years, some of the most prominent legal philosophers in the area of criminal 
law, such as Husak (2008b), raised concerns about the current status of the criminal law 
and whether there has been a substantial departure from its moral foundations. Husak 
(2014), for instance, contends that there is a tendency for the legislature to criminalise 
behaviour which is already prohibited by criminal law and thus creating a substantial 
number of overlapping offences. Ashworth (2000) has been critical of the vast number of 
new criminal offences introduced each year something which, according to him, 
undermines the importance of the criminal law. According to Husak (2003-2004), the 
vast number of offences can be attributed to the politicisation of the criminal law. Based 
on his account, what is concerning about the politicisation of the criminal law is that it is 
used as a first rather than as a last resort measure (Husak, 2004). Others, such as Duff 
(2010), have raised concerns about the introduction of the civil preventive measures, 
especially the ASBO.23 These concerns are often associated with what is known as the 
phenomenon of over-criminalisation, i.e. to introduce new offences without providing 
adequate justification as to their necessity (Husak, 2008b).  
Chalmers (2014) sought to categorise the factors which have allegedly contributed 
to this over-criminalisation crisis. Based on his account, legal scholars’ concerns 
regarding over-criminalisation tend to focus on three main pillars. First, academic 
criticisms focus on the ‘overuse of the CJS’ (Chalmers, 2014: 488). Here, reference is 
made to the number of new offences enacted every year. Secondly, another cause for 
concern is the ‘inaccessibility of the criminal law’ (Chalmers, 2014: 485). As Chalmers 
(2014: 485) maintains, there is currently so much criminal law that it has become 
‘inaccessible to those who are expected to adhere to its structures’, those whose behaviour 
might potentially fall within the ambit of the criminal law are not sure whether what they 
are doing constitutes an offence or not. Thirdly, the criminal law has been criticised for 
being absurd, that there is no logic behind the criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour 
either due to the fact that what has been criminalised is too trivial or because there was 
simply no need to introduce a new criminal offence (Chalmers, 2014).  
                                                             
23 Duff was critical of the ‘two-step’ criminalisation process used by the ASBO. 
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  For the purposes of this thesis, my analysis will focus only on the alleged ‘overuse 
of the CJS’ by the state in order to regulate our behaviour. It should be noted from the 
outset that the purpose of the following analysis is not to determine whether there is 
indeed an over-criminalisation crisis. Determining whether we have more criminalisation 
than what is actually necessary is a normative argument which is contingent upon 
someone’s perception of criminal law’s moral foundations and boundaries. Rather, the 
prime objective of the following analysis is to elucidate the implications of this study’s 
findings on the debate on over-criminalisation.   
As Chalmers (2014: 484) contends, ‘the sheer volume of statutory material 
produced in the UK is remarkable, and appears to have grown very substantially in the 
second half of the twentieth century’. Data presented by a number of recent studies 
suggest that a rather large number of new offences are enacted in this jurisdiction every 
year. According to the Law Commission (2010), between 1997 and 2010 more than 3000 
new criminal offences have been enacted in England and Wales. The Commission’s 
findings are based on an examination of Halsbury’s statute books which have expanded 
significantly in recent years, reaching the conclusion that this is evidence of criminal 
law’s expansion (Law Commission, 2010).  
Chalmers and Leverick’s (2014) research findings suggest that in 1997-1998 and 
2010-2011 alone more than 3000 new offences were created. Their overriding objective 
was to compare the number of offences created during the first year in government of the 
New Labour (1997 – 1998) and of the Coalition Government (2010 – 2011) (Chalmers & 
Leverick, 2014). Based on their findings, between 1997 and 1998, the New Labour 
Government enacted in total 1395 offences; this includes both statutory instruments and 
primary legislation (Chalmers & Leverick, 2014). In the second period under scrutiny, 
the number of criminal offences created in the United Kingdom under Coalition’s first 
year in office was 1760.24  
Both of these studies acknowledged that it is extremely ‘difficult to identify 
accurately the number of offences created by a piece of legislation’ (Chalmers & 
Leverick, 2014: 59), making particular reference to the fact that the vast majority of the 
existing criminal offences were created by secondary legislation through powers 
                                                             
24 It has been acknowledged that these figures do not represent the actual number of offences introduced in 
England and Wales during these time periods since not all of these offences extended to the entire United 
Kingdom (Chalmers & Leverick, 2014). 
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delegated to specialist bodies and institutions (Chalmers & Leverick, 2014; Law 
Commission, 2010). A systematic analysis of the existing criminal offences includes 
enormous difficulties both in terms of the methodology adopted and the resources 
required. This is evident by the ambiguities regarding the actual number of the existing 
criminal offences.25 Another possible explanation can be the difficulty in determining 
what constitutes an offence, whether overlapping or duplicated offences should be 
counted as well, and how many, if any, offences are repealed through the introduction of 
a new offence (Chalmers & Leverick, 2014).  
Does, however, the actual number of offences reflect the true extent of 
criminalisation in this jurisdiction? Relying solely on the number of offences as this 
appears on the statute book cannot provide us with an accurate account of the current 
extent of criminalisation in this jurisdiction. If the abovementioned hurdles in counting 
the exact number of offences can be addressed, then we will be able to measure the extent 
of direct criminalisation. Our assessment, however, will be incomplete without taking 
into consideration indirect criminalisation as well.  
Although there has been a modest attempt by legal theorists to measure the current 
extent of criminalisation, their assessments rely on the assumption that criminalisation is 
restricted to what is formally classified as a criminal offence. This, however, presents a 
partial account of criminalisation since it overlooks the possibility of indirect 
criminalisation through the implementation of the civil preventive measures. The 
foregoing assertion is reaffirmed by the findings of this study which demonstrate that the 
implementation of certain civil measures, such as the injunction, can indeed result in the 
indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour.  
It was also evident through this study that the implementation of these tools and 
powers can vary considerably from one area to another. Thus, we cannot simply include 
the ASB tools and powers into our assessment of the current criminal offences. Instead, 
a very detailed examination of how these legal rules apply in practices is needed. The 
above is neither to undermine the research done by criminal law theorists on over-
criminalisation nor to confirm the existence of this phenomenon. Rather, it is to point out 
                                                             
25 Compare, for example, the figures provided for the period between 2010 and 2011 by the Ministry of 
Justice (2012) and those provided by Chalmers and Leverick (2014). 
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that the civil preventive measures pose a significant barrier in assessing the true extent of 
criminalisation in this jurisdiction.   
6.2.2 Reflecting back on under-criminalisation  
At first sight the ASBO, the new civil injunction and other civil preventive mechanisms, 
such as the TPIMs, can be criticised for ‘lower[ing] the threshold of intervention, 
formalis[ing] previous informal responses, intensif[ying] forms of intervention and hasten 
punishment’ (Crawford, 2009). In theory, the civil nature of these measures enables law 
enforcement agents to take formal legal action against people whose behaviour would not 
previously warrant the use of the criminal law. To illustrate this, consider the following 
hypothetical. Suppose that Sam who is 12 years old used threatening language against 
Andrew. Although Sam’s behaviour might have constituted an assault,26 the CPS chose 
to take ‘no further action’ due to his age and because they believed that his conduct was 
part of everyday social interaction.27 Although the CPS decided not to prosecute Sam for 
an assault, local enforcement agents dealing with ASB felt that his behaviour ‘caused or 
is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ to other members of the community. For 
this reason, they decided to apply for the issue of an injunction against Sam through which 
he would be prohibited from using threatening language against other people.    
The decision of local enforcement agents to apply for the issue of an injunction 
against Sam can be criticised for using the injunction as a substitute for criminal 
prosecution (Ramsay, 2004). As Ashworth and Zedner (2010) contend, to use the 
injunction or any other non-criminal method of social regulation as a means of addressing 
behaviour which is criminal in nature constitutes under-criminalisation. Although under-
criminalisation has been briefly discussed earlier, it is instructive to revisit this issue in 
light of the findings of this study.28 As noted before, at first sight under-criminalisation is 
contentious because: (i) it allows for the regulation of criminal behaviour in the absence 
of the enhanced procedural protections; and (ii) it erodes the normative distinction 
between the criminal and the civil law.29  
                                                             
26 If Andrew apprehended immediate violence, then Sam’s behaviour would have constituted an assault. 
See: R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, 150. 
27 CPS, ‘Minor Offences’. Available from: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/minor_offences/#an03 
[Accessed 18th May 2017].  
28 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
29 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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Evidence collected by this study suggests that there is indeed an overlap between 
ASB and criminality.30 When research participants were asked to provide examples of 
behaviour that they would regard as anti-social, they made reference to conduct which 
was already proscribed by criminal law, such as criminal damage, begging and assault. 
This finding was consistent with the findings of previous studies which found that these 
measures were sometimes used to address behaviour which fell within the ambit of the 
criminal law (Koffman, 2006; Crawford, Lewis, & Traynor, 2016). There is ample 
evidence to suggest, therefore, that on at least certain occasions some local enforcement 
agents used these measures as a substitute for criminal prosecution.  
Notwithstanding the concerns raised above, under-criminalisation is not 
objectionable per se. To explain this further, consider the following hypotheticals. A, 
Sam, who is 15 years of age, is constantly intimidating most of his neighbours, but his 
prime target is Andrew. Some of Sam’s neighbours notified the police regarding his 
behaviour and the fact that he targets Andrew. The police decided to investigate this 
further by asking Andrew about Sam’s behaviour. Andrew corroborated what the others 
said about Sam’s behaviour and stated that he felt harassed by it. Nonetheless, Andrew 
informed the police that he is too afraid to testify in court against Sam. If the police decide 
to apply for the issue of an injunction against Sam simply because there is lack of 
evidence to support a criminal prosecution, then the injunction will be used in this 
instance to circumvent the enhanced procedural protections afforded to those facing 
criminal prosecution.  
B, Andrew was willing to give oral evidence in court against Sam. Instead of 
invoking the criminal law in this case in order to address Sam’s behaviour, local 
enforcement agents decided to utilise the injunction due to the perpetrator’s age. They 
perceived the injunction as a means of diverting Sam away from criminality. As one local 
practitioner stated, their ultimate objective when using the ASB tools and powers against 
behaviour which was criminal in nature was ‘to [divert people away from criminality] 
rather than implementing the full power straight away’ (Int.10 (LP) Site B). Similar to 
scenario A, the use of the injunction constitutes again a form of under-criminalisation. In 
scenario B, however, injunction is used as an intermediate form of regulation in order to 
diver Sam away from criminality.  
                                                             
30 See 5.2.1. 
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The above is not to suggest that the use of the criminal law should always be used 
as a ‘last resort’ measure. 31 Rather, it is to suggest that under-criminalisation should not 
be dismissed outright.32 At first sight, the use of these measures as an intermediate form 
of regulation through which those who behave in an anti-social manner and/or commit 
low-level offences are diverted away from criminality appears to be reasoned. In order 
for this proposition to survive close scrutiny, however, it is imperative to identify and 
defend a set of conditions under which civil preventive measures can be legitimately 
deployed as a substitute to criminal prosecution. An advocate of this theory, for instance, 
needs to identify the kind of offences which would qualify for under-criminalisation. 
Similarly, the proponents of this theory need to identify the kind of offenders for whom 
this intermediate form of regulation should be used, e.g. offenders with mental health 
issues. It is not my intention here to identify and defend a set of conditions that must be 
met in order for under-criminalisation to be warranted. Rather, my intention is to illustrate 
the impact of my empirical findings on the academic debate on under-criminalisation.       
Conclusion  
This chapter has reflected further on the findings of the empirical study and scrutinised 
their implications both at a theoretical and at a practical level. Central to this chapter has 
been the need to formulated mechanisms through which the indirect criminalisation of 
certain kinds of ASB can be prevented in the future. Although data collected from the 
empirical study suggests that the implementation of the ASB tools and powers has rarely 
resulted in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it was imperative to 
assess various reform options through which this can be prevented. To this end, three 
possible reform options have been identified and analysed. The first option requires the 
repeal and replacement of the current legal framework with a new set of provisions which 
will prevent the imposition of restrictions/obligations that would satisfy both prerequisites 
of this thesis’s working definition of criminalisation. It has been argued that it will be 
almost impossible for the legislature to prevent the imposition of restrictions/obligations 
                                                             
31 Based on Husak’s (2004: 215-216) account, it is impossible to adopt a literal interpretation of the ‘last 
resort’ principle. For him, although we can formulate many alternatives to the criminal law, not every single 
one of them is a ‘serious candidate for implementation’. To illustrate his argument, Husak provides an 
example based on which people would be permitted to ‘smoke cigarettes [only] if they allowed their 
foreheads to be branded’. Similar to Husak’s argument, when I make reference to non-criminal alternatives 
I am referring primarily to the injunction and any other pre-existing method of social control rather than to 
any possible future alternatives.  
32 For a more elaborated account on non-criminal alternative methods of social regulation, such as informal 
justice, see Matthews (1988).  
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that will not interfere with the perpetrators’ liberty as this was defined in chapter 3.33 
Hence, attention should shift to how local enforcement agents can be prevented from 
publically and purposefully condemning those against whom these measures are used. 
Although the proposed amendments are capable of preventing indirect criminalisation, it 
has been concluded that the first reform option is unlikely to be implemented by the 
legislature because it will inevitably undermine the flexibility and possibly the 
effectiveness of these measures. 
 The second option presented places particular emphasis upon the need to provide 
those who face the prospect of criminal punishment all of those enhanced procedural 
protections afforded to those prosecuted for the commission of an offence. This reform 
option starts from the premise that if we cannot prevent the ASB tools and powers from 
operating as de facto criminal rules, then we need to ensure that at least all of the enhanced 
procedural protections are afforded to those subjected to these measures. A possible way 
to achieve this is for the courts to adopt this thesis’s working definition of criminalisation. 
This will enable them to assess whether local enforcement agents have implemented these 
measures in a manner that resulted in the imposition of criminal punishment. If indeed 
the relevant local authorities consistently implemented the ASB measures in manner that 
satisfied both prerequisites, then the full enhanced procedural protections should be 
afforded to the alleged perpetrator. Although this reform option does not require any 
legislative amendments, it is also unlikely to be taken forward because this will require 
courts to examine closely how each CSP has previously implemented these measures.34 
 The final and most viable reform option presented requires the formulation of a 
code of practice for local enforcement agents. Apart from clarifying and maintaining the 
consistent application of the relevant tools and powers, the code should aim primarily at 
preventing the indirect criminalisation of ASB. This chapter reflected back on the 
findings of the empirical study in order to identify factors that have contributed to the 
prevention of indirect criminalisation and that can form the basis of this universally 
applicable code of practice. The three main factors identified included: (i) the adoption 
of a multi-agency approach which extends beyond mere information sharing agreements; 
(ii) the need to focus on the underlying causes of ASB; and (iii) the need to contemplate 
on the impact that enforcement is likely to have on the perpetrator. It has been argued that 
                                                             
33 See 3.2.1. 
34 See 3.3.1. 
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these factors have significantly contributed to the adoption of a more social care driven 
approach in both sites under investigation. This departure from censure centred strategies 
is capable to prevent the indirect criminalisation of ASB through the implementation of 
these measures.             
The second main issue discussed in this chapter relates to the implications that the 
findings of this study have on our theoretical understanding of criminalisation focusing 
primarily on the issues of over and under-criminalisation. As far as the former is 
concerned, it has been argued that if criminal law theorists wish to assess the true extent 
of criminalisation in this jurisdiction, then they should take into consideration both direct 
and indirect criminalisation. As this study revealed, it is possible for criminal punishment 
to be imposed through non-criminal legislation. As to the latter, it has been concluded 
that under-criminalisation should not be dismissed outright. Although the use of non-
criminal legislation to address behaviour which is criminal in nature possesses a number 
of normative challenges, its use to divert people away from criminality appears to be 
reasoned. In order for this argument to survive close scrutiny, however, a complete theory 
of under-criminalisation is needed. 
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Conclusion 
 
The impetus for this thesis came from the introduction and the rise of the civil preventive 
measures. Of particular concern was the ASBO’s hybrid nature which could, in theory, 
lead to the criminalisation of any kind of behaviour that was labelled as anti-social. 
Ramsay (2012) contends that what was in fact criminalised through the ASBO’s second 
limb was the perpetrator’s failure to reassure society that they do not pose any risk to their 
security. Ramsay’s argument seems theoretically reasonable, but in effect the ASBO’s 
hybrid nature provided the means to criminalise behaviour which appeared to be part of 
everyday human interaction. In theory, as Gil-Robles (2005) pointed out, the ASBO’s 
two-step prohibition model enabled local enforcement agents to criminalise the behaviour 
of people ‘who have incurred the wrath of the community’ and thus lead to the creation 
of ‘personalised criminal codes’. 
The foregoing criticism should be examined in light of ASB’s statutory definition 
which focuses on the actual and/or potential impact of someone’s behaviour rather than 
on its true nature.1 What appeared to be really contentious though was the first limb of 
the ASBO. Although in McCann (para. 72) the order was deemed to be civil in nature, 
the law, as this appeared on the statute book, allowed for the imposition of significant 
restrictions on the liberty of those against whom such an order was issued. As Duff and 
Marshall (2006) put it, these restrictions could be so severe that they could amount to a 
form of criminal punishment in their own right and thus lead to the indirect 
criminalisation of the behaviour in question. The importance of this lies in the fact that 
indirect criminalisation allows for the imposition of criminal punishment in the absence 
of the enhanced procedural protections afforded to those facing criminal prosecution. 
Moreover, indirect criminalisation is problematic because it undermines the normative 
distinction between the criminal law and other forms of social control used by the state 
to regulate our behaviour.2 
The 2014 Act did little to mitigate against these concerns despite replacing the 
ASBO with a purely civil injunction.3 Whilst under the 1998 Act the issue of an ASBO 
                                                             
1 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
2 See 2.1. 
3 See 4.1.2. 
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had to be necessary for the purpose of preventing further ASB, under the 2014 Act the 
injunction needs only to assist towards this end. Most importantly, the introduction of 
positive obligations means that first limb of the injunction can potentially be more 
restrictive than the ASBO.4  
Research findings 
One of the main reasons for conducting an empirical research on the implementation of 
the injunction’s first limb was the possibility of using this measure as a means of creating 
localised criminal codes through which certain kinds of behaviour are criminalised 
indirectly without the need to resort to direct criminalisation. 5 This was partly attributed 
to numerous stories that made the headlines based on which the ASBOs were sometimes 
used to address what appeared to be behaviour which was part of everyday human 
interaction (Macdonald, 2006a). There were identifiable concerns about the ‘name and 
shame’ methods used in certain localities as a means of ‘informing’ local population about 
the issue of ASBOs and the behaviour of certain individuals.6 A prime example of this 
was Guildford’s ‘wall of shame’ where pictures of those against whom an ASBO was 
issued were posted for ‘public information’ (Squires and Stephen, 2005a: 523).  
 While many of the interviewees emphasised the possibility for misusing the 
relevant legislation, it was evident from the data collected through this study that the 
implementation of ASB tools and powers rarely constituted a form of indirect 
criminalisation. Instead, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the implementation 
of these measures was mainly social care driven. This was attributed primarily to three 
factors. These factors include the extensive collaboration between the various institutions 
dealing with ASB at a local level, 7  the fact that local enforcement agents were 
contemplating the impact of enforcement on the perpetrators, and that central to the 
implementation of the relevant tools and powers was the need to address the underlying 
causes of ASB rather than pursuing a censure-based response.8  
                                                             
4 See 4.1.2. 
5 See 4.2.2. 
6 See, for example, my analysis of Stanley in 4.2.2.2. 
7 The collaboration between the various institutions dealing with ASB and low-level criminality was not 
limited to information sharing agreements, but it also extended to decision taking with regard the overall 
management of ASB in their localities. See 5.2.3.2. 
8 See 6.1. 
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Taken together, most of the findings of this study managed to mitigate against many of 
the initial concerns espoused within the extant literature regarding the implementation of 
the ASB tools and powers. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the findings of 
this study do not necessarily represent how the ASB tools and powers are implemented 
across England and Wales. Rather, as discussed earlier, the use of these measures can 
vary considerably from one area to another primarily due to the extensive discretion 
afforded to local enforcements agents regarding both the implementation and the scope 
of the law in this area.9 This was also one of the main reasons why this thesis argued for 
a universally applicable code of practice through which clarity and consistency can be 
achieved with regard to the implementation of these measures.10   
Another important limitation of the findings of this thesis relates to the fact that 
the empirical study focused only on those responsible for the implementation of the ASB 
tools and powers and thus failed to take into consideration the views of other important 
stakeholders, e.g. of those subjected to these measures and/or their lawyers. On this view, 
the findings of this study might have been different if the views of these other stakeholders 
were taken into account as well (e.g. if their accounts contradicted local enforcement’s 
testimonies).  
Interviewing perpetrators and/or their lawyers would have indeed enabled me to 
obtain a more holistic account of the implementation of the ASB tools and powers. 
Although at face value the above criticism appears to be reasoned, it is worth reiterating 
that the methodology adopted and the sample technique used for the empirical study were 
largely determined by the merits of my main research question and how it could be best 
addressed (Wilson & Sapsford, 2006). To explain this further, it is imperative to go back 
to the working definition of criminalisation formulated in chapter 3. Based on this 
working definition, a sanction imposed or threatened to be imposed amounts to 
punishment if: (i) it interferes with someone’s liberty; and (ii) if it results in the public 
and purposeful condemnation of that individual. Clearly, by interviewing perpetrators I 
would have been able to determine whether the sanctions imposed on them satisfied the 
first limb of the working definition. However, I would not have been able to determine 
whether the purpose of the implementation was to publically condemn these individuals. 
As discussed above, only in cases where the implementation of the injunction by state 
                                                             
9 See 5.1. 
10 See 6.1.3. 
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actors aims at the public denunciation of the perpetrators the second limb of the test will 
be satisfied. Although, therefore, interviewing perpetrators and/or other stakeholders 
would have been instructive in terms of studying how these measures were implemented, 
this would not adequately contribute to addressing the primary research question of this 
thesis. 
Although the findings of this thesis are generally positive, this does not mean  that 
the relevant legislation is need of no reform or that no mechanisms are needed in order to 
prevent the indirect criminalisation of ASB. As illustrated through Figure 3.1 and 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6, since the implementation of these measures has 
resulted, even in a minority of cases, in the indirect criminalisation of ASB, it is 
imperative to scrutinise various reform options through this can be prevented in the future. 
As part of my analysis three possible reform options have been identified and analysed in 
depth.  
The most viable solution examined was the one which requires the formulation of 
a code of practice for local enforcement agents. This will be a universally applicable code 
of practice for local enforcement agents across England and Wales. Central to the 
proposed code of practice should be the need to prevent the indirect criminalisation of 
ASB. In order to give more content to this code of practice, I reflected on the majority of 
cases where the implementation of the ASB tools and powers did not result in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. Through the close analysis of this study’s 
findings the abovementioned factors that have contributed to the adoption of a social care 
driven approach have been identified. These three factors should form the basis of the 
proposed code of practice. The proposed code of practice will not only include policies 
that will prevent the indirect criminalisation of ASB, but it will also bring clarity and 
consistency to the implementation of the relevant tools and powers.    
Contribution to the academic literature 
This thesis provides an insight into the implementation of the new ASB tools and powers 
introduced under the 2014 Act. Despite the rich theoretical and empirical research on the 
implementation of the ASBO, this is the first empirical data collected (that I am aware 
of) on the 2014 amendments.11 As discussed in 6.2, the findings of this study have 
                                                             
11 See 5.1. 
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implications not only with regard to our theoretical understanding of ASB, but they also 
affect our broader understanding of criminalisation.  
 As to the former, the findings of this study challenge certain dominant narratives 
and misconceptions with regard to the implementation of ASB tools and powers, such as 
the expansion of the net of social control to merely offensive behaviour.12 Although this 
might have been the case in the past (or still be the case in some areas), this study revealed 
that there was a review procedure in place which ensured that the relevant statutory 
instruments were implemented in a rational manner whilst adhering to the principles of 
proportionality and necessity.  
 As to our understanding of criminalisation, the contribution of this study to the 
current academic literature is threefold. First, it raised the issue of indirect criminalisation 
by pointing out the need to look beyond the labelled attached to the civil preventive 
measures and scrutinise their implementation. Initially, this was achieved through my 
theoretical analysis of the ASB tools and powers and how these can be implemented in a 
manner that can result in the indirect criminalisation of those subjected to these 
measures. 13  The importance of this theoretical analysis was later reaffirmed by the 
findings of this study according to which the implementation of ASB tools and powers 
resulted in some cases in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. This 
finding challenges the preconception that criminalisation can only occur directly by 
formally labelling legal rules as criminal. It also highlights the need for criminal law 
theorists to formulate mechanisms through which we can identify and prevent indirect 
criminalisation (Steiker, 1998).  
 Secondly, my analysis of indirect criminalisation in conjunction with the findings 
of this study challenges conventional academic wisdom with regard to the phenomenon 
of over-criminalisation. For many decades, criminal law theorists have tried to determine 
the true extent of criminalisation by measuring the exact number of offences in this 
jurisdiction.14 Despite their endeavours, it is evident through this study that even if there 
was common consensus as to the exact number of offences, it seems unlikely for this to 
represent the true extent of criminalisation in this jurisdiction. As this study has 
                                                             
12 See ‘Conceptualising anti-social behaviour under the current law’. 
13 See 4.2.2. 
14 See 6.2.1. 
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illustrated, this can only be achieved if we include into our assessment both direct and 
indirect criminalisation.  
 Another important contribution of this study relates to the issue of under-
criminalisation. For many prominent criminal law theorists, such as Duff (2007), 
Ashworth and Zedner (2010), under-criminalisation is the phenomenon where ‘pseudo 
non-criminal’ mechanisms of social control, such as the ASBO, are used by the state as a 
means of addressing behaviour which is criminal in nature. What is problematic about 
under-criminalisation is that it undermines the normative distinction between the criminal 
law and every other form of regulation.15 As the findings of this study illustrate, however, 
under-criminalisation should not be dismissed outright. This study found that on many 
occasions non-criminal measures, such as the injunction, were used to divert perpetrators 
away from criminality rather than introducing them to the CJS. Although at first sight this 
appears to be warranted, it has been concluded that in order for under-criminalisation to 
survive close scrutiny it is necessary for legal theorists to identify and defend a set of 
conditions under which non-criminal measures can justifiably be used to address criminal 
wrong, e.g. the kind of offences for which under-criminalisation can be used. 
 Finally, the crux of this thesis’s original contribution lies with the means through 
which the indirect criminalisation of ASB can be prevented. As discussed earlier, 
although the implementation of the ASB tools and powers rarely resulted in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, it was still necessary to examine various 
reform options through which this can be prevented in the future. The close analysis of 
the various reform options that can be implemented led to the conclusion that the most 
viable option is the introduction of a code of practice for local enforcement agents. At the 
core of this universally applicable code of practice will be the need to implement the ASB 
tools and powers in a manner that does not result in the indirect criminalisation of certain 
kinds of behaviour. To this end, the proposed code of practice should include policies 
which are informed by the findings of this study, particularly the three factors identified 
above which have led to the adoption of a social care driven approach with regard to ASB 
and low-level criminality.         
                                                             
15 See ‘The pre-2014 approach to anti-social behaviour’. 
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Moving beyond this thesis: Future research 
Before concluding this research project, it is imperative to highlight some key issues 
which have not been fully addressed through this thesis and are worthy of further 
exploration in the future. First, although this study focused primarily on the injunction’s 
first limb, it is important to investigate how other ASB instruments, such as the 
Community Trigger and the Community Remedy, have been implemented at a local level. 
Both the Community Trigger and the Community Remedy have been introduced as part 
of this more general shift towards a more victim-oriented approach with regard to ASB 
(Home Office, 2013). As the title of Part 6 of the 2014 Act indicates, these legal 
instruments aim to enhance local involvement and accountability. Although this study 
found a shift towards RJ processes which are victim-focused,16 it is still necessary to 
examine how victims of ASB view their interaction with local enforcement agents and 
whether a truly victim-oriented approach has been adopted.    
 Secondly, as far as those who behave in an anti-social manner are concerned, it 
would be instructive to examine what the impact of this social care driven approach was 
on those individuals.17 As most of the interviewees argued, focusing on the underlying 
causes of ASB is sometimes the only way to address this kind of behaviour. Thus, instead 
of imposing bland prohibitions, attention should be paid to how these underlying causes 
can be best addressed. Although at first sight this appears to be justifiable, it is imperative 
to examine whether local enforcement agents’ endeavour to address these underlying 
causes has been effective or if it has perpetuated the perpetrator’s position even further. 
An equally important task is to examine this from a perpetrator’s perspective in order to 
investigate how they perceive the implementation of the injunction and whether this has 
indeed addressed the underlying causes of their behaviour 
Thirdly, for criminal law theorists there remains the question as to whether the 
legislature can label measures which are susceptible to indirect criminalisation as non-
punitive regardless of their stated objectives. As this thesis illustrated, although the 
prevention of certain undesirable outcomes appears to be a legitimate objective for the 
state to persue, it is possible for civil preventive measures to be implemented in a manner 
that results in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour. It is, therefore, 
necessary to determine whether the need for an early intervention should override the 
                                                             
16 See 5.2.3.3. 
17 See 5.2.3.2. 
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potential misuse of these measures or whether certain mechanisms should be put in place 
in order to minimise the potential for indirect criminalisation. The formulation of a code 
of conduct similar to the one proposed by this thesis is a viable option which should not 
be overlooked.  
Finally, after reflecting back on the findings of this study it was concluded that 
under-criminalisation should not be dismissed outright. As discussed above, 18  regardless 
of the theoretical challenges raised by this phenomenon, its potential benefits cannot be 
overlooked, such as diverting people away from criminality.19 If this proposition is to 
survive close scrutiny though a more detailed theory of under-criminalisation is needed 
through which we must specify the kind of offences and offenders against whom this can 
be used.  
Concluding remarks 
ASB can be construed very widely depending on people’s tolerance threshold, their 
personal circumstances, and their socio-economic background. Although it can 
sometimes be dismissed as too trivial and/or as part of everyday human interaction, it can 
severely disrupt people’s lives and lead to their repeated victimisation. What can start as 
a minor argument between two neighbours over parking, can rapidly escalate to serious 
criminality with devastating consequences for both sides. For this reason, a flexible legal 
framework is needed through which local enforcement agents will be able to address 
behaviour that really has a negative impact on people’s quality of life. 
The need to address ASB swiftly and effectively can hardly be disputed. What is 
concerning about the current legislative framework though is that the ASB tools and 
powers can be implemented, at least in theory, in a manner that results in the indirect 
criminalisation of certain kinds of behaviour, albeit their official stated objectives (i.e. to 
prevent ASB and low-level criminality). Although in most of the cases explored within 
this study the implementation of the ASB tools and powers did not result in the imposition 
of criminal punishment, it seems appropriate to conclude this thesis by reiterating the 
need to introduce mechanisms, such as the proposed code of practice discussed earlier, 
                                                             
18 See 6.2.2. 
19 It should be borne in mind that the findings of this study are representative of how the ASB tools and 
powers have been implemented in Site A and Site B. These findings should not be generalised as they might 
not be representative of how these measures have been implemented in other parts of England and Wales. 
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through which the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB can be prevented in 
the future.   
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Appendix A: Consent form for research participants 
   
Project Title: Criminalisation, civil preventive measures and the creation of localised       
criminal codes 
Project Approval Reference: ER/SD366/1 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I 
may keep for records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to 
be interviewed by the researcher. Also, I give my consent for the interview to be audio 
taped by the interviewer.  
I understand that a pseydonym will be used instead of my true identity in both the PhD 
thesis and in future publications in order to prevent my identity from being made public. 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project by 
any other party. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Name: …………………………………………………. 
Signature: ……………………………………………… 
Date: …………………………………………………… 
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Appendix B: Participant information sheet 
 
This is an invitation to participate in a research study which is part of the ‘Anti-social 
Behaviour and Civil Preventive Measures: Creating Localised Criminal Codes?’ project. 
This research study will take place in the period between 01/05/2015 – 01/12/2015. This 
research is organised and funded by myself as a student of the Law, Politics and Sociology 
department of the University of Sussex as part of my PhD thesis. This research study has 
already been approved by the Social Sciences & Arts Cross-Schools Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Sussex (Ref. number: ER/SD366/1). Before participating 
in this research, it is important for you to read carefully this information sheet in order to 
understand the nature and purpose of this research study. 
The primary objective of this research is to examine the way in which civil preventive 
orders relating to anti-social behaviour are used by local authorities. It has been argued 
by many academics and non-governmental organisations, that the use of these orders 
constitutes a form of criminalisation. This claim, however, has not been tested empirically 
yet. This study will seek to test this assumption empirically and examine whether 
localised criminal codes have been created through the use of these measures. 
As part of this research forty face-to-face interviews will be conducted. The primary 
intention of this research study is to interview twenty police officers and twenty local 
practitioners. Interviewees were chosen due to their experience and everyday interaction 
with civil preventive orders relating to anti-social behaviour.  
Your participation in this research is absolutely voluntary and it is up to you to decide 
whether or not you will participate. If you would like to participate after reading this 
information sheet you have to sign the accompanied consent form. Even if you sign the 
consent form you can still refuse to participate either before or during the study. 
If you eventually accept to participate in this research you will be asked to participate in 
an interview session which will last no longer than sixty (60) minutes. During this 
interview session you will be asked a number of questions relating anti-social behaviour 
orders and the way in which you use your powers granted to you through the relevant 
legislation.  
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I will use a voice-recording device in order to transform the interviews into transcripts 
through which I will be able to have a complete account of our discussion and prevent 
any ambiguities or misunderstandings. If, however, you object to the use of this voice-
recording device I will be just taking notes during our discussion.    
As to the potential disadvantages of participating in this research it has to be stated that 
the main disadvantage will be the time spent on the interview session. If the interview is 
not taking place within your institution transportation costs, if any, will be covered. 
Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that through your participation you will provide 
some invaluable insight on the way in which those orders are used. Also, through your 
participation you will be able to reflect on what you are doing on a daily basis and have 
the opportunity to examine anti-social behaviour from an alternative perspective. 
The results of this study will be used in my PhD thesis. Every piece of information 
collected during those interviews will be kept strictly confidential subject of course to any 
legal limitations. The true identity of the participants will be replaced by a unique 
identifier, a pseudonym, in order to avoid any potential adverse effects that this research 
might have on the participants. In addition, in my PhD thesis reference will be made only 
to participants’ pseudonyms and not to their true identities. As part of this process a list 
of pseudonyms linked to participants’ names will be created. However, this list will be 
stored securely and it will not be accessible by third parties. The list along with the 
recorded interviews will be deleted after successfully completing my PhD. Furthermore, 
it should be borne in mind that my intention is to publish my PhD thesis, either as a 
monograph or in separate chapters, in the future. Once again confidentiality will be 
preserved protecting participants’ true identity.  
If you agree to participate in this research study please sign the consent form and contact 
me in order to arrange an interview. For any further information or clarifications 
regarding this research please do not hesitate to contact me either through email 
(s.demetriou@sussex.ac.uk). If you have any concerns about the way in which this study 
has been conducted please conduct my supervisors, Dr. John Child 
(j.j.child@sussex.ac.uk) and Dr. Mark Walters (mark.walters@sussex.ac.uk).  
Finally, I would like to thank you for the time spent reading this information sheet. 
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Appendix C: Interview schedule 
 
Part A: Conceptualising anti-social behaviour 
1. Could you describe briefly the work you do on a daily basis with regard to anti-
social behaviour? 
2. How would you define anti-social behaviour? 
2.1 Is there a specific definition of anti-social behaviour that you have to 
follow or is it up to you to decide? 
2.2 Are you aware of the legal definition of anti-social behaviour? Do you 
know what this definition is? 
2.3 Can you give me some examples of behaviour which you would describe 
as anti-social? 
2.4 How do you feel about ‘the likely to cause’ part of the statutory definition? 
3. Who makes the decision to classify someone’s conduct as anti-social behaviour? 
3.1 Does the public have any role in the way in which anti-social behaviour 
is defined in your local area? 
3.2 What is the role of the politicians in this? 
4. Is there a consistent application in terms of definition? 
       5.  To what extent, if any, is anti-social behaviour a social problem in your local area? 
5.1 To what extent does it affect local residents? Are you able to give any 
examples? 
Part B: The 2014 amendments 
6.  Are you aware that there have been recent changes to legislation on anti-social 
behaviour orders?  
6.1 What is your opinion about the possibility of imposing positive 
obligations?  
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6.2 How do you feel about the fact that breach of the order will not be an 
offence anymore? 
6.3 What is your opinion on the extended definition of anti-social behaviour? 
6.4 Do the changes have any effect on the way in which you deal with anti-
social behaviour in your local area? If, so, in what ways? 
6.5 Do you think that the current law is in need of further reform? If, so, how? 
Part C: The procedure followed 
7.  Can you briefly describe the procedure you follow when applying for an 
injunction? 
7.1 Is there a minimum number of incidents of anti-social behaviour needed 
before enforcement? 
7.2 Do you use any pre-enforcement tools? If, so, what? 
7.3 Is enforcement used as a last resort measure? 
Part D: Resorting to enforcement 
8.  In your experience what are the most common types of restrictions that are 
imposed through an injunction? 
8.1 How effective would you say these restrictions are in preventing further 
anti-social behaviour? 
8.2 Are they proportionate? 
8.3 Are there any other restrictions that you think should be used to prevent 
further anti-social behaviour? If, so can you give some examples? 
8.4 How do you ensure that the terms of the injunction are not breached? 
8.5 Do you inform the public when an injunction is issued against somebody? 
9.  What would you say is the primary purpose of using the injunction? 
9.1 Is the injunction ever used for the purpose of punishing somebody for his 
or her anti-social behaviour?  
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10.  Is the injunction ever used to prevent individuals from engaging in otherwise 
innocent activities? If, so, why? 
11. What factors are used by the police/local enforcement agents to determine 
whether someone will be charged and prosecuted for an offence or whether the 
ASB will be dealt with through the injunction? 
11.1 Is the injunction ever used in order to avoid criminal prosecution? Can 
you explain why?  
 
